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**Looking Back and Looking Forward:
Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP) Evaluation
Final Report**

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List of Acronyms

ACDI/VOCA (or A/V)	Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Oversees Cooperative Assistance
ADF	America's Development Foundation
AOR	Area of Responsibility (of IPs)
BOQ	Bill of Quantity
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CAG	Community Action Group
CERP	Commander's Emergency Relief Program
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
CHRR	Commander's Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Fund
CI	Counterpart International
CICR	Columbia Institute for Conflict Resolution
CMT	Community Mobilization Team (of IPs)
COP	Chief of Party
COSIT	Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (of Iraq)
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CRDA	Community Revitalization through Democratic Action Program (of USAID/Serbia)
CRS	Catholic Relief Service
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Community Stabilization Program
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DAC	District Advisory Council
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
D&G	Democracy and Governance
DOS	Department of State (of the USG)
EBDP	Economic and Business Development Program (of IRD)
EOP	End of Project or Program
FY	Fiscal Year
GOI	Government of Iraq
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IIACSS	Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies
IBTCI	International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc.
ICAP	Iraq Community Action Program
ICSP	Iraq Civil Society Program
IP	Implementing Partner
IR	Intermediate Result
IRD	International Relief and Development
IRI	International Republican Institute
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization
IRRF	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
IT	Information Technology
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LG	Local Government
LGP	Local Governance Program
LOE	Level of Effort
LOP	Life of Project or Program
Marla	Marla Ruzicka Innocent Victims of War Fund (formerly, the Leahey Program)
MC	Mercy Corps
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEPP II	Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program, Phase II
MIS	Management Information System
MOE	Ministry of Education



MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
N/A	Not Applicable
NAC	Neighborhood Advisory Council
NCD	National Capacity Development Program
n.d.	No Data
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OJT	On-the-job Training
OSC	Overseas Strategic Consulting
OTI	Office of Transitional Initiatives
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PC	Provincial Council
PRS	Project Reporting System
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PWD	Person With Disabilities
Q	Quarter
RF	Results Framework
RFA	Request for Application
RIG	Regional Inspector General
SC	Save the Children
SCIRI	Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SME	Small or Medium Enterprise
SO	Strategic Objective
SOW	Scope of Work
TA	Technical Assistance
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USM	United States Military
WB	World Bank
Y1, Y2, Y3	Year 1, Year 2, Year 3



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Iraq Community Action Program

Funded through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP) worked in rural and urban communities throughout the nation's 18 provinces. Begun in June 2003 with a planned end in July 2006, ICAP's overarching objective was to promote grassroots democracy and better local governance via a project + process paradigm of demand-driven community development. This paradigm had been validated by prior USAID programs in other war-torn parts of the world.

However, ICAP was funded only year-to-year; and across the life of the program (LOP) it operated without a Results Framework (RF) and associated Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) keyed to the Mission's own PMP. Thus it was buffeted by multiple and changing aims and emphases under pressures from the US military, Department of State, and Congress. Yet its pre-tested paradigm proved robust enough to accommodate these vagaries effectively (see evaluation findings below).

The core of this paradigm consists, first, of mobilizing Community Action Groups (CAGs). These are comprised of volunteers elected in a town-hall-type meeting who then spearhead community-prioritized development projects, drawing upon ICAP and other funding. In Iraq, such projects spanned the following categories: schools/education, health, roads and bridges, water and sewerage, assistance to civilian victims of war, business/economic development, youth, and "other" – mostly environmental. Second, coupling this CAG project heuristic with a set of participatory-learning and democratic-action CAG processes, under the paradigm ICAP sought to:

- instill lessons and principles of democracy and provide people with opportunities to practice them, e.g., in CAG formation and meetings, and throughout the process of project prioritization, planning, fundraising, tendering, implementing, and monitoring;
- engage people with their local government agencies (LGs), e.g., by CAGs' consulting with LG on proposed projects, obtaining required LG permissions for same, soliciting LG contributions to CAG projects, and advocating with LG for other community needs or new projects independent of ICAP;
- prevent or mitigate civil unrest by bringing together people of diverse and often conflicting ethnic, religious, tribal, etc. backgrounds around projects of mutual interest and benefit, whether within CAGs or across clusters of CAGs;
- foster citizen involvement in the rehabilitation and economic revitalization of Iraq generally; and more specifically
- assist innocent victims of coalition military operations to recover from their losses, using so-called "Marla" funds earmarked by Congress.

Five prime contractors were each awarded ICAP Cooperative Agreements (CAs). Termed "implementing partners" (IPs) in Iraq, they and most of their sub-contracting organizations were US non-profits. Each operated autonomously in separate areas of responsibility (AORs), comprised of anywhere from 1 to 9 of Iraq's 18 provinces.

1. Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA or, for short, A/V) -- with Counterpart International (CI) as a sub-implementer in one province and Overseas Strategic Consulting (OSC) as another "sub" mainly for identifying and hiring international specialists to work on ICAP in Iraq



2. Cooperative Housing Foundation International (CHF)
3. International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD)
4. Mercy Corps International (MC)
5. Save the Children Federation (SC) – with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) as a sub-contractor for a time

Funding for ICAP came in fits and starts from fragmented and shifting sources. But as of the planned end-of-program (EOP) in July 2006, it totaled \$338,478,006. Only \$271,320,000 of this amount came from United States Government (USG) sources. The remainder (\$67,158,006) consisted of contributions in cash or kind raised by CAG communities (who were expected to provide between 15% and 25% of their projects' costs) plus other monies and goods leveraged by IPs, mostly from non-governmental international bodies.

For greater detail on ICAP's background and evolution, consult Chapter 1 of the present report.

The Evaluation and the Evaluation Report

The present report constitutes a formal, external, and technically "final" evaluation of ICAP. It covers the period from program start-up until its planned end in mid-July 2006. However, in late July USAID/Iraq extended ICAP through December 2006. At that time, too, the Mission drafted a plan to re-new the program in 2007 for another three years under a consortium of the first four IPs enumerated above. In consequence, this "final" evaluation became more like a midterm evaluation, with far more expected of it in terms of critical analysis and concrete re-design recommendations for ICAP II.

The evaluation was headed by a team of three senior and independent experts with longtime experience in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and/or in Iraq and the ICAP paradigm. This team was contracted under USAID/Iraq's Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program II (MEPP II), implemented by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI). Evaluation activities took place between May and July 2006, with August devoted to data analysis and report write-up. Data collection drew upon a veritable armory of methods and instruments. This was necessary for two reasons.

First, security conditions in Iraq permitted few site visits and thus little first-hand ground-truthing of existing data or collection of fresh, firsthand data by the evaluation team itself. The team was advised that doing so would normally place not only themselves but also their Iraqi interlocutors in harm's way. Even so, the team did manage several site visits and face-to-face discussions with CAG and LG members plus IP community-mobilization staff [hereafter, simply mobilizers] in more permissive parts of the Red Zone.

Second, the ICAP-wide management information system (MIS) for M&E was flawed in a number of regards. Called the Project Reporting System (PRS), it only ambiguously captured certain types of data on ICAP projects – which constitute the program's outputs. Worse, the PRS included little about ICAP processes or the CAGs that embody them -- which normally would correspond to an RF's Intermediate Results (or outcomes) and Strategic Objectives (or impacts). Thus, to address these levels of program performance, the evaluation was obliged to rely mainly on asystematic and/or qualitative data.

Chapter 2 and Annexes A through D plus F and G present greater detail on the evaluation team, scope, timeline, approach, methods, instruments, subjects, and documentation. Chapter 4 delves into the PRS and other aspects of M&E in ICAP, with extensive recommendations for improving these systems during and, in the case of the PRS even before, ICAP II.



Summary of Evaluation Findings

Despite the constraints noted above, the evaluation found that ICAP's achievements in the space of its three tumultuous years are nothing short of astonishing. Consider some of the quantitative or semi-quantitative "facts and figures" the evaluation was able to glean.

- A total of 1,457 CAGs were mobilized.
- Some 40% of these currently remain active, many of them since ICAP started.
- At least 257 clusters of CAGs also formed.
- Of all CAGs mobilized, 31% went on to do more than a single ICAP project.
- Nearly 17,000 Iraqis (24% of them female) served on CAGs.
- Many thousands more of their fellow community members worked with them to implement and learn from CAG projects and processes.
- Communities contributed nearly \$26.5 million worth of support to their CAG projects.
- CAGs raised another \$27+ million of support from their LGs.
- Across the LOP, the incidence of LG contributions to publicly oriented CAG projects increased.
- IPs leveraged an additional \$13.6 million in non-USG support for CAGs.
- IPs have nationalized the vast majority of their in-country management positions.
- In total, ICAP was responsible for completing 4,854 projects. This equals greater than 30% of all projects in USAID/Iraq's portfolio, second only to USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives.
- Beneficiaries spanned virtually all religions and ethnicities, with many projects specifically targeted to groups like youth, civilian war victims, the disabled, and of course women – all regardless of religious, ethnic, or other affiliation.
- Among other achievements, literally hundreds of schools were built, rehabilitated, and/or furnished and equipped under ICAP, including vocational schools and at least one college.
- The program also generated over 81,000 short-term and nearly 31,000 long-term jobs, with 43% of the latter going to women.
- In addition to the foregoing figure, approximately 1,000 jobs were created for Iraqi nationals as IP staff.
- Along with IP staff, untold thousands of CAG, community, and LG members received training in numerous community-mobilization, conflict-resolution, and democracy-related topics.
- An unanticipated (and thus undocumented) positive effect of ICAP is that perhaps as many as 100 CAG members (including a few women) reportedly went on to stand for, and often win, elective LG office.
- Another "democracy dividend" was that some (again undocumented number) of CAGs formally re-structured themselves as non-governmental or civil-society organizations (NGOs, CSOs).

Of course, facts and figures alone do not convey the full flavor of ICAP activities and achievements. Hence the many "success stories," mini-case-studies, interviewee statements, or citations from IP documents scattered throughout the evaluation report. A selection of illustrative findings from these sources follows. While not all are representative of all CAGs or AORs, and while quantitative data are lacking, these findings are suggestive of what the ICAP paradigm could potentially achieve on a much wider scale if given stable funding, coherent objectives, and more time.

- Many CAGs now have a solid track record in: participatory analysis of priority local needs; identification of practical responses to them; campaigning and fundraising for such; and interacting accordingly with LG agencies.
- A number of CAGs have mounted successful projects on their own, without ICAP funding.
- On balance, CAGs did a creditable job of incorporating women and girls into both projects and processes.
- In all AORs, the ICAP paradigm and the CAG concept have become so widely known that citizen groups now approach IPs to become CAGs, instead of the other way around as in Year 1 (Y1) of ICAP. By Y3, many more groups were approaching IPs than could possibly be accommodated.
- Moreover, in some instances, applicants to the program pre-organized themselves along CAG-style lines they learned of even before approaching an IP.
- In some areas, CAGs' democratic ways of working -- e.g., with public input, oversight, transparency, plus capacity building in these and cognate skills -- have become so well-appreciated by LGs that they are also instituting them.

In fact, an audit by the Regional Inspector General's Office published in January 2005 (p. 5) found that ICAP "...achieved 98 percent of its intended outputs in the areas of citizen participation, inter-community cooperation, local government cooperation, employment generation, and...environment..." Based on all available data as of end July 2006, the present evaluation essentially re-confirms this RIG assessment.

ICAP achievements are all the more noteworthy when one considers the on-again/off-again funding, fluctuating political pressures, and deteriorating security conditions under which both international and national staff labored -- sometimes even under personal threats of death. Yet the defining feature of ICAP is that it is the predominate USAID program that works directly with and through the Iraqi public on-the-ground, in their own neighborhoods and communities.

Probably more than any other USG initiative, ICAP has thereby contributed to winning the hearts and minds of Iraqi citizens away from warring factions and their overlords' blandishments to new and more democratic alternatives. A senior CAG leader spoke for many other CAGs when he told one evaluator: "...now, having worked with... [ICAP]...we have another way to think and act: identifying our problems, prioritizing, and then solving them ourselves [with our local government agencies]. This gave us something [else] to live for."

Summary of Evaluation Recommendations

Naturally, even the best of programs can always be improved. To that end, the evaluation report discusses myriad lessons learned from ICAP I; italicizes best practices on the part of one or another IP in various arenas of program management and staffing, project and process implementation, and M&E of all the foregoing; and clearly bullets concrete recommendations in all these regards for ICAP II.

However, given the limited space in an executive summary for a program of such breadth and importance as ICAP, only a synthesis of evaluation recommendations is offered here. It is organized by the most broadly substantive chapters (3, 5, 6). Already mentioned above, Chapter 4 deals with rather technical PRS and M&E matters that need to be remedied.

ICAP Management and Staffing. This is the subject of Chapter 3. For USAID/Iraq management, recommendations center on respectively consolidating, streamlining, and improving program archives, reporting requirements, and the PRS. Also noted are the needs for USAID to require an RF and PMP from the proposed ICAP II consortium, and to write or commission a fact sheet explaining ICAP vis-à-vis related Mission programs.

USAID staffing recommendations involve: stabilizing ICAP management staff insofar as possible; planning for better hand-over in the case of staff changes; possibly adding staff; certainly, off-loading some Mission responsibilities (notably, the PRS) onto the proposed ICAP II consortium; and codifying the relative roles of Baghdad-based ICAP managers versus USAID field representatives to evolving Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Equally important, and as also noted in the RIG report, all ICAP-related USAID staff should increase their site visits and other contacts with program participants.

With regard to IP HQs, important management tasks are to continue what clearly have been excellent HQ \leftrightarrow field relations across the LOP, and to start planning now for the proposed ICAP II consortium, including formalizing and intensifying HQ \leftrightarrow HQ relations. With regard to international staffing, IPs should continue their innovative recruitment practices, but also address any inequities arising therefrom and plan better for backstopping of prolonged vacancies in field positions.

IP field offices need to do more frequent scenario planning; review, share, and insofar as possible, standardize best management practices in preparation for ICAP II; and plan for regular IP-wide workshops in future – which USAID staff should make sure to attend, by the way. In terms of staffing, IPs should: continue their already strong trend towards nationalization; add more national staff if and when new components are tacked onto the program (as with the Marla initiative); continue their security-conscious and compassionate policies for national staff; and institute a scheme of service for national staff – ideally standardizing the last two elements insofar as possible under ICAP II. Finally, all IPs need to intensify capacity building, especially for national staff. To this end, under ICAP II's consortium, IPs should share their best training materials and methods.

ICAP Outputs – CAG Projects. Chapter 5 exemplifies several basic types of data analyses that -- with an RF/PMP and the PRS revisions and expansions recommended here and, indeed, in most chapters -- should become a normal part of ICAP II M&E. These analyses are what generated most of the quantitative data in the evaluation. They led to concrete recommendations like the following for ICAP II projects: pay more attention to gender in projects aimed at youth and short-term job creation; consider implementing a project “ownership” index; institute cross-training and experience exchanges for and by mobilizers on the staff of different IPs according to their relative success in one or another type of project or process.

Two more fundamental observations emerged from these analyses. One was that the most cost-effective way to promote long-term job creation is through business/economic development grants to individuals, as versus to cooperatives or community/employee-owned enterprises. All such individual grants are vetted by CAGs; and IRD has implemented a best practice whereby some form of social pay-back or pass-on attaches to them. Still, such individual-level “projects” risk diverting CAGs from their primary focus on democratic community action and advocacy. Thus, ICAP II designers should give some thought to the optimum balance between these very different thrusts. The other observation was that project performance in A/V's AOR argues for a review of logistic and security conditions there to determine whether return to a stabilization as versus a development mode of operation is more realistic.

ICAP Outcomes and Impacts – CAG Mobilization and Democracy Dividends. In Chapter 6, a major recommendation is to study MC's best practice of “graduating” CAGs from ICAP assistance. In that way, the program can more rapidly be scaled-out to new beneficiaries. Lessons learned in this regard could also be useful in planning an exit strategy for ICAP II.

Another important recommendation is to analyze the relative merits of two rather different approaches taken to CAG mobilization during ICAP: one is the more established model of

forming truly community-based groups *de novo*; the other builds around special interests that may cross-cut communities (e.g., the plight of the disabled) or on pre-existing institutions (e.g., hospitals, arts centers, sports clubs). Conceivably, this distinction may define the difference between a CAG versus an NGO or CSO.

CAG capacity building is a featured topic in Chapter 6. Recommendations in this regard are many and varied. First, of course, is that data on all ICAP-supported training should be tracked in the PRS. Other recommendations are to: greatly expand popular workshops in “advanced” CAG subjects (notably, conflict resolution, leadership, and communications); as appropriate, offer certification of training; look for synergies and efficiencies across ICAP IPs and related USAID/Iraq programs in training materials, methods, and delivery; as security permits, include CAG exchange visits as another mode of capacity-building within and across AORs. Finally, harking back to Chapter 3, apply all the same recommendations to development and training of IP national staff.

Another major topic of Chapter 6 is CAG-LG interactions. A key recommendation here is, when IPs discover particularly weak local government agencies, they should refer them to related programs for LG capacity building. These include Iraq’s National Capacity Development Program, USAID’s Iraq Civil Society Program (ICSP), and USAID’s Local Governance Program (LGP).

Finally, a qualitative analysis was done of the factors in pro and con of the enabling environment for CAG-LG interactions and sustainability of CAGs or at least their democracy learnings and dividends. While this analysis suggests that such sustainability is still a ways off in a nation that was for decades subject to a less-than-benign dictatorship, it also suggests that – given enhanced coordination with other key USAID and USG programs – the factors are on balance favorable. Thus it is a wise decision on USAID/Iraq’s part to move forward with an ICAP II, to consolidate its investments in ICAP I.

Some suggestions for enhancing sustainability of ICAP II achievements are as follows. IPs must more actively seek out win-win opportunities for CAGs to collaborate directly or indirectly with other programs like those listed just above. Following another MC best practice, IPs should also do more to link CAGs with existing Iraqi NGOs and CSOs. For their part, CAGs should use their relatively high rates of community involvement and contributions to advocate more aggressively for support from their LGs. And in tandem with USAID/Iraq and LGP, ICAP II should strategize how CAGs can best access PRT funds and build long-term links to Provincial Councils in particular.

To conclude, all the foregoing recommendations are spelled out in more concrete and operational detail in the pages of this evaluation report. Again, throughout the report, considerable technical input is also given for re-designing ICAP’s Project Reporting System to become a true Program Reporting System, and for other ways of strengthening M&E. It is the authors’ and MEPP II’s sincere hope that – by “looking back and looking forward” -- the evaluation findings will help make for an even more successful ICAP II.



CHAPTER 1: THE IRAQ COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM (ICAP)

1.1 BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF ICAP

Background

The ICAP Paradigm. From June 2003 through July 2006 (and now extended through December 2006), the Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP) worked in rural and urban communities in all of Iraq's 18 governorates (hereafter, provinces), funded by the United States (US) Agency for International Development (USAID). ICAP's overarching goal was to promote democracy and good governance (D&G) -- including transparency, inclusiveness, and citizen advocacy with government -- and thereby help prevent and mitigate conflict.

To these ends, ICAP was mandated to mobilize Community Action Groups (CAGs) of community-elected citizen volunteers around local projects of priority need in a community, employing a participatory learning and action process that also involved local government agencies (LG). Again, the aim was to instill democratic principles in, and provide opportunities for Iraqi citizens to practice them in the course of their prioritizing, designing, and realizing community projects.

This project + process paradigm had earlier been elaborated and tested by USAID programs in other war-torn areas like the Caucasus, Gaza, Lebanon, and most notably Serbia – where all “prime” ICAP implementers had also previously worked (see, e.g., the final evaluation of the Serbia program by Czajkowska *et al.* 2005). These two, intimately intertwined project + process components are described and analyzed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 of the present report; and they are illustrated in selected “success stories” below. However, as expressed in the Request for Applications (RFA) to ICAP (USAID/Iraq 2003:12), in Iraq this paradigm was designed to:

...complement other USAID initiatives by implementing demand-side projects that promote civil participation, revitalize essential infrastructure, create employment and income generation opportunities, and address critical environmental problems ...[by] ... mobilizing community and other resources, and monitoring project implementation... ...broader cluster committees will be formed with representatives from various community committees to increase participation and cooperation on issues of regional concern, and to promote ethnic, religious, and tribal cooperation, and...strengthen capacity of local communities to better identify and manage underlying tensions and strain, that left unaddressed, could fuel violence among Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious groups.

IPs and Funding. In Summer 2003, USAID awarded ICAP Cooperative Agreements (CAs) to 5 prime implementing partners (IPs), all of them US private voluntary organizations that worked internationally. Some IPs also had significant sub-contractors.

1. Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA or, for short, A/V), with Counterpart International (CI) as a sub-implementer in one province and Overseas Strategic Consulting (OSC) as another “sub” mainly for identifying and hiring international specialists to work on ICAP in Iraq
2. Cooperative Housing Foundation International (CHF)
3. International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD)
4. Mercy Corps International (MC)
5. Save the Children Federation (SC) as lead agency, with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Caritas Iraq (CCI) as implementing partners

Initially, ICAP was funded for one year (Y1) with the possibility of two further years. After much start-and-stop funding from shifting US government and military (USG, USM) sources (see Chapters 3 and 4), Y2 and Y3 were also implemented. Across the 3-year life of the program (LOP), USAID awarded a total of \$271,320,000 to ICAP partners, as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Summary of ICAP Funding, by Source*

IPs	USAID (obligated)	Local Contributions**	Other/Leveraged Contributions	Totals
A/V	\$50,190,000	\$9,974,922	\$440,364	\$60,605,286
CHF	\$55,412,000	\$13,640,999	\$136,707	\$69,189,706
IRD	\$65,190,000	\$8,540,147	\$9,125,925	\$82,856,072
MC	\$56,528,000	\$5,023,594	\$1,822,700	\$63,374,294
SC	\$44,000,000***	\$16,392,273	\$2,060,375	\$62,452,648
Totals	\$271,320,000	\$53,571,935	\$13,586,071	\$338,478,006

*This and all other monetary amounts in the present report are in US dollars (USD).

**Includes community, contractor, and LG contributions but no actual out-of-pocket monies from IPs. See Chapter 5 for definitions.

*** Includes de-obligated \$9,620,000 when SC withdrew from ICAP.

Table 1.1 also shows the total USD value of in-kind and cash contributions from local sources. These reflect CA requirements that, as a sign of commitment and good faith, communities and/or their LGs furnish between 15% and 25% of the costs of any CAG project. For their part, IPs leveraged “extra” cash and in-kind support from other sources, adding another \$13.5+ million to ICAP. Examples of in-kind “extras” include donations of clothing, medicines, school supplies, and in MC’s case, sports equipment from the Nike company, for use in its many youth projects.

IPs’ Geographic Areas of Responsibility. Each IP operated autonomously in a designated number of provinces. Together, these were termed their “areas of responsibility” or AORs. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, A/V and its CI “sub” were responsible for the largest number of provinces. In contrast, IRD was responsible for only one, Baghdad. Though small in geographic terms, Baghdad Province is particularly demographically diverse and thus conflicted; also, besides urban sites, it embraces cropping and stock raising lands up to 50 km away from the city itself. Finally, CHF, MC, and SC each covered 3 of the remaining provinces.




Figure 1.1 IP AORs, by Province

Table 1.2 reiterates IP AORs by province, but now indicating the current geographic location of IPs' primary and secondary offices (except SC which has since withdrawn from ICAP). IRD maintained a single headquarters (HQ) in Baghdad. MC and SC opted to open offices in each province, with one of these also serving as an HQ. CHF has its main in-country office in Hilla, but its central office is in Amman, Jordan. A/V had offices in Erbil, Kirkuk, Ba'qubah, Samara and Tikrit. CI, A/V's subcontractor for Al Anbar Province, initially set up offices in Baghdad, Falluja and Ramadi, but later moved to Erbil with A/V. With the closure of SC in the South and subsequent agreements by CHF and MC to take over SC's AOR, CHF will open offices in Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar, and MC in Basra. MC is also in the process of moving its field HQ out of Iraq, to Kuwait.

Table 1.2 IP AORs and Current Field Offices, by Location

IP	AOR Provinces	Primary and Secondary Field Offices
A/V	Al Tamim, Arbil, Dahuk, Diyala, Ninawa, Salah ad Din, Sulaymaniyah	1 ^o : Kirkuk, Arbil 2 ^o : Ba'qubah, Samara, Tikrit
CI (sub)	Al Anbar	1 ^o : Baghdad 2 ^o : Fallujah
CHF	Babil, Karbala, Najaf	1 ^o : Amman (Jordan) 2 ^o : Hilla
IRD	Baghdad	1 ^o : Baghdad
MC	Al Qadisiyah, Maysan, Wassit	1 ^o : Sulaymaniyah 2 ^o : Amara, Diwaniya, Khanaqin, Kut
SC*	Al Muthanna, Basra, Dhi Qar	1 ^o : Kuwait City (Kuwait) 2 ^o : Basra, Nasiriya, Samawah

* SC concluded operations in Iraq by May 2006

Evolution

50-50-90 Start-Up. The ICAP RFA called for a quick start in which IPs would complete 50 projects with 50 CAGs within the first 90 days of the program. (A similar requirement was imposed in Serbia.) During the first 3 months of ICAP, IPs thus rushed to: recruit and hire (if not initially train) both international and national staff; establish offices; and quickly mobilize communities to form CAGs (if not always in an egalitarian fashion) and complete projects rapidly. One way or another, a majority of IPs succeeded in meeting these rather unrealistic 50-50-90 requirements, at least on paper.

However, reportedly at least 2 IPs (SC and MC) consciously opted to adhere to longer-term tenets of participatory D&G processes instead of simply pumping out projects during this phase (see Chapters 5 and 6.) The same IPs took umbrage with a CA clause concerning IP relations with the media. Negotiation of this delicate subject caused a 2-month delay in their start-up. Regardless, interviews with HQ and field managers of all IPs indicated that this quick-start strategy made for serious programmatic mistakes vis-à-vis longer-term D&G objectives, merely in order to satisfy USG and USM donors' short-term political ends and "burn rates." Fortunately, however, all IPs appear to have followed the 50-50-90 scramble with a phase of CAG consolidation and capacity-building (see Chapter 6).

CA Modifications. Between 8 and 10 CA modifications and corresponding funding sub-sources and amounts were issued to each IP across Y2 and Y3 (Table 1.3). Modification 02 introduced a new Congressional earmark into ICAP (see below). Modifications 03 and 06 shifted funding to SC that had originally been allocated to Bechtel Corporation for construction or rehabilitation of 107 primary and secondary schools in Basra Province. Finally, IRD received incremental increases in funding in its modifications 05 and 07 for undetermined reasons.

Table 1.3 Y1-Y3 Funding Modifications

Agreement or Modification	A/V		CHF		IRD		MC		SC	
	Amount	Date	Amount	Date	Amount	Date	Amount	Date	Amount	Date
Initial Agreements	\$7,000,000	3-Jun-03	\$7,000,000	16-May-03	\$7,000,000	16-May-03	\$7,000,000	15-Jul-03	\$7,000,000	15-Jul-03
Modification 1	\$7,000,000	27-Sep-03	\$7,000,000	27-Sep-03	\$7,000,000	27-Sep-03	\$7,000,000	8-Jul-03	\$7,000,000	27-Sep-03
Modification 2	\$8,900,000	25-Mar-04	\$8,900,000	25-Mar-04	\$8,900,000	25-Mar-03	\$8,900,000	25-Mar-04	\$8,900,000	25-Mar-04
Modification 3	\$7,100,000	30-Sep-04	\$7,100,000	30-Sep-04	\$7,100,000	30-Sep-04	\$7,100,000	30-Sep-04	\$5,580,000	16-Apr-04
Modification 4	\$2,050,000	28-Dec-04	\$2,100,000	28-Dec-04	\$2,000,000	29-Dec-04	\$2,050,000	28-Dec-04	\$7,100,000	30-Sep-04
Modification 5	no cost	12-May-05	no cost	12-May-05	\$2,000,000	17-Feb-05	no cost	12-May-05	\$2,050,000	29-Dec-04
Modification 6	\$15,000,000	17-May-05	\$15,000,000	17-May-05	no cost	12-May-05	\$15,000,000	17-May-05	\$990,000	16-Feb-05
Modification 7	program change*	12-Jul-05	program change*	13-Jul-05	\$30,000,000	17-May-05	program change*	15-Jul-05	no cost	12-May-05
Modification 8	\$3,140,000	10-Jul-06	\$1,900,000	11-May-06	program change*	12-Jul-05	\$1,900,000	11-May-06	\$15,000,000	17-May-05
Modification 9	none	none	\$6,412,000	10-Jul-06	no cost	11-May-06	\$7,578,000	11-Jul-06	program change*	12-Jul-05
Modification 10	none	none	none	none	\$1,190,000	10-Jul-06	none	none	-\$9,620,000	1-Mar-06
Total:	\$50,190,000		\$55,412,000		\$65,190,000		\$56,528,000		\$44,000,000	

Note:

* Refers to changes in cost share, key personnel, spending provisions, new technical proposals, reporting and M&E

ICAP Total : \$271,320,000

Shaded areas represent IP specific funds related to strategic program objectives or activities

Naturally, such funding shifts also led to programmatic shifts in ICAP. These are broadly summarized in Table 1.4, drawing upon the CA modification documents.

Table 1.4 Shifts in ICAP Programmatic Foci

Y1	Y2	Y3
<p>Major program components:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Promote citizen involvement Conflict mitigation Promote diverse and representative citizen participation Benefit 5 million Iraqis Ensure that citizens' basic needs are met Participate in decision making related to policies Target at-risk groups <p>Four focus areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Community mobilization and cooperation Social and economic infrastructure development Employment and income generation Environmental protection and management 	<p>Areas for increased emphasis:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity building of community mobilizers and other local staff. Greater focus on the ICAP process and working more closely with the CAGs Strengthening of CAGs Income and employment generation Women and youth participation Conflict mitigation Civil society development Increased LG linkages <p>*Addition of Marla funding and programming (see below)</p>	<p>Five focus areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Direct citizen participation in the rehabilitation of Iraq and involvement in the political process Increased focus on income and employment generation Conflict mitigation and prevention Increased capacity of CAGs in advocacy and engagement of sub national government. Participation of women, youth and other under-represented groups

The major shift in Y2 was the addition of programming and monies from the Civilian Victims of War Fund. In 2003, Congress enacted this fund under Public Law 108-11, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act. In Iraq, however, it is better known as simply “the Marla fund,” after Ms. Marla Ruzicka, a dedicated aid worker who lost her life in Iraq after founding the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict in 2003. The fund contains a provision sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy, authorizing the use of Iraq relief and reconstruction monies to aid Iraqi civilians who suffered losses from coalition military operations. As noted in Table 1.3 this earmark was added to ICAP in March 2004.

At first, MC and especially SC were wary of administering Marla “reparations,” seeing them as more appropriate to the USM and as a potential source of added strife and envy within communities. But their fears proved unfounded. As noted in SC’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2004 (p. 28):

The [Marla] program uses...community action groups (CAGs) to identify and determine the most appropriate means to best meet victims’ needs in their communities. The CAGs are particularly well suited to assess needs and determine solutions as they are comprised of representative members from across the community. The CAGs best understand how to meet victims’ needs, and whether projects to meet these needs should be at the individual level, the family level, and/or to provide assistance to victims as members of a broader community.

Along with CHF, MC and SC favored Marla grants to groups with a goodly proportion of war victims among their membership. In contrast, A/V and IRD permitted more individual and family awards. But in all cases, grants were vetted and distributed by CAGs. As it turned out, this

strategy served to strengthen CAGs. Consider the following extract from IRD's Semi-Annual Report of December 2004 (p. 35).

Individual assistance to war victims has had an enormous positive impact in the ICAP communities. War damaged victims who have lost all hope for compensation suddenly found a reliable source of genuine compensation through the CAGs. The effects on the CAG trustworthiness and ability to deliver in cooperation with IRD, has spread the word throughout the communities and hundreds of cases were submitted. The speedy delivery of assistance especially related to rehabilitation of damaged properties clearly reverberated throughout the communities and greatly empowered the CAG members.

Another major shift in ICAP programming was increased emphasis on business and economic development, beginning in Y2 and intensifying in Y3. "Projects" in this arena primarily supported individual micro-enterprises as well as small and medium ones. But again, all applications were vetted by CAGs. Interestingly, IRD accounted for 75% of all IPs' business initiatives, and it included a unique "pass on" component (see Chapter 5).

Other Changes. Most of these had to do with deteriorating security conditions—especially after the April 2004 Sadr uprising in the South, which catalyzed extensive social unrest throughout Iraq. Indeed, IPs experienced many and often serious security-related incidents throughout ICAP. These spanned, e.g. death threats to ICAP personnel of all ilk; murders of national staff and/or their family members (some job-related, some not); raids on IP offices, not only by terrorists or insurgents but also by coalition forces; frequent discovery or detonation of improvised explosive devices (as when one evaluator went to meet with Baghdad CAGs); shelling by mortars or rockets; and so forth.

For a general appreciation of the differing security and other environments in which IPs worked, Table 1.5 is informative. (The table is keyed to the provincial numberings in Figure 1.1's map.)

Table 1.5. Present ICAP Operational Environment, by Province

Province	Security Conditions	Major Religion and Ethnicity	Population*
1. Dahuk	Permissive**	Sunni Kurd	472,238
2. Arbil	Permissive	Sunni Kurd	1,392,093
3. Al Tamim	Variable	Sunni Arab	854,470
4. Sulaymaniyah	Permissive	Sunni Kurd	1,715,585
5. Diyala	Variable	Shia Arab	1,418,455
6. Baghdad	Variable	Shia Arab	6,554,126
7. Salah ad Din	Variable	Sunni Arab	1,119,369
8. Ninawa	Variable	Sunni Arab	2,554,270
9. Al-Anbar	Non-permissive	Sunni Arab	1,328,776
10. Babil	Variable	Shia Arab	1,493,718
11. Karbala	Variable	Shia Arab	787,072
12. Al Qadisiyah	Variable	Shia Arab	911,641
13. Wassit	Permissive	Shia Arab	971,280
14. Maysan	Variable	Shia Arab	762,872
15. Dhi Qar	Permissive	Shia Arab	1,472,405
16. Basra	Variable	Shia Arab	1,797,821
17. Najaf	Variable	Shia Arab	978,400
18. Muthanna	Permissive	Shia Arab	554,994

* As gauged by the evaluation team at the time of the evaluation.

** As estimated for mid-2004 (COSIT 2005).

As Table 1.5 shows, along with demographics, security conditions in Iraq are varied and variable, particularly among the Kurdish North, the Sunni Triangle, and the Shia-dominated South. But no matter where, problems like those described above have greatly constrained both international and national staff's ability to travel safely within their AOR, or even to go to their offices. Security issues have also led to frequent staff evacuations and temporary or permanent closures or relocations of IP offices to more secure locations inside or outside Iraq.

For security reasons, SC had always maintained its field headquarters (HQ) in Kuwait City. As conditions deteriorated, CHF also moved its field HQ abroad, to neighboring Jordan. Currently, MC is in the process of doing likewise in Kuwait City, although this move also responds in part to MC's taking over Basra Province from SC. Together, these shifts reflect a trend toward increasingly "remote" management of ICAP (see Chapter 3).

However, by far the most serious consequence of all this for ICAP was SC's Y3 decision to withdraw from the program. In interviews with the evaluation team, top managers at SC's Washington DC HQ explained this decision as a mix of security and mission concerns: "We pulled out because the balance had tipped in terms of increasingly unsafe conditions and what we could do for children as versus communities under those conditions and the program." With SC's formal close-out as of May 2006, the provinces it had worked in were eventually re-assigned to CHF (Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar) and MC (Basra) as noted above.

USAID was notified early in the new year of SC's decision to withdraw; but the Mission did not act on the situation expeditiously. Early on, IRD offered to cover SC's AOR, conditional on an organized and timely turnover of assets and records, which SC stood ready to provide. But the Mission never responded to IRD's offer, and so it was withdrawn. In the end, SC had to simply close its offices and dispose of all its assets instead of transferring them to another IP, as SC had hoped. Reprogrammed SC de-obligated funds were not disbursed until July 2006. The evaluation was not able to measure the extent of loss occasioned by all this, but it is doubtless significant in terms of valuable staff, CAG motivation, and program credibility with LG.

To give a better flavor of ICAP's evolution, Table 1.6 catalogues significant events across the LOP, as noted by the evaluation team and IPs themselves. Noteworthy is the importance IPs attached to security events as milestones. IPs also identified office re-locations as milestones; these, too, were mainly driven by security events. Like many programs in Iraq, ICAP operations hinge on security.

Table 1.6. Notable ICAP Operational Milestones

Month (s)	Year	Notable Operational Milestones
May - Jun	03	Cooperative Agreements signed: \$7 m obligated to each IP
Jun - Aug	03	Program start-up /establish office / train staff / initial identification & formation of CAGs
Aug	03	Al-Anbar Province declared unpermissive
Sep - Dec	03	Start-up projects under 50-50-90 approach / training in mobilization & project management begins
Sep	03	Mod 1: \$7 m obligated to each IP
Oct	03	CHF receives bomb threat upon Hilla office
Nov	03	CAP strategic management meeting held in Amman
Feb	04	Assassination of 2 IRD CAG members in Baghdad
Mar	04	Mod 2: \$8.9 m obligated to each IP; Civilian Victims of War Program (Marla Fund) introduced
Apr	04	Sadr army uprising in South disrupts CAP programming
Apr	04	Civilian Victims of War Program (Marla Fund) launched
Apr	04	IRD staff evacuates to Amman for 19 days / MC staff evacuates to Diyala
May	04	CHF staff evacuate to Amman
May	04	Sub-Contractor Catholic Relief Services withdraws from Iraq / SC assumes CRS area
May	04	4 IRD staff detained & shackled to floor for 36 hours
May	04	MC launches Persons With Disabilities (PWD) Program
Aug	04	Ayatollah Sistani returns to Najaf which assists implementation in CHF, MC, and SC AORs
Jul	04	SC prohibits expat staff from coalition countries to enter Iraq
Sep	04	Tribal fighting in Basra disrupts SC program areas
Sep	04	CARE Director Margaret Hassan killed- A/V evacuate to Amman, all Partners indirectly impacted
Oct	04	USAID - CAP retreat held in Amman
Dec	04	A/V re-locate offices to Erbil
Jan	05	National elections- some IP staff evacuate to Amman
Feb	05	CHF procurement officer killed in car bomb
Feb	05	Explosion 1 km from CHF offices kills 128 people
Mar	05	CHF moves offices due to security
Jul	05	A/V moves to former RTI compound in Kirkuk (Arafa)
Sep	05	SC completes rehabilitation of 103 PCO (Bechtel) schools
Sep	05	A/V launches Apprentice Program
Oct	05	SC has dispute with Local Council about handover of 2 projects
Oct	05	IRD CAG Chair abducted from CAG meeting
Dec	05	SC informs USAID of decision to terminate grant & exit Iraq due to security concerns
Jan	06	Assassination of IRD CAG member
Feb	06	SC disposes of all assets and closes all sub-offices in Iraq
Feb	06	SC hands over 2 disputed projects to Provincial Council
Mar	06	SC close out procedures conducted in Kuwait
Mar	06	MC takes over Basra Governorate from SC
Apr	06	Murder of IRD national staff member
Apr	06	SC closure of Kuwait office / ICAP ends for SC
May	06	Murder of IRD national staff member
Jun	06	MC moves ICAP main offices to Kuwait
Jul	06	A/V local staff killed travelling between offices
Jul	06	ICAP extensions to end of year

1.2. ICAP PROJECTS AND PROCESSES

Projects

As noted above, ICAP exposes Iraqis to the practice of democratic decision-making coupled with citizen action and advocacy -- all as part of the processes of identifying and implementing community-based projects. More than 16,000 Iraqis nationwide have been involved with ICAP projects and processes in this way. Furthermore, ICAP has been responsible for greater than 30% of all projects in USAID/Iraq's list of projects nationwide. Only USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has implemented more USAID projects in Iraq than ICAP. And OTI's projects tended to be more expensive, in part because they did not require community contributions.

Table 1.7 (next page) illustrates the kinds of CAG projects completed or underway as of the end of May 2006.¹ Projects are listed next to the project-type category shown in the left hand column. The table's illustrative projects were randomly selected from a list that had been sorted by IP, project type, and grant amount (in that order). To ensure a fair portrayal, for each IP a random start was followed by a fixed interval calculated to select 3 projects within each type category. As a result of these selection methods, the projects are ordered by grant amount, from high through mid to low.

A rapid analysis of Table 1.7's data reveals that School/Education projects were similar across IPs. They included new construction plus repair of water, electricity, school sanitation facilities, and school fencing. Health projects ranged from big-ticket items like construction of a hospital operating room down to donations of wheelchairs to persons with disabilities (PWD). Typical water and sewerage projects included laying pipes and upgrading sewage lift stations. Marla projects were interpreted differently by different IPs.

Business/Economic Development projects tended toward infrastructure like neighborhood electrification or marketplace construction. But IRD's Economic and Business Development Program (EBDP) also provided private-sector grants to medium, small, and micro/individual enterprises, with the latter constituting 2/3 of all such grants. A few examples from Table 1.7 plus a focus group of IRD CAG members are: for home-based or other micro- enterprises, equipment and accessories for home-made food or craft (e.g., sewing) products, carpentry, and smithing; for small and medium enterprises, equipment and/or goods for, e.g., community grocery stores, sewing or rug-weaving mini-factories, fishing crews, print shops, dental labs, and breed stock for farmers or livestock co-ops and enterprises. Also included in this category was assistance to vocational schools. Further note that, in many instances, such projects consisted of grants to Marla victims whose livelihoods had been destroyed by coalition forces.

¹ All the project data comes from the USAID comprehensive CAP project lists. A limited number of additional projects were added to the list during June and July. Chapter 4 discusses the source and quality of these data.

Table 1.7 The kinds of CAG projects Completed or Underway by May 2006

Project Type	ACDI/VOCA	CHF	IRD	Mercy Corps	Save the Children
Schools/Education:	16% Construct Al-Mustafa primary school for girls in Banat-al-Hassan village in Samarra district to improve girls' education New School Year: Supplying Six Boys Secondary Schools with winter clothing and stationary Supplying furniture for Abdul kadir Al Jaza'ary co-educational primary school to improve educational standards for the p	27% Hassan Bin Thabit Elementary Mixed School Rehabilitation, Classrooms Extension and Construction of a New Road Leading to school Abed-Alah Bin Abas Vocational School Rehabilitation Dimashq Elementary Mixed School Maintenance of Water Pipes, Electricity Network, Fence Construction, and Filling Swamp	14% School Al-Ghazliya Secondary for Girls Reconstruction and Supply Office Equipment School Al Taliea Primary for Girls Rehabilitating Electrical System, Supply Water Tanks, and Repair Damaged Structure of The Building School Ram Allah Secondary for Girls Establish New Computer Laboratory	45% Construction of Jaber Al-Ansari Primary School with 12 Classrooms for coed Construction of 6 classrooms for expanding the facilities for Al-Ghadir for boys and Al-Rahma for girls primary schools Construction of Fence in the Technical Inst	38% Rehabilitation Technical Preparatory School Rehabilitation of Khadmia primary school Establishing Computer Training Centre
Health:	9% Supplying medical equipment and furniture for the health center to improve health conditions for Balad Ros people Supplying the Iraqi handicapped center in Dawr District with equipment and computers to improve the fitness and health s Supplying electrical equipment to Al-alam health center in order to improve functioning of medical equipment using elect	9% Al-Hashimiyah Hospital Operating Room Construction Rehabilitation and Provision Medical Equipment to Al-Khairat Primary Health Clinic Karbala Central Medical Laboratory Provision of Laboratory Medical Equipment	4% Al-Karama Hospital Supply Medical Equipment and Install Electricity Cables Ibn Al Bettar Hospital Rehabilitation & Supply Office Equipment & Furniture Supply Wheel Chairs for the Disabled in Al-Sheikh Marouf	5% Construction of Primary Health Center Expansion of Al-Aziziya hospital Distribution of 123 Wheelchairs to PWDs in Amarah	8% Rehabilitation of the infectious diseases ward in the general hospital Furniture and equipment for Om El-Baneen health center Education posters about child immunisation
Roads & Bridges:	8% Construct retaining wall in Chwarta/Sulaymaniyah to enhance road safety on the Chwarta main road Drinking Water Network & Road Pavement for Sjaria Village Covering the roof of the public bus and taxi station in Taq-Taq/Erbil with galvanized corrugated sheet to improve the waiting facility for travelers	23% 3 Km Primary Agricultural Roads Paving and 37 Culverts Rehabilitation Construction of New Entrances and Exits With Side Walks and Road Paving of Sa'ad Bridge Streets Lighting and Provision of 325 Light Fixtures and Fitting, 1000 m Cables Installation and 25 Photo Cell	3% Paving Main Street in Baya'a (1Km in Length, 24m in Width)(PRT) Leveling the Street and Laying Sub-Base in Saïda Area Zahra Main Streets Spreading Sub Base	5% Rehabilitation of Farm Road Road Paving of 5,000 m in Emarat Al Eskin Industrial Zone, Amarah Improvement of Neighborhood Streets	12% Road and Bridge repair Street Lights in 3 communities Paving road with sub-base in Hay Ar-Rasheed
Water & Sewerage:	11% Establishing a 3000m sewerage network in the Qadisia Quarter to remove open pools of water filling the streets and impro Establishing new drinking water supply systems (installing pumps, pipes, building concrete storage tanks (3m x 5m x 3m) Replacing the old water pipe net and extending nourishing pipes line for the new living units in Al Abascia village	15% Village Water Station and Water Network Installation Rehabilitation of Sewage System, Rehabilitation of Potable Water Station, and Water Network Installation 10,000 M³ Swamps Filling and 3 Km Irrigation Channel Cleaning and Maintenance	3% Dayala River Water/Treatment Plant Rehabilitation and Supply Chlorenate Device and Office Equipment for The Plant Office Open Blocked Sewerage, Clean & Build Mainholes for Sheikh Omar Sewerage Network Baya' Sewerage Pump Station Rehabilitation	17% Rehabilitation of Water Network in Rifat Community Neighborhood Sewage Swamp Clean-up Project Sewage Lift Station Upgrade in Al Iskan quarter	8% Repair water network and pumps Construction of sewage canals Maintenance for Al-Metehaa water project
Marla Fund:	37% Establishment of a mechanical bakery to improve the living standard of the families' victims of war in Samarra. Establishment Calves fattening project to improve the living standard of the family deceased Rasheed Mohammed Awad Establishment of calves fattening project to improve the living standard of the family of deceased Zuher Adnan Ebrahim.	13% Provision of Equipment to the Central Physical Treatment Center Partially Re-building and Repairing Two Homes Provision of 11 Sewing Machines to Women in need	19% Printing and Reproduction Workshop of Technical Instructors Training Institute Rehabilitation House Rehabilitation & Supply House Equipment & Furniture/Abbas Hamza Hassan Rehabilitation & Supply Furniture/ Abdul-Mahdi Abdul-Ameer Mahdi	5% Rehabilitation of 24 classrooms to Al Rasheed Primary School for boys in Musharah, Amarah Supply Equipment for Ninawa/Balkees School - Phase 3 Kut Town without Barriers (ramp construction)	5% Rebuilding of destroyed classrooms Providing of household items to war victims Rehabilitation of carpentry workshop in orphanage
Business Development:	10% Supplying a new electrical network for Shik-shed & Sin Al Thibban quarters and connecting it with Balad electrical netwo Establishing and supplying a 50-member cattle fattening cooperative with 525 cattle, fodder and other necessary equipment Supplying equipment, nitrogen container and liquid nitrogen for artificial insemination and improving Genetic stock fo	8% Installation of Transformer, Wires, Fittings, and Re-distribution of Electricity Network. Provision, Installation, and Erection of Electric Distribution Transformer, Electric Wires, cables and Poles. Al-'Alawi Market Floor Tiling, Roof Replacement, Ventilators Installation and Lighting	52% Al-Karama Vocational School in Jameela Construct Two Additional Classrooms Rehabilitate the Building and Supply Equiomen Faten Mu'ayad Kamal Homebased Cooking in Rasheed Supply with Equipment Fatima Abdul Fattah Yas Homebased Sewing in Al-Mansour Supply with Sewing Machines and Accessories	6% Supply & Installation of Generator in Al Maamil Village Quality of Life - Distribution of Livestock to Vulnerable Families Industrial Sewing Workshop	8% Rehabilitaion of internal electricity network Equipment for the Basrah women union Agricultural training for farmers
Youth:	8% Building a girls center for cultural, Educational and recreational activities in Karakosh Supplying workshop equipment and sport needs for Al-Khalis youth center (7 Lots). Renovating the public garden including public w.c , planting of grass with fixing amusement toys to entertainment of ch	3% Playground, Gymnasium, and Sanitation Construction. Al- Hussein Sport Club Rehabilitation and Provision. Al-Hindiya Sports Club Rehabilitation	2% Establish Sport Halls for Al-Dura Handicapped City Sector 7 Children Garden Ameerat Public Garden/ Playground Graden for Children Rehabilitation	10% Noamaniayah Sports and Recreation Center Reconstruction and Equipment Supply to Missan Sport Club in Awasha, Amarah Rehabilitation of the Sport & Art Halls of the Teachers' Institute for Women	9% Rehabilitation of children and youth center Equip Al-Basrah Sporting Club Supply of sports materials for youth
Not elsewhere classified:	4% Public Garden Rehabilitation Supplying and fixing new lamp fittings (steel base, lamps, brackets and accessories) to benefit 500 residents Supplying cleaning tools and laborers for cleaning up Kanan District	4% Clean up and Removal of Solid Wastes, Construction of Walls around empty areas used as garbage dump sites and Provision Park Creation, Cleaning up and Lighting of Park area and Provision of Garbage Containers Clean Up and Solid Wastes Removal.	4% Jaderia Residential Complex Rehabilitation & Supply Equipment Supply Trash Containers in Mahala 966 Clean and Provide Four Landscapes of Mahala 334 in Gre'at Area with Trash Containers	6% Supply a Jet Truck for Al Diwaniya Urban Communities Construction of an Annex and Reconstruction of Independent Supreme Commission of Elections Rehabilitation of Sindibad Public Garden in Amarah	12% Rehabilitation and equipment for the Immigration Department Rehabilitation and Equipping of Basrah central court Support to Al Nahrain radio station

Youth projects centered on sports facilities for both boys and girls, and occasionally playgrounds or parks for younger children. MC had one of the largest portfolios of youth projects. Finally, projects “not elsewhere classified” typically involved improvements to public spaces and buildings. Examples are park construction, rehabilitation of public offices, and clean-up of solid waste.

Table 1.7 also gives percentages of projects by type for each IP. These show significant differences in project portfolios across IPs, presumably due to differences in AORs, the influence IPs may exercise with their CAGs to achieve program objectives, and of course the preferences of CAGs themselves.

For instance, Marla projects predominate in A/V’s portfolio (37%) and economic/business development in IRD’s (52%). CHF, MC, and SC all emphasized schools/education (27%, 45%, and 38% of their projects, respectively). The latter two figures reflect MC’s philosophy of engaging communities via their children, and SC’s agreeing to take over the rehabilitation of more than 100 schools in Basra after Bechtel lost interest in such small projects.²

Processes

Such “facts and figures” as those above hardly tell the whole story of ICAP. Chapter 6 zeros in on ICAP CAG processes. But to flesh these out and give a more human face to the findings to follow, the evaluation team challenged IPs to write and submit “success and learning stories” for inclusion in the present report. This chapter concludes with a selection of these stories.

Box 1.1 Self-Organizing for Community Health Care

The Ibn Zuher neighborhood of the Mada’en District of Baghdad formed their CAG by an election of 19 community members at a town hall meeting in May 2004. Working with an IRD mobilizer, the CAG set about identifying and prioritizing needs in their community to develop ICAP proposals. But they did not stop there. CAG members also worked with mobilizers to put together a realistic implementation plan for projects that the CAG could organize and fund through its own resources.

These ranged from small neighborhood cleanups to the restoration of facilities at the neighborhood hospital. The CAG raised money and awareness for their programs through information campaigns and relied on volunteers to perform the work. For the Ibn Zuher Hospital project, the CAG was able to dovetail their independent project with an ICAP project.

This Hospital is the preeminent facility for treating communicable diseases in Iraq. Also, it is the only one with specialized equipment and staff trained to treat patients with HIV/AIDS. In 2003, the hospital was looted. During the rampage, looters not only stole vital equipment, supplies, and drugs, but they also started fires, damaged facilities and smashed windows. After the looting, hospital staff tried to restore the facility’s capabilities by scrounging medical equipment from all over Baghdad and purchasing



² Modification 03 of the Save the Children Cooperative Agreement provided additional funding to renovate a minimum of 100 schools in Basrah. These were not CAG generated projects, but had been identified by the Ministry of Education as priority schools. Referred to by Save the Children as ‘PCO School Rehabilitation’ the schools are identified by PIF codes. 107 schools were rehabilitated.

supplies with their own meager salaries. The destruction of the hospital was a bitter blow to the people of Ibn Zuher, who took great pride in the hospital's important work and relied on it for emergency room services and primary health care.

The CAG thus designated restoration of the hospital its highest priority. CAG members met with the hospital staff to determine what the hospital's most urgent needs were. Then they worked with IRD mobilizers to develop a proposal. The completed project provided the hospital with much needed equipment such as diagnostic tools and sterilization. For the community contribution portion of the project, the Ministry of Health provided additional equipment and office furniture.

At the same time, CAG members developed their own project for the hospital to restore its electrical system. CAG members canvassed the neighborhood raising donations and signing up volunteers. In total, 20 people from the community, in addition to the 19 CAG members, volunteered at the hospital to repaint rooms, and make light carpentry repairs. Using equipment donated from local businesses, volunteer electricians repaired the hospitals damaged electrical system bringing it up to international standards.

The Ibn Zuher CAG has continued to demonstrate its commitment to improving the lives of their neighbors. In April 2006, CAG members formed their own NGO to assist the disabled. So far, relying solely on donations from the community, the NGO has been providing clothing, wheelchairs, and medical care to 360 disabled children living in the Mada'en District. The NGO contacted IRD for more capacity building on project and fundraising, and mobilizers are now working with their development.

The Ibn Zuher CAG did not wait for someone from outside their community to tell them what they needed, or how to proceed. The members took the initiative to organize themselves and get to work. This kind of grass-roots activism is the heart of civil society.

Box 1.2 Bringing New Hope to Women

In Amarah, women who have not been able to complete their education in the formal school system have been given a second chance to learn. Beginning in November 2005, Mercy Corps, in cooperation with the Department of Education, began a literacy program offering reading, writing and math classes targeted to women and girls living in both urban and rural areas of Maysan. Initially designed for 1,140 participants, the project has attracted over 2500 regular attendees to the lessons. This is a strong indicator of the unmet need among the population for these basic skills. Response to the program has been so great that the Department of Education in Maysan will enroll some participants in the public schooling system based on their successful performance in the courses. In addition to the academic component of the courses, participants also take part in a series of democracy and governance lectures designed to make them aware of their rights and to help them become more fully engaged in the political process unfolding in Iraq.



Box 1.3 Improving Community Relations by Improving a Marketplace

Project:	Paving and Rehabilitating Roads in al Korea Market
Community:	Kirkuk Cluster
ACDI/VOCA Contribution:	\$ 47,596
Community Contribution:	\$ 10,888

When A/V staff first visited al Korea Market in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, the market was unsanitary and unsafe for families. Yet it is one of the major outdoor markets in Kirkuk and attracts many local families, who buy fresh fruits and vegetables, meat, and used clothing there. Unfortunately, poor infrastructure caused filthy water to collect around market stalls, breeding insects and rodents that spread disease. Potholes also covered the road, making the transport of goods to and from the market difficult and hazardous.

Through the ICAP, A/V brought together Kirkuk community members in a town hall meeting to identify priority needs for development in their neighborhood. The rehabilitation of al Korea Market was named the top concern, and the city government agreed to contribute to its reconstruction. The municipality supplied raw materials and construction supervisors, valued at approximately 20% of the total project cost. ACDI/VOCA contributed the remaining funds necessary to help the community pave the market roads with water-absorbent concrete, reconstruct the sidewalks, and dig a drainage canal for excess water.

The market is now an attractive and sanitary shopping center for approximately 50,000 merchants and shoppers. As a result of this project, community members of Kirkuk now have solid experience in working together across religious and ethnic line and with local government to achieve common objectives. This is particularly crucial in Kirkuk, which is demographically very diverse and conflict-prone

Before**After**

Box 1.4 Linking Community to Municipal Government in Sader District



The Al Bir CAG in Baghdad's Sader District serves Sectors 7 and 8, a community of roughly 25,000 people. Since their formation in January of this year, the CAG has completed 15 CAP projects ranging from small business grants to a project to turn a vacant lot into a public park and playground. In the short time of existence, the CAG has also established itself as an important link between individuals and their municipal government.

Sader District is one of the poorest in Baghdad, with high unemployment and little access to services. The Al Bir CAG initiated contact with their Neighborhood Advisory Council (NAC) to determine what assistance might be available for the communities represented by the CAG. The CAG learned of a program to provide needy homes with cooking oil and propane gas that had not been

extended Al Bir neighborhood because there was not a municipal bureaucracy in place in the community to distribute the goods. In the absence of such a municipal structure, the CAG members set out to create their own.

The CAG first conducted a house by house needs assessment of their community. They then organized a distribution network consisting entirely of donated warehouse space and vehicles and staffed completely by volunteers. Once the network was in place, the CAG developed a block by block distribution schedule and launched a publicity campaign to inform residents about the program and when they could receive the gas and oil.

In addition to the gas and oil distribution campaign, the Al Bir CAG has also launched a program to provide safe and sanitary circumcisions to children in the community. Circumcision is a requirement of Islam. In the Al Bir neighborhoods, families were too often relying on practitioners who were unskilled and using unsanitary equipment. The Al Bir CAG organized a program by which circumcisions could be performed at home free of charge by a skilled practitioner and with a nurse in attendance. This program has proved very popular in the community as families no longer have to spend what little money they have to have their boys circumcised and the procedure is performed in a safe and sanitary manner.

The Al Bir CAG has also organized smaller community projects on their own, such as neighborhood cleanups and public health campaigns. In the few short months it has been in existence the CAG has become a vocal advocate for its community. Community members in the Al Bir neighborhood know that they can go to their CAG with problems and concerns and they will be heard.

CHAPTER 2: THE ICAP EVALUATION

2.1. OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION

Evaluation Team

The independent external evaluation reported here was conducted under the auspices of USAID/Iraq's Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program II Phase II (MEPP II), which is implemented by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI). The scope of work (SOW) for the evaluation is displayed as Annex A to the present report. The core evaluation team consisted of three senior-level experts, all native-born US citizens. Briefly, they included:

- A team leader (female) with decades of M&E experience in general, and in particular with evaluation of large scale USAID programs and projects in communities as well as ICAP-like programs such as the World Bank's Social Funds in war-torn nations like Angola.
- Another M&E specialist (male) with equal qualifications, but who also: had prior long-term experience in Iraq (with LGP); is now permanently posted in Iraq under MEPP II; and is a consummate expert in survey design and statistical analysis.
- A content and country specialist (male), with long-term management and field experience in ICAP-type programs and institutions in Iraq and other conflict-ridden areas (e.g., the Balkans).

Assisting this team were: a manager and various support staff at IBTCI HQ; the interim and then permanent COPs of MEPP II; and an Iraqi consulting firm, the Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS). Because of its proven experience with surveys and focus groups, IIACSS was sub-contracted to conduct all such fieldwork that, for security reasons, might have imperiled respondents seen talking to US nationals (see Section 2.2).

Also note that in myriad ways, IPs themselves greatly assisted the evaluation by freely providing, e.g.: vital logistic support to evaluators and IIACSS interviewers; key documents and other records (see Annex G's Bibliography); raw quantitative data not captured in USAID's Project Reporting System (PRS) on ICAP; special qualitative data, as in Chapter 1's boxes; and exceptionally candid interviews. For greater detail on all the foregoing participants in the evaluation, see Annex B's list of persons contacted.

Evaluation Timeline

Evaluation activities took place between May and mid-September 2006. They began with pre-evaluation work by the MEPP II/IBTCI survey expert in May. In June, he was joined electronically by the team leader (*gratis*), for inputs on the CAG survey discussed in the next section below. Formally, however, the evaluation began on 17 July when the team leader and the content/country specialist met in the Washington DC area for 2 weeks' worth of work planning, instrument design, document review and interviews with IP HQs. From there, they traveled to Iraq to join the survey expert.

The team then worked together in-country during the whole of July. Across August, operating electronically from their home bases in Iraq, South Africa, and the US, each team member helped to analyze data for, and write, the present report. Annex C displays the evaluation work plan and schedule, along with the team's level of effort (LOE).

One major departure from this schedule must be noted. As of 1 September 2006, IIACSS' survey and focus-group work was still incomplete, despite their own and IBTCI's pre-planning as far back as May. This delay was occasioned primarily by very belated research permission from the national government, which only USAID could facilitate. Not until late July was permission finally received. Consequently, it was agreed with USAID/Iraq that the findings from these efforts will be analyzed and presented subsequently as design studies, in preparation for an ICAP II, envisioned to be implemented by an IP consortium.

Evaluation Scope

Upon arrival in-country, the team did a detailed walk-through of the original SOW with the CTO. There was unanimous agreement that the SOW required zero substantive changes, nor even any semantic emendations. Only a few adjustments were made to LOE and the timeline and structure of deliverables (again, see Annex C).

Technically, this was a final evaluation. But in practical terms, due to USAID/Iraq's plan for an ICAP follow-on, the task was more akin to a midterm evaluation. This is evident in the thoroughness of the SOW and its forward- as well as backward-looking nature. (Hence the title of this report.) As a result, the evaluation team was obliged to go beyond merely lessons learned to craft concrete recommendations for nearly every aspect of ICAP II. Indeed, at the time of the team's exit debriefing on 24 July, USAID/Iraq requested, and received, the team's additional assistance in reviewing the Mission's preliminary draft of a program description for ICAP II.

That said, one element excluded in the SOW was IPs' financial or other compliance. For such, both the Mission and the team agreed to rely on a fairly recent report on ICAP from the Regional Inspector General's Office (RIG 2005). Otherwise, the major evaluation tasks flowing from the objectives outlined in the SOW can be summarized largely as enunciated in the team's midterm debriefing to USAID/Iraq.

- Note ICAP successes and failures/shortcomings in different activities, sectors, and functions (e.g. M&E).
- Ascertain the efficacy of CAGs as tools to achieve ICAP objectives vis-à-vis Strategic Objective (SO) No. 9 in USAID/Iraq's RF.
- Provide lessons learned, best practices, and recommendations for any ICAP follow-on, with special attention to PRTs and the new Community Stabilization Program (CSP).
- Evaluate the PRS, and mine it for data that can speak to all the above.

In sum, the SOW was an exceptionally thorough and clear one that lent itself well to methodological operationalization. Section 2.2 describes how this was done.

2.2 EVALUATION APPROACH, METHODS, AND SUBJECTS

Evaluation Approach

As per the state-of-the-art in evaluation theory and praxis, this evaluation respectively adopted a utilization-focused and mixed-methods approach to the ICAP evaluation. The team began by systematically assessing each of the 30-some evaluation questions listed in Part V of the SOW as to whether to tackle each question in primarily quantitative or qualitative terms – albeit typically employing both, and ideally triangulating findings using several different methods.

A cross-cutting concern throughout this exercise was how the security situation in Iraq might affect the team's ability to ground-truth monitoring data or personally gather evaluation data from direct beneficiaries to complement data filtered to the team via IP reports and IPs' HQ or in-country managers. To this end, during the Washington DC design work, plural methods were

mooted. The main methodological concern was how to tap into the experiences and opinions of direct beneficiaries of ICAP without bias from IP management. Direct (and associated indirect) beneficiaries were comprised of two main groups.

- Primary direct beneficiaries in the form of CAG members -- and indirectly, their families and communities.
- Secondary direct beneficiaries in the form of IP national staff, who have garnered jobs and significant capacity-building from ICAP -- and again indirectly, their families. These secondary direct beneficiaries merit notice because reportedly they amounted to some 1,000 employees.

Security concerns were not only for the team's safety but also for Iraqi nationals' who, if seen in the company of US citizens, might be targeted for life-threatening reprisals. These dangers had already been foreseen by the evaluation team's survey expert in the case of direct primary beneficiaries. Hence his pre-evaluation sub-contracting of IIACSS to administer a nation-wide CAG survey. Once the whole evaluation team came together in-country, however, they learned that even face-to-face meetings with IPs' community mobilizers (hereafter, simply mobilizers) were also problematic. So IIACSS was additionally contracted to conduct on-site focus groups with mobilizers from each IP in their respective AORs.

However, it is important to note that the survey and focus-group instruments (and indeed all evaluation methods) were designed by the evaluation team (not IIACSS) and were thereafter pre-tested by or under the supervision of team members. And in fact, evaluators did manage to meet face-to-face with some CAG members and IP mobilizers (see below),

Evaluation Methods

Methods utilized by the evaluation team can be generically categorized as: literature reviews; both structured and unstructured interviews with both individuals and groups; a participatory evaluation workshop; at the team's request, IPs' collection and compilation of special corpuses of data not otherwise readily available; field visits and participant observation; statistical analysis of data from ICAP's management information system (MIS) for project monitoring (i.e., the PRS -- see especially Chapter 4, but also 5 and 6); a randomized survey; and formal focus groups.

Table 2.1 breaks these generic categories down into more specific sub-categories and/or explains their content and subjects in the particular context of the ICAP evaluation. The table also displays the actual or approximate number (N) of the gross units of analysis or other elements involved.

Table 2.1. Evaluation Methods/Data Sources

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Review of IP documents like the following (N = approx. 200)<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. ICAP RFAb. All cooperative agreements and modifications theretoc. For Y2 and Y3 of ICAP, all IP weekly, monthly, and semi-annual reports plus quarterly work plansd. Other IP documents such as surveys, databases, evaluations, indicator tables, mini-case studies, and special reportse. ICAP II consortium concept paper2. Review of non-IP supporting or reference documents like the following (N = approx. 20)<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. Various D&G guidance from USAID/D&G |
|---|

- b. Several reports by the US Institute of Peace
 - c. A World Bank study of demand-driven development at community level
 - d. Final evaluation of USAID/Serbia's Community Action Program
 - e. Numerous documents on PRT structure and functioning in Iraq
 - f. Evaluations of PRTs in Afghanistan
 - g. Documents on other USAID/Iraq programs designed to link with ICAP – notably, CSP, ICSP, Izdihar, and LGP (see Chapter 6)
 - h. Confidential drafts of USAID/Iraq's program description for ICAP II and new Performance Management Plan
3. Interviews with direct hires and contractors of USAID and the US Department of State (DOS) who are knowledgeable about ICAP (N = approx. 5 USG units and 4 contractors)
 - a. USAID/DC D&G Office
 - b. USAID/ and DOS/Iraq offices and units
 - c. IPs of other USAID/Iraq programs
4. Interviews with HQ staff of prime ICAP IPs in Washington DC (N = 5 IP groups, including SC)
5. Interviews with senior IP managers posted in Iraq (N = 5 IP groups, including CI)
6. Formal presentations of ICAP achievements by IPs at an all-IP evaluation workshop in-country (N = 5 IPs, including CI)
 - a. Formal presentations as per an outline of topics pre-provided by team
 - b. Best/worst IP cases of: ICAP design; dealings with USAID/Iraq; field-staff training; CAGs; and LG interactions
7. Data tables designed by team for IPs to complete (N = 6 IPs, including CI)*
 - a. Management and programmatic milestones
 - b. Year-by-year sources of ICAP support
 - c. Turnover in professional/technical staff in-country
 - d. Current field staff: number, sex, ethnicity, religion
 - e. Staff development and/or training for IP professional/technical staff, IP field staff, and CAGs
 - f. Inventory of IP training materials
 - g. World Bank matrices for characterizing CAG and LG enabling environments
8. Field trips, participant observation of projects, and site interviews with LG authorities, CAGs, or IP mobilizers by team members (N = 3 trips, in the order shown)
 - a. Erbil
 - b. Kut
 - c. Baghdad
9. Statistical analysis of PRS data on CAG projects
10. Formal random survey of CAGs
11. Formal focus groups with IP mobilizers

Not all IPs completed and submitted all the requested tabular data, however. However, A/V, CI, IRD, and MC win kudos for being especially responsive in this regard.

For the most part, the items in Table 2.1 are self-explanatory. But a few merit added comment. For instance, as explained earlier, it was impossible to complete field administration of the CAG survey and IP mobilizer focus groups (Items 10 and 11) during the evaluation period. But note that the instruments for these items were designed and field-pre-tested during that time.

Unfortunately, 10 and 11 were the only methods capable of systematically capturing direct beneficiaries' own assessment of ICAP. Item 8 provided some input in this regard, but only asystematically and anecdotally.

Briefly, the CAG survey was purposively designed to begin to fill the vast gap in outcome or impact data left by the PRS' unitary focus on projects. The survey thus aimed to collect data on: CAG formation, training, membership, fundraising, and general mode of operation (meetings, elections, etc.); CAG processes of project identification, selection, development, and implementation; and a flavor of community and LG participation (beyond just required contributions) in all the foregoing, as appropriate.³

Focus groups with IP mobilizers were considered equally vital for the same reason as the CAG survey, but also other reasons. First, mobilizers might help balance overly roseate biases in IP managers' perspectives. Second and related, mobilizers are Iraqis who are literally "on the front lines" of ICAP, often residing in or near the communities they serve. As such mobilizers almost certainly have some unique insights to share. Third, they represent the bulk of ICAP's institutional memory (see Chapter 3). Thus the focus-group guide for IP mobilizers was designed to gather their views on, e.g.: the context and roles of their work; training they received; the realistic dynamics of CAG formation, leadership, and LG links; and in general, how the ICAP paradigm in fact played out or evolved on-the-ground with CAGs across the LOP.

Item 9 also merits some comment. Particularly in the absence of the CAG survey, statistical analysis of the PRS' project data perforce provided most of the quantitative data presented in this report. Table 2.2 outlines the plan of attack on the PRS data.

Table 2.2. Plan of Analysis for PRS Project Data

1. Summary statistics on project/grant amount, and community and LG contributions
 - a. By project type and IP
 - b. By project type and grant amounts
 - c. Contributions of unusual value (i.e., statistical outliers)
2. Ratio and percent of community contributions vis-à-vis project/grant amount
 - a. Achievement of target contributions of 15% to 25% of total project cost
3. Primary direct beneficiaries of projects
 - a. By project type and beneficiary gender within IP
 - b. Statistical outliers of unusually high numbers of direct beneficiaries
4. Primary indirect beneficiaries of projects
 - a. By project type within IP
 - b. By statistical outliers of unusually high numbers of indirect beneficiaries
5. Long-term employment generation
 - a. By project type and employee gender within IP
 - b. Statistical outliers of unusually high numbers of long term employment
6. Short-term employment generation
 - a. By project type and employee gender within IP
 - b. Statistical outliers of unusually high numbers of short term employment
7. Costs of producing project benefits

³ The CAG Survey was subsequently completed and the results of the survey have been reported to USAID/Iraq as a design study for the CAP II program.

- a. Cost per primary direct beneficiary by project type within IP
- b. Cost per long-term employee by project type within IP
- c. Cost per short-term employee by project type within IP

To conclude this section, readers should note that all the instruments utilized in this evaluation are displayed in Annex D or, in the case of Item 7-h in Table 2.1 (the World Bank framework and matrices), in Chapter 6 of this report. This highlights a best practice in evaluation generally.

- ❖ *Best Practice: Evaluation teams should always display the actual methods and instruments they use. Such tools can perhaps save time and money and make for better intra- or inter-country and -program comparative analysis, to the extent the evaluation tools are deemed reliable and applicable in subsequent evaluations of the same or similar programs.*

Evaluation Subjects

Table 2.3 tabulates the number and variety of people who participated in or contributed to the ICAP evaluation. At the same time, it expounds on Table 2.1 by more precisely specifying: which methods were administered by whom (i.e., the evaluation team versus IACSS interviewers) and to whom; whether they were applied to individuals or groups; and also whether, in the case of interviews, these were unstructured or structured. (For the latter, please see again Annex D.)

Table 2.3. Evaluation Subjects, by Methods/Instruments

Subjects/ Interviewees	Methods/Instruments Administered	By Whom	Females	Males	Total
USAID/DC staff	Unstructured group interview	Team	2	0	2
USAID/Iraq staff	Unstructured individual and semi-structured group interviews	Team	7	5	12
Staff of related units or programs in Iraq: ADF, CSP, ICSP, IRMO, LGP, MEPP, PRTs	Unstructured individual interviews	Team	1	5	6
Sr. managers at IPs' DC HQs	Structured group interviews – but sometimes only a single individual was available	Team	5	7	12
Sr. managers of IPs in Iraq	Workshop presentations and exercises; structured-group and unstructured-individual interviews; special data compilations*	Team	4	17	21

IP mobilizers and engineers of 2 IPs (A/V and MC)*	Focus-group pre-test; unstructured individual and group interviews	Team	2	2	4
Other IP mobilizers*	Formal focus groups – 1 per extant IP	IIACSS	10**	30**	40**
CAG officers and members of 2 IPs (IRD and MC)*	Unstructured or semi-structured group interviews	Team	4	27	31
CAGs of the 4 extant IPs*	Formal random survey of CAG officers/members	IIACSS	192**	608**	800**
LG authorities: governor, PC chair	Unstructured individual interviews	Team	0	2	2
Other, e.g.: security experts, IIACSS staff	Open-ended interactions, short communications	Team	0	4	4
Grand total	Interim figures, pending completion of IIACSS work	---	227	707	934
Percent by sex	Interim figures, as above	---	24%	76%	100%

**Not included by name in the contacts list for reasons of security, as per IPs' request.

When it comes to administration of the CAG survey and the focus groups with IP mobilizers, estimates are that respondents will equal approximately 800 and 40, respectively, with an anticipated gender breakdown similar to the overall gender split of CAG membership.

2.3. STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

Chapters 1 and 2 of this report set the stage for reporting the substantive results of the evaluation that are presented in Chapters 3 through 6. Part of setting the stage was to ask each of the partners to provide success stories following a template (Annex D-3). A selection of these stories were provided in Chapter 1. The substantive chapters are structured so that findings come first followed by recommendations related to them. The intention is to link the recommendations to supporting evidence. Each chapter is divided into sections/subsections and within each section/subsection the findings/ recommendation schema is followed. The following paragraphs describe each of the substantive chapters.

The overall management and staffing of ICAP is examined in Chapter 3. This begins with the examination of the USAID/Iraq Mission management and staffing followed by that of the ICAP HQ and extending to ICAP field management and staffing. USAID, HQ and field define the three sections in the chapter. Each section has one subsection for management, and another for staffing. While in Washington DC, before departing for Iraq, the evaluation team met with the HQ staff for each of the ICAP partners and interviewed them using a structured questionnaire (Annex D-2). The results of these interviews are presented in the second section of Chapter 3. The final section of Chapter 3 drew on the Erbil workshop and confidential interviews with the senior staff of each of the ICAP partners.

With Chapter 4 the evaluation turns to current monitoring and evaluation systems. The main source of data reporting on the operations of the ICAP program is the Project Reporting System. Chapter 4 starts with a critical examination of how this reporting system evolved to its current

state. System evolution and identification of major system issues are addressed. Since the ICAP is primarily measured by the PRS it was important to understand the validity of what was being measured. This is done in the first section of Chapter 4. Subsections that encompass specific issues of measurement include: project beneficiaries, employment generation, project contributions and project typology. Unlike Chapter 3 the recommendations are presented at the end of the section and not with the subsection.

The second section of Chapter 4 points out the flawed M&E that has missed reporting on the program instead reporting on the project. A critical finding of the evaluation is that current management information focuses on projects (seen as program outputs) rather than on program processes. The second section presents the core information about this problem. Subsection topics include Program Foci; A Unified and Expanded PRS Coding Structure; Program and Process, Not Just Project; Inadequate PRS Architecture and Indicators, and “New PRS” Recommendations. Specific remedies are provided in the recommendations. Section three remains with M&E this time looking at individual ICAP partner innovations, and demonstrating that there was an early understanding about what needed to be reported, but somehow never was. The section closes with discussions regarding the need for a program PMP and for external evaluations.

With Chapter 4 the problems with project data were scrutinized and identified. Chapter 5 has four sections and begins the analysis of the projects themselves. Projects are the ICAP outputs. How projects are selected, contracted, implemented and completed are the subjects of the first section of this chapter. The next section begins the analysis of the PRS data by examining the type and number of CAG projects developed over time. It is noted that project type development responded to shifts in program direction. Characteristics of project beneficiaries, short term and long term employment are presented. The third section drills down further into the PRS data to analyze how resources were allocated to create projects. Costs and benefits of creating short and long term employment are a part of this section. The important concept of project ownership is developed. The fourth and final section reports on results of the start-up initiative, the program audit and site visits. Findings on ICAP outputs then segue to the final chapter where program outcomes and impacts are addressed.

The focus of the ICAP program is the community action group (CAG). Chapter 6 devotes itself to the CAG. The first section describes the principles and practices of CAGs, estimates how many CAGs were mobilized, and estimates the number of projects undertaken by individual CAGs. Section two looks at what the ICAP partners did to develop the capacity of the CAGs, and how the CAGs implemented their newly developed skills. The third section of Chapter 6 turns attention towards the CAG enabling environment. Borrowing from a recent World Bank study framework for the analysis of CAG/Local Government Interaction the evaluators asked the ICAP partners to characterize the enabling environment for demand driven development. This section presents those results, and draws on further analysis of local government contribution to indicate participation in the CAG process. The final section in the report looks at indications of sustainability of the CAGs and how the CAGs fit into the broader picture with other USAID funded programs at the provincial level.

CHAPTER 3: EVALUATION OF ICAP MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

3.1. USAID/IRAQ MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

Management

IPs can hardly say enough positive words about USAID/Iraq's hard-working and extremely supportive staff (see next section on staffing). Yet the Mission is the first to admit that USAID/Iraq management and oversight have often slipped, due to factors like the following:

1. Phenomenal staff turnover (see next section);
2. An initially decentralized structure of ICAP oversight that featured five CTOs, followed by a now-centralized structure (as of June 2005) with a single CTO for all of ICAP;
3. ICAP funding drawn from multiple and shifting USG sources/earmarks requiring different project categorizing and financial coding;
4. A steadily deteriorating security environment since April 2004; and
5. Frequent changes in or additions to ICAP thrusts and emphases (see Chapter 5), all in the absence of a Results Framework or RF (see Chapter 4).

One consequence of staff turnover and decentralization (Factors 1 and 2 above) was inconsistent and dispersed hard-copy and e-filing systems for ICAP within the Mission. For instance, reportedly some CTOs filed ICAP documents and reports by sector, others by infrastructures, still others by IP/AOR or USAID field office. Moreover, under the decentralized system, some of these records might not always have reached Baghdad. However, the current CTO and his sole Activity Manager are recovering and organizing all ICAP I documents into unitary hard- and soft-copy archives so that, even with future staff turnover, new incumbents can readily locate predecessors' records.

As the evaluation team can attest first-hand, this is no mean feat. USAID/Iraq requires a tremendous number of reports and documents from each IP. Leaving aside documents such as responses to contract modifications, project and personnel approvals, general notices and guidance, and occasional special reports (e.g., as per urgent Congressional inquiries), regular reports alone include the following:

- weekly staffing report;
- weekly monitoring report (the project tracking sheet);
- monthly program report;
- monthly financial report;
- quarterly work plan;
- periodic financial audit reports; and
- semi-annual (i.e., twice-yearly) program reports.

Excluding audits, these sum to 134 regular reports from each IP annually. Multiplied by five IPs, this means that USAID/Iraq is managing 670 such items per year from ICAP alone!

The third factor above – multiple and shifting funding sources for ICAP -- caused great confusion in Mission monitoring of the program via the PRS because USAID/Iraq failed to inform IPs of the project categorizations and financial codes for different types of CAG projects paid out of different “pockets,” as it were, at different points. This oversight was compounded by factor five above plus the fact that the PRS coding structure proved inadequate for USAID accounting requirements (see Chapter 4).

The result was that funds were wrongly logged as greatly over-spent in one category of projects (say, governance) and under-spent in another (say, roads and bridges), and/or projects were

charged to the wrong source entirely. Again, however, the Mission is now endeavoring to reconcile such errors (again, see Chapter 4).

Apropos, there is a tangled story of what sources of funds were taken from one pocket to be used for ICAP and then later put back in that pocket as a new pocket opened. This was all rather murky, and the topic lies outside the evaluation team's SOW. That said, it is evident that the shifting sources and stop-and-start nature of ICAP funding had negative repercussions for the program.

For example, experienced international and national IP field staff would begin seeking other employment, or would quit, as their one-year contracts neared completion. This made for losses in implementation momentum, in institutional learning and memory, and in investments in staff development and training. Additionally, droughts of funding led to IPs' reneging on already approved CAG projects, which led to losses in ICAP credibility among CAGs and communities – as CAG focus-group members remarked to the evaluation team. On the other hand, sudden deluges of funding stressed remaining staff to ramp back up quickly to meet “burn rates” – leading to losses in the quality of implementation in CAG projects and processes.

The Mission's current plan for ICAP II is a three-year award with, respectively, \$50, \$70, and \$70 million per year. Hopefully, this funding will flow more predictably and smoothly than in ICAP I. Stable funding is even more important for ICAP II in view of the implications of escalating conflict in Iraq (Factor 4 above) for staff morale and retention as well as community confidence.

Surprisingly, no results framework (RF) was created for ICAP either at its outset or as new elements and emphases were added on (see Factor 5 above). The absence of an RF made for further problems in M&E (see Chapter 4). But it may also have contributed to another major evaluation finding: the general confusion among various Congressional, Department of State (DOS), United States Military (USM), and even USAID audiences about the major purpose and thrust of ICAP. Consider the following observations.

From an interviewee in USAID/DC's Democracy and Governance (D&G) Office:

CAP has become all things to all people. [Of course] we see it as a D&G initiative whose purpose is to build public goods and democratic processes around them. The military see it as a way of quelling violence. And Congress is mainly interested in the war victims' aspect.

From a Senior Program Officer in one IP HQ:

AID itself has difficulty explaining CAP. Is it D&G? Is it economic development? They [USAID/Iraq] need to boil the program down to its essence. It is about a democratic process that has concrete outcomes.

From an HQ Director in another IP:

Part of the problem is that the donor does not get to lay their eyes on the program.

From another HQ interviewee in a different IP:

Any follow-on to ICAP will need to have a clearer vision and to enunciate it clearly.

From *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Fact Sheet*, Public Affairs Section of the US Embassy in Iraq, 16 June 2006, p. 1:

“Support for the PRT program comes from a variety of sources, including the...Community Action and Local Governance Program (LGP).” This quote suggests that DOS has conflated ICAP with another related but very different USAID/Iraq program (see Chapter 7's discussion of the ICAP institutional landscape).

Certainly, for ICAP II an RF must be constructed. Ditto for a program Performance Management Plan (PMP) keyed, as usual, to the relevant Strategic Objective (SO) and its corresponding indicators in USAID/Iraq's own RF and PMP (again see Chapter 4).

Beyond that, the Mission should consider working with the ICAP II consortium to generate a simple brochure or fact sheet explaining what ICAP is/is not and does/doesn't do vis-à-vis other USAID/Iraq programs that have reinforcing or linking roles to ICAP II. Indeed, the Mission would be well-advised to do the same for these other programs, too, given the confusion evidenced in the above Embassy fact sheet. Most notably, these programs include:

- Community Stabilization Program (CSP)
- Iraq Civil Society Program (ICSP)
- Izdihar – a finance program with a microfinance component
- Local Governance Program (LGP)

Management Recommendations

- Complete on-going efforts to create organized and user-friendly hard- and soft-copy archives for ICAP I -- and thus also ICAP II.
- Streamline ICAP II reporting requirements insofar as possible.
- Commission a comparative study of the Mission's PRS and IPs' own M&E systems at both project and program/CAG levels.
- Based on study findings, and in conjunction with IPs and the findings and recommendations in Chapter 4:
 - create a new program (as vs. project) PRS database;
 - re-assign its management and ownership to the M&E unit of ICAP II's consortium, so as to "unload" this function from USAID/Iraq; and
 - see that clear guides for properly categorizing and coding all data for this new management information system (MIS) are written.
- Avoid stop-start funding, for all the reasons cited earlier.
- Require the ICAP II consortium to do a complete PMP after award of the cooperative agreement and in close coordination with the Mission or its designated M&E contractors/consultants.
- Make a "fact sheet" clearly explaining ICAP II's vision vis-à-vis other USAID/Iraq programs (especially CSP).

Staffing

For its first 17 months, ICAP enjoyed the services of five CTOs, i.e. one for each IP. Four of these positions were covered by USAID/Iraq Regional Representatives, who were posted to USAID field offices around the country. The fifth was posted in Baghdad and assigned to IRD. Also supporting the program were a Private Sector Development Advisor and a Local Governance (LG) Specialist.

In the ensuing eight months, however, the number of CTOs shrank to three -- one each in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil. And the complement of specialists shifted to two in LG only. Across these first 25 months of ICAP, CTOs turned over three times for three IPs, and four times for SC -- the one prime IP that pulled out of ICAP before end-of-program (EOP).

By June 2005 and continuing until the present, however, ICAP was down to a single CTO and one activity manager (both in Baghdad) with no advisors or specialists. Beyond this two-person cadre, Regional Representatives still lent important general support and facilitation to ICAP and other USAID programs in their regions (Basra, Erbil, and Hilla). On occasion they also visit CAG project sites.

Despite the turnover and shrinkage in USAID staffing, without exception (and whether in their HQ or field offices), IPs gave high marks to present and, for the most part, past USAID/Iraq staff for their management and support of ICAP. Said one IP manager of the present CTO, “We consider him not only our CTO but also a friend.” The DCOP of another IP enthusiastically described how the Regional Representative in her AOR “...is always there for us. You can always go to him whenever you need help.”

Among other things, however, the scaling back from five to one CTO has left IPs feeling that they no longer interact sufficiently with USAID. All IPs expressed how much they valued such interaction, especially when the Mission used to convene all-IP meetings such as the oft-cited one held in Amman, Jordan in November 2003. IPs also feel that approvals and other exchanges with the Mission are taking longer than they should. As one IP Chief of Party (COP) observed, “We hit a lot of balls over the fence into the Green Zone. But a lot of them never come back. And those that do often come back very late.”

For its part, USAID/Iraq worries that the quality of ICAP oversight at the AOR and project levels may suffer from the cutback in Mission management staff. But its plan is for Mission representatives to PRTs to essentially assume the responsibilities of the formerly plural and decentralized CTOs. At the moment, however, only six PRTs are operational: four led by the US (in Babil, Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Ninawa Provinces) and one each led by Italy (Dhi Qar) and the UK (Basra). USAID/Iraq also hopes that the move to a consortium arrangement for ICAP II may lighten its administrative burden, thereby leaving more time for substantive interactions between Mission and IP managers.

In short, based on both written and verbal statements, all parties concerned appear to agree on the need for greater USAID ↔ IP interaction and collaboration. From the outset of ICAP II, it is vital to clarify the relative authority, responsibilities, and lines/modes of reporting among all Mission staff involved, as well as staff of related elements of the DOS and USM. Particular attention will need to be paid to the relationship between the CTO and the PRT representatives so as to avoid misunderstandings, miscommunications, or potential manipulation by consortium IPs'. Otherwise, they could be tempted to play the CTO off against the representatives.

Staffing Recommendations

- Minimize turnover in ICAP CTOs, to whatever extent possible.
- Plan for a substantial hand-over period and AID/IP meetings whenever CTO or Activity Managers change.
- Add staff if needed.
- Off-load some tasks currently performed by USAID/Iraq onto the ICAP II consortium (such as management of the PRS – see also Chapter 4).
- Try harder to get out to the field, and to attend or convene major all-IP workshops and conferences.
- Respond more rapidly to IP approval requests and other operational needs, or at least explain why the hold-up
- Codify in writing the roles of USAID/Iraq Regional Representatives to PRTs vis-à-vis IPs, the ICAP II Consortium, and the CTO.
- Establish regular meetings of the CTO and other interested USAID/Iraq parties with a defined group of ICAP II managers – e.g., all IP COPs plus selected Consortia personnel (like the heads of Finance and M&E).
- In close consultation with IPs, write clear guidance on the relative roles, rights, and responsibilities between and among: IPs, the CTO, USAID/Iraq's Regional Representatives and/or its representatives to the various PRTs (and also the US embassy and the military).

3.2. IPs' HQ MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

Management

In no uncertain terms, the field offices of all prime and sub IPs report constant -- indeed, "intense" -- and uniformly excellent communications with, and support from, their US-based HQs. HQ personnel double-confirm this excellence and intensity of communications. This holds for programmatic backstopping units, finance personnel, compliance specialists, and even VPs and senior VPs. As one VP said, "Even though I am responsible for 5 other countries, Iraq and ICAP take up 80% of my time."

In the interviews with all 5 of the original "prime" IPs in Washington DC, the evaluation team was pleasantly surprised by the breadth and depth of knowledge about ICAP at each HQ. One reason for this is that a number of HQ staff have served on ICAP themselves at one point or another. Another is the reportedly smooth flow of both programmatic and financial reporting between HQ and the field. While the bulk of such reporting is done in the field, HQs assist with edits and checks. Yet another factor is the learning HQs did to lobby effectively against ICAP's possible shut-down at one point.

This effort merits special mention, because for the first time it brought ICAP HQs into regular meetings with one another. Before, meetings were rare, although there were frequent informal phone and e-mail contacts among HQ managers to compare notes and share information of various sorts. Finally, while it is "early days" yet, it is never too soon to give thought to how plural HQs should inter-relate to the field-based management of the planned ICAP II consortium of which they are part and, via that management, to USAID/Iraq. Doing so may forestall needless confusion and ill will later on.

But likely the main reason for HQ staffers' extensive knowledge of ICAP is their frequent and often extended visits to Iraq or third countries to meet with their field staff. An average number of such visits per IP seems to be around once a quarter. For at least two IPs, however, 5 or 6 visits annually is the norm. Often, all such visits include more than just a single HQ member. Indeed, HQ staff seemed more knowledgeable about ICAP than did some USAID/Iraq personnel. (Recall the boxed observations in Section 3.1.)

- ❖ *Best practice for HQ management: Despite the security situation, HQ staff of various levels should continue to visit their ICAP field teams frequently.*

A minor frustration expressed by a few HQs was the mis-match in business hours, weekends, and holidays between the US and Iraq. These differences sometimes made communications more difficult and less timely than both they and field staff or USAID/Iraq would have wished.

Management Recommendations

- Maintain what are clearly excellent field ↔ HQ relations, especially via frequent field visits.
- Under ICAP II's consortium, regularize inter-HQ meetings so as to make decisions or trouble-shoot consortium-level problems collectively, and also so as to speak with a unified voice on any emerging consortium concerns vis-à-vis the donor.
- Sooner rather than later, codify how HQs will relate to and interact with consortium management.

Staffing

In-depth analysis by the evaluation team revealed no significant staffing issues among IP HQs with regard to greater-than average turnover in HQ personnel who backstop or support ICAP.

Indeed, ICAP seems to have enjoyed considerable visibility and institutional memory in all IP HQs, for reasons already cited above.

Only one HQ-related staffing issue surfaced. Some tensions exist between the international staff of A/V and those of its other "sub," Overseas Strategic Consulting (OSC). OSC mainly serves as a headhunter of technical staff for A/V postings to Iraq. These tensions center on significant differences in salaries, authority, and organizational representation rights. This situation probably cannot be solved at the field level. Rather, the HQs in question need to sit together to mitigate such tensions before they fester.

In fact, all IPs reported difficulty in identifying and recruiting qualified expatriates to work in Iraq, for the obvious reasons. Communication/information technology (IT), community development, and especially finance were mentioned as particularly difficult positions to fill. But HQ interviewees shared a wealth of lessons learned and best practices for recruiting international staff to work in such conflict-ridden countries as Iraq. These can be summarized as follow.

❖ *Best practices for recruitment of international staff to work in conflict-ridden countries:*

- *Recruit continuously, even if no positions are vacant – because international staff turnover is such that there soon will be.*
- *When "really good people" are willing to work [for your IP] in Iraq, be prepared to shift field positions around to accommodate them and their skills.*
- *Cast the recruiting net wider. Just posting positions on job lists and websites is not enough. Use other outlets as well.*
- *Relatedly, for skills such as finance and information technology (IT), look beyond US/Canadian and Western European citizens to other countries and continents. Examples are the Philippines and the Balkans.*
- *Promote junior staff from other countries within your own IP into higher positions in Iraq.*

A related staffing issue merits some HQs attention. Despite the foregoing best practices, prolonged vacancies in key field positions still sometimes occur. HQs should have contingencies for such situations, such as temporarily fielding HQ staff, former staff, or volunteers/consultants with the requisite skills, while continuing to recruit for the vacancies.

Somewhat related, the concept paper for ICAP II notes how the consortium will "...utilize the technical expertise of each of the CAP consortium members to catalyze cross-sector learning among staff and CAGs" (p. 1) and how "...each CAP implementing agency will provide leadership in a technical area where they have particular expertise, such as in conflict mitigation, disability, or economic development" (p. 6). Assuming these statements apply at least in part to HQs, the consortium should consider inventorying the availability of such expertise, leadership, guidance or training materials, etc. among its member HQs as well.

Staffing Recommendations

- Strive for greater equity in pay scales and authority between international staff of primes and their subs.
- Continue the creative and flexible recruitment policies evolved for international staff.
- Lend short-term TA for key field positions that are long vacant.
- Inventory the specialized in-house technical expertise that each HQ can lend ICAP II, if needed.

3.3. IP FIELD OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

Management

The evaluation team was impressed by the dedication, skills, and quality of work exemplified by the in-country leadership of all five IPs. To a large degree, they operate under a decentralized management structure vis-à-vis their HQs. This empowered program managers to make more rapid and flexible management decisions and responses to shifting realities in Iraq. To take one example, they had full freedom to decide when or if to re-locate to safer areas during particularly threatening periods (most notably after the Sadr uprising in April 2004), returning to their AOR offices once the security situation normalized (also, see below).

Furthermore, IP field managers reported no instances of HQ interference in program decision making or implementation to the disadvantage of field operations or staff. That said, field-level management by all IPs was negatively impacted by several other factors. Most notably:

- stop-and-start funding
- security conditions
- “remote” management

Paramount among these factors were constant funding interruptions and uncertainties. ICAP implementation suffered not only directly from such vagaries, but also indirectly via the loss of trained staff (see section on staffing). Annually, IPs were forced into a shut-down mode, when one-year leases on offices and housing plus staff contracts came due. The latest of such threatened shut-downs took place during the present evaluation when -- with only four days remaining -- some carryover funds at last came through from USAID. Across the five prime IPs, the scramble to renew scores of leases and nearly a thousand personnel contracts in less than a week can only be imagined.

Acute security problems also severely hampered program management and implementation. Moreover, by all accounts security conditions have been steadily deteriorating since Spring 2004, with a fresh spike in conflicts since the fighting between Israel and Lebanon began. Security considerations figured prominently in all IPs' weekly, monthly and semi-annual reports in explanation of why ICAP advances were often delayed. As eloquently expressed in A/V's Semi-Annual Report of June 2004 (p.19):

Lack of security was the principal reason why goals were not met. Insecurity was like a many-headed monster that reared its head in every e-mail, every car ride, and every activity on the ground.

In truth, it is hard to imagine a more difficult or demanding environment in which to promote community-based development and democracy than present-day Iraq. Due to the many and growing dangers, IPs have had to adopt extensive policies and procedures that are strictly enforced by their security contractors. The movements of international staff are severely restricted throughout most of Iraq. Likewise for national staff, albeit to a lesser degree. The evaluation team understands that most IPs have security/emergency-procedure manuals, although time did not permit verification or inspection of these.

This unique situation has resulted in an overall structure of remote management, in which managers must oversee activities from their central offices in secure locations, sometimes outside Iraq itself. SC exemplified the classic case, as it were, of such long-distance management. For security reasons, SC adopted a policy forbidding all personnel from coalition countries to enter Iraq. Instead, these staff worked out of Kuwait City, where the initial COP was based. Significant logistical support for SC was provided by the Humanitarian Operations Center, a body set up by the Kuwaiti government to assist international aid agencies with their

activities in Iraq. Similarly, CHF's international staff work out of a central office in Amman, Jordan.

The other IPs all operate inside Iraq. A/V has a central facility in Kirkuk plus offices in Erbil. MC maintains field offices in each province of its AOR – a management model it says it copied from early SC structures. MC's field offices are managed by Iraqi staff who report to a central office in Sulaymaniyah. IRD's fully staffed central office, located in Baghdad, is perhaps the one exception to remote management.

In certain senses, however, these three IPs also operate remotely. For A/V, when fighting or protests in Kirkuk “heat up,” international staff decamp to Erbil until things “cool down.” As MC interviewees described to the evaluation team, even though some of their field sites lay only a couple hours' drive from their central office, even in MC's relatively more pacific AOR, the dangers of road travel still make managers effectively “remote.” And for all IPs (including IRD in Baghdad), sometimes security concerns make it unsafe for national staff to come to the office (see section on staffing). Even IRD's international staff cannot travel freely to project sites, only a few miles away from their Baghdad compound.

No matter where their staff, offices, and project sites were located, IPs all struggled with the same kinds of management challenges. While these are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, the following citation from SC's Semi-Annual Report of June 2004 (p.10) gives a flavor of these challenges.

SC and the communities learned that although it was true that successes could be achieved and enthusiasm and commitment created, it was also true that contractors could try to cheat, communities could get tangled in power struggles, losing bidders could try to sabotage the work for the winners—even to the extent of death threats—and rivalries among community groups, governmental agencies, and implementing partners could stall and stymie implementation. ... The way to mitigate these disruptive tendencies is to institute more rigorous systems that all understand.

The evaluation team's strong impression is that, both individually and in the aggregate, IPs have been incredibly flexible, creative, and diligent in coping with: remote management in general; specific challenges like those just cited – which except for death threats, are common in development work worldwide; the unique and ever-shifting security situation in Iraq; and other external forces beyond IPs' control, such as funding vagaries.

The trick under ICAP II will be to distill the many management lessons learned by all IPs under ICAP I into a consortium-wide plan that takes advantage of the “best of the best” such practices. The aim should be to share -- and in some cases even to provide semi-standardized -- guidance, manuals, software, etc. for as many aspects of management as feasible. These might include: finance, security, human resources or HR (next section), and certainly M&E (see Chapter 4). “Feasible” means not in contravention to any IP's required HQ policies or procedures.

Given the time constraints and volume to be covered under this evaluation, the evaluators lacked the time to do such a distillation. Anyway, it would be better if IPs themselves did this as part of their pre-planning for a proposal to USAID/Iraq to operate as a consortium under ICAP II. Among other benefits, to the extent that IPs can agree on any general management principles and procedures, they will be better able to act in mutually supportive ways and to speak with a stronger unified voice when confronted by funding crises, shifting security or other realities on-the-ground in Iraq, or untoward donor or other (e.g., PRT) demands and pressures.

In addition, looking ahead to management systems under an ICAP II consortium, far greater inter-IP interaction in-country will naturally be required. Happily, IPs' initial consortium concept paper (CHF 2006) foresees this need, at least at the COP level. However, based on many

thoughtful reports and enthusiastic comments on two all-IP conferences that took place during ICAP I, plus the lively dialogue and idea exchange at the evaluation workshop held in July 2006, equally important are ICAP meetings that embrace a wider range of staff in such interactive venues.

Management Recommendations

- Do scenario planning more frequently, in view of the deteriorating security environment.
- Conduct a pre-consortium review of best management practices and materials from all IPs; and design any consortium proposal accordingly.
- Where possible, under consortium leadership, integrate and harmonize IP field-office practices, policies, and reporting mechanisms in order to take full advantage of the foregoing review.
- Hold frequent all-IP workshops where both managers and fieldworker staff can share both operational and programmatic issues and problems, lessons learned, and ideas for ongoing program improvements.

Staffing

Each IP maintained different staff compositions that depended on numerous operational factors. Management-level staffing these can be schematized as shown in Figure 3.1 (based on an undated A/V organigram). In addition to the usual support personnel, all IPs employ a large cadre of field staff: engineers, community mobilizers, and business development mobilizers. Total field staff per IP generally ranged between 150 and 200 persons.




Figure 3.1 Schematic of IP Staffing

International Staff

All IPs reported difficulties in maintaining continuity among international staff. While the COP for A/V remained with the program for a full three years, this was an exception to the rule. Across the five prime IPs, a total of 13 COPs, 12 DCOPs and 15 Finance/Administration Officers came and went. This averages more than 2.5 changes in key positions per IP per year. (In fairness, it should be noted that a few of these changeovers represented international staff who left when their contracts were nearing an end and so felt the need to seek further employment -- but who later “re-upped” with ICAP after taking interim jobs outside Iraq.) In any case, this degree of turnover comes as little surprise given:

- the difficulties described in Section 3.2 in recruiting professionals with the right qualifications who are willing to go to a war-torn area to begin with;
- once in Iraq, the conditions under which international staff were forced to live, including extremely confined housing (typically in a group home or compound), restricted movements, and very limited amenities; and
- employment contracts limited to only one year.

ICAP’s long-term objectives cannot help but have suffered from the loss of institutional memory such turnover entails. Furthermore, evaluation interviews hinted at occasional management, financial, and human-resource (HR) problems due to shifts in key positions. Today, however, all IPs have nationalized most of what were previously international positions. Although initially this was done mainly in response to security threats to internationals, it has cut down on turnover at the management level.

Currently, most IPs have no more than two or three international staff. Due to its policy of forbidding travel to Iraq by nationals of coalition countries, SC has a unique policy of hiring international staff for posting in Iraq exclusively from Arabic cultural backgrounds.

National Staff

National staff rosters remained fairly consistent once positions were filled. A partial exception to this statement is one IP’s story of having lost nearly all its national staff due the impending shutdown of ICAP. But when funding was restored, staff returned *en masse*. This case illustrates the vital importance of consistent funding.

All IPs spoke to the evaluation team about the difficulty of recruiting national staff in the first place. In fact, IPs can “advertise” positions only by judicious word-of-mouth. This is because of very real threats to the lives of Iraqi employees and their families if they are known to work for a US-based (or indeed, any “international”) organization. All IPs have experienced staff losses due to murders or disappearances or to resignations from fear of harm or death. Not all this

attrition was directly work-related. Even so, IPs have instituted a number of careful and compassionate HR policies for national staff. A sampling of these includes:

- Keeping all HR information extremely confidential
- Allowing national staff to check in at IP offices at their discretion
- Permitting national staff to work out of their homes as much as possible, and setting up in-home internet access for them wherever possible
- Holding meetings in places where staff will not be suspected of working for international organizations
- Continuing pay to staff who have to “drop out” for a time, while personal threats to them blow over
- Helping threatened staff or murdered staff’s surviving family members to reach safe haven if they have received or been victims of death threats
- Giving extra medical benefits or compassionate leave when a staffer or family member is injured or killed

In this security atmosphere, IPs candidly confess that often they must hire simply the most willing and broadly able, if not sectorally experienced, of national applicants. Staff thus come from backgrounds as disparate as veterinary medicine and law. Despite the need (still continuing) for training of new national hires, IPs and USAID/Iraq alike literally cannot say enough positive words about ICAP national staff: their dedication, loyalty, bravery in the face of tremendous personal danger, and quickness to learn and advance. The evaluation team concurs, based on the many stories that IP personnel (both international and national) told about their Iraqi colleagues’ devotion to duty in the face of direct personal threats.

The following statement from SC’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2004 (p.10) eloquently summarizes the foregoing assessments.

One important learning and a joy for all who have worked on the CAP program is the commitment, dedication, intelligence, energy, thirst for knowledge, and persistence of the Iraqi mobilization staff, as well as a large number of the longer-serving members of CAGs. CMTs [mobilizers] have seen very little turnover and it is not just a case of people hanging on desperately to a job in a ruinously low employment environment. Most CAP workers devour new knowledge voraciously and work very hard to use it on the job. ...[The program could not function without] ... the strength and continuity CAP [national] staff bring to their jobs and the skills in leadership, training, modeling of democratic practices and concepts they demonstrate and pass on to their clients, the communities, and CAG members, as well as local government officials.

This evaluation noted two negative findings with regard to numbers and structure of national staffing, however. The first has to do with staffing impacts from the sudden addition of program components – specifically the Marla war victims’ component. As one IP put it, “This stretched our existing national staff way too thin.” IPs had to scramble to cope with this new burden given no budget to hire additional staff.

Second is the lack of a scheme of service laying out how national staff (especially mobilizers) are to receive promotions and pay increases. Worse still is the case of A/V: four months after ICAP start-up, A/V mobilizers’ salaries reportedly were suddenly cut in a move that is equally inexplicable to them and the evaluation team. Now three years later, A/V mobilizers are still smarting at this indignity – as, indeed, would anyone, especially given the dangers of their work.

The point here is that – as noted in the preceding section -- under a true consortium arrangement, staff other than just managers should have opportunities for meeting and exchanging lessons learned and best practices. But if they do, doubtless they will also exchange information about status and salaries. Thus the consortium would be well-advised to

establish a standard scheme of service for national staff who do the actual fieldwork – whether mobilizers, engineers, or other. This would increase morale and retention and forestall future problems. If a consortium-wide scheme is not feasible, then at the very least, each IP should establish such a scheme internally.

Staff Development/Training

Given that national staff, in particular, were hired from many walks of life other than international development or D&G, staff development was a “must” for all IPs. These became even more urgent as international staff presence and travel in-country became increasingly circumscribed or, as noted earlier, entire international cadres de-camped to nearby countries. When asked about such training, all IPs averred that they had kept records. But only three complied with the evaluation team’s request for data on staff development (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Staff Development Data from A/V, IRD, and MC*

Staff Level	A/V	IRD	MC	Total
Professional/technical	47	1	130	178
Field/community	373	587	130	1090
Total	420	588	260	1268

* Figures in this table may refer to numbers of staff or to numbers of trainees at various events, of which a given staffer might have attended several. The data were not clear on this point.

Staff capacity-building topics covered by all three IPs included: conflict resolution, program administration and management, monitoring and evaluation, IT, and various practical skills (e.g., English, security, photography). In addition, A/V and IRD actively trained their staff in community mobilization and development plus small business development. A/V was the only one of the three to offer advocacy training. Both A/V and MC also reported sending selected staff to a number of overseas study tours and conferences.

Staffing Recommendations

- Write duration-of-cooperative agreement personnel contracts under ICAP II for all staff.
- Continue the trend to nationalize in-country management.
- Continue and, if at all feasible under the consortium, standardize HR policies for fieldworker staff based on best practices of flexible and compassionate personnel benefits under ICAP I.
- Put in place a scheme of service for non-managerial national staff, ideally consortium-wide.
- If new components are tacked onto ICAP II, request added donor support and re-allocate existing budget for adding more and properly skilled staff accordingly.
- Increase professional development and training for staff (national or international) wherever competency and skills mix remain weak

CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION OF ICAP M&E SYSTEMS

4.1. THE ICAP PROJECT REPORTING SYSTEM

System Background and Evolution

For USAID/Iraq, ICAP's premier -- indeed, only -- management information system or MIS is the Project Reporting System. The PRS was modeled after an MIS originally developed and copyrighted by CHF based on its ICAP-like work on its Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA) program in Serbia, also funded by USAID. An active online version of this CHF MIS can be viewed at www.sada.usaid.org.yu. Subsequently this same MIS was adopted by various other organizations conducting similar programs in the same or other conflicted areas, such as Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Lebanon, Montenegro, and Serbia (see CHF's ICAP CA, p. 10)

Even at the ICAP design stage, USAID/Iraq's intention was to bring this pre-existing MIS to bear upon ICAP. However, it was not until Modification 02 to the ICAP CAs (dated 28 February 2004) that USAID/Iraq instructed all IPs to "adopt and use" the PRS. This document further required all IPs to "...utilize an online system called PRS, per data defined by USAID. As a result, each recipient will be required to have adequate online access, appropriate staff, and the data (including before and after pictures) required by USAID." This was to occur by 1 May 2004; and by 1 June 2004, data on all existing projects were to be "...inputted into the system..."⁴

USAID/Iraq was to contract technical assistance (TA) to set up this MIS. Thereafter, each IP was to enter the information noted in Table 4.1 into spreadsheets for all its CAG projects dating back to ICAP start-up in June 2003.

Table 4.1 PRS Data Reporting Requirements per Y2's Modification 02

Project indicators
1. Location of project -- province, district, community, GPS coordinates
2. Cost of project to recipient
3. Total contributions to project -- community, LG, other
4. Status of project -- i.e., under review, approved, underway, completed
5. Dates of project -- start, end
6. Beneficiaries of project -- male/female, war victims, and indirect beneficiaries
7. Days of employment generated by project -- male/female
8. Number of persons employed -- male/female
9. Sector of project
Program indicators
10. *Number of CAGs by province
11. *Number of CAG members by province -- male/female
12. Number of media reports

* The number of CAGs and the gender of CAG members were reported early on in ICAP monthly and semi-annual reports. But somehow these indicators were never included in the PRS.

⁴ All citations here and (sometimes paraphrased) in Table 4.1 or elsewhere in this chapter in references to Modification 02's are taken from this document's Schedule B Program Description, Attachment 1 - Adoption and Use of the Project Reporting System.

Y3 modifications (No. 07 for A/V, CHF, and MC, 08 for IRD, and 09 for SC) made renewed reference to the PRS, weekly reporting requirements, and the need for online access to project data through MEPP II. These “mods” changed the number, nature, and in some cases the definition of PRS data requirements. This can be seen by comparing Table 4.2 with Table 4.1.

Table 4.2 PRS Data Reporting Requirements per Y3 Modifications

Project indicators

1. Name of project
2. Description of project
3. Activity – construction, non-construction
4. Identification code of project
5. Location of projects --province, district, community, GPS coordinates
6. Cost of project to recipient
7. Total contributions to project – community, LG, other
8. Status of project – coded as (1) identified/need more information, (2) approved, (3) tender released/proposal review, (4) contract awarded/project underway, (5) completed
9. Dates of project – start, end
10. Beneficiaries of project -- male/female, war victims, and indirect beneficiaries
11. Days of employment generated by project – male/female
12. Number of persons employed – male/female
13. Sector of project – coded as electricity, roads and bridges, health, education, water and sanitation, youth, women, economy, agriculture, public spaces, civic outreach, humanitarian assistance, war victims, other
14. Number of long-term jobs created – male/female
15. Additional indicators as agreed

Program indicators

16. Number of CAGs by province
17. Number of CAG members by province -- male/female

Table 4.2’s changes can be seen as a partial response to the findings of the RIG audit of ICAP. It singled out the inadequate quality of PRS data in an otherwise glowing report. The report noted that in July 2004 the ICAP Program Manager requested IPs to “...scrub their respective data for accuracy in reporting.”⁵ It went on to recommend that:

...USAID/Iraq develop and implement a plan of action to improve the integrity of the data in the Community Action Program’s Project List in order for it to be a more effective monitoring tool and a more accurate and reliable data source for reporting purposes.”⁶

Despite numerous attempts to address problems in data reporting, however, the evaluation team found that the PRS requirements specified in Table 4.2 were not uniformly understood nor met by IPs. This means that data are reported inconsistently by different IPs. Among other things, this is because no PMP was ever done for ICAP, complete with indicator reference sheets that would have made standard indicators operational.

Neither has online data entry ever been achieved, although all IPs have internet connectivity in-country. More important is the fact that the TA promised by USAID/Iraq in Modification 02 never

⁵ USAID, Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program, Audit Report Number E-267-05-001-P, January 31, 2005. Page 10.

⁶ Op. cit. page 15

materialized. Instead, IPs currently e-mail weekly “tracking sheets” of project data to the ICAP CTO in Baghdad, where he and/or the Activity Manager re-enter the data into an in-house Excel database. Unfortunately, IPs differ in how these data are submitted (see later sections). So it is up to the CTO and his assistant to map the data received into a common format for entry into the PRS. This has become a very time-consuming cut-and-paste chore of moving data from one spreadsheet to another.

Major System Issues

The following sections turn to an in-depth analysis of PRS data items and problems. These considerations are vital because currently PRS indicators represent the only quantitative data routinely collected and reported to USAID/Iraq about ICAP. The PRS has thus become the main mechanism for measuring IP performance – albeit again only at the project level versus at the program level.

Data Definitions. For the reasons just cited, it is fair to ask: Just how good are these PRS measurements? And which of them are in fact being used? Should any of them be dropped? Re-formulated? To answer questions like these, Table 4.3 offers a critical-analytic examination of each of the indicators listed in Table 4.2.

Table 4.3 Critical-Analytic Examination of PRS Data Items

Item	Comments and Recommendations
Project name	This item is not reported.
Project description	This item should fully describe what the project did, along with the name and type of the institution, building, network, road, or individual that was the primary focus of the project. Currently there is a range of descriptive “utility” provided. Descriptions such as “school repair,” “road repair,” or “clear blocked sewage channel” do not provide sufficient information about the magnitude or purpose of the project. Guidelines are needed on what should be included in the project description.
Activity	Originally defined as construction or non-construction, this is no longer reported. Determine whether this item is required by IRMO or others; otherwise, drop it. It provides only limited information and may misclassify more complex projects that have both construction and non-construction components, e.g., “rehabilitate sports club and provide football coaching.”
Project identification code	Code structure should be the same for all IPs. (Some IPs currently have additional coding schemes.) An appropriate “smart” code structure can identify the IP, its sub-contractor, the year, province, project sequence number, and other aspects of the project such as a CAG identifier.
Project location – province, district, community, GPS coordinates	There is a need for a standard reference to anglicized names of provinces and districts. This becomes an issue when sorting or selecting data. Definitions could be coordinated with the central statistical authorities for ease of cross-reference to GOI census or survey data; or the United Nations’ p-codes could be adopted. Furthermore, community names can be problematic where local boundaries are unclear, names are duplicated, or multiple popular names are in use. Large municipalities have areas identified by neighborhood and block, but this is the exception. A common practice has been to repeat the district in the community-name column. But this provides no additional information; instead, the name could be supplemented with a quadrant identifier such as NE, SW. GPS provides positive location coordinates, but needs to be coupled with a GIS

	system to display or summarize project geographic distribution data.
Project cost to recipient	This is a misnomer. This data field actually contains only the project grant amount. It should be re-labeled accordingly.
Total contribution	Contributions to the project are auditable and contribute to IPs' cost share calculations. Operational definitions of contributions have been addressed by the IPs individually and during conferences (see Table 4.4). All contribution data must be fully documented. All IPs agree that community contributions are underestimated due to the difficulty of obtaining the qualifying documentation; and there is no an easy remedy for this. Nevertheless, the data provided are of a high and auditable standard, but there are differences among IPs on how (or if) contributions are classified at the project level. (See later section on this topic.)
Project status	<p>The five current status codes are not sufficient to cover the range of status possibilities. IPs underscored the lack of a code for projects that had to be abandoned midway (due, e.g., to security). So an additional code 6 is required, for "terminated when partially complete."</p> <p>More generally, since project status code is linked to the CAG project approval process, so long as this process varies across IPs so, too, may coding criteria. Neither is it clear at what stage a project enters the PRS, or whether a project can be removed from the PRS once it has appeared. These issues need to be discussed and agreed upon by the proposed consortium.</p>
Project dates	Dates are linked to the CAG project approval process. As above, it is necessary to specify at what stage in this process the "start date" begins and a project enters the PRS.
Beneficiaries	Several IPs provide instructions to their mobilizers and engineers on how to estimate direct project beneficiaries. Under the proposed consortium a standard measurement methodology for this should be devised. The measurement of indirect beneficiaries lacks credibility and should be abandoned.
Employment days generated	The sources of these data are timesheets for voluntary labor and the labor used by project contractors. An employment day is six or more hours. These data are audited and are assessed to be credible. No change is envisioned. Attribution to the project is high and well documented.
Numbers employed	Same as above. Also called short-term employment, such jobs are often used to implement a project. Attribution to the project is high and well documented.
Project sector	Project sector was not reported routinely by all IPs. Partners tended to classify projects in many different ways. The result was that the CTO and the Activity Manager attempted to add project type codes to the submitted project tracking sheets. This was done intermittently. Code types should line up with program objectives. (See later sections on this topic.)
Long-term jobs	Long-term employment is defined as that which is created by project completion. Teachers for new schools, health workers for new clinics, additional employees for assisted SMEs, and employment from micro- or home-based enterprises are examples. For the most part, these figures are forward-looking estimates and thus are less credible than short-term employment figures, which are based on documentation.

Early attempts at PRS data definition began during the all-IP conference hosted by USAID/Iraq in Amman, Jordan in November 2003. Table 4.4 summarizes definitions agreed on there, according to the conference report.⁷

Table 4.4 Data Definitions Agreed on at All-IP Conference in 2003

Completed project: Services or equipment have been delivered and signed off by all 3 concerned parties, i.e. IP, CAG, and project contractors. (However, there is allowance for performance payments to be withheld for a period of time after project completion.)

Beneficiaries: All data must be disaggregated gender. Only people benefiting within the timeframe of the project are to be counted. Measures will be made on a project-by-project basis. For particular types of projects, direct and indirect beneficiaries are defined as follow.

- Schools: Direct = students and school employees. Indirect = community.
- Clinics: Direct = catchment area. Indirect -- not measured.
- Roads: Direct = community within which the road lies. Indirect = immediately surrounding communities.
- Water: Direct = population receiving water. Indirect — not measured.

Employment: One person day = 6 hours.

Contractor contributions: If a contractor does extra work after winning the tender, this is counted as “other contributions” not “community contributions.”

Since that conference and following upon the RIG report, individual IPs have worked to provide more such standard definitions, for use by community mobilizers and engineers in measuring project performance. Some of these could point the way to standardized definitions and measures under ICAP II. For instance:

- ❖ *Best Practice:* MC has produced the following guides for tracking its ICAP projects: *Beneficiary Counting Guide*; *Tracking Sheet Instructions* (details how to code the project tracking sheet); *Data Collection and Reconciliation System*; *Monthly Project Monitoring Report*. IRD has similar materials.

Even so, one participant at the all-IP evaluation workshop convened by the evaluators spoke for many when he stated: “...we are victims of numbers...putting out numbers that are unrealistic... we want to start out [with the ICAP II consortium] by correcting how the numbers [are defined].” In response to this concern, the evaluator team paid especially close attention to a variety of PRS measures that seemed particularly problematic. These include: beneficiaries; employment; contributions to projects; and specification of project types. Statistical outliers for certain of these indicators are compiled in Annex E-1. Outliers are generally identified as the five highest values of an indicator for each IP.

Beneficiaries. Table 4.5 displays the total number of indirect beneficiaries reported by IPs by quarter and year since ICAP inception. In Quarter 4 of 2003, only six months into implementation, in the aggregate IPs claimed indirect beneficiaries amounting to almost half the population of Iraq; IRD alone claimed a number equaling nearly twice that of GOI estimates for Baghdad’s mid-2004 population of 6,554,126 (COSIT 2005). By Quarter 2 of 2006, IPs were reporting close to 55.5 million indirect beneficiaries -- more than twice the total estimated population of Iraq in mid-2004, which was only some 27.1 million.

⁷ USAID/Iraq, Community Action Program, Fall 2004 Conference, October 11-12, 2004, Amman, Jordan

Table 4.5 Indirect Beneficiaries

	ACDI/VOCA	CHF	IRD	Mercy Corps	Save the Children	Total	
	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	% that indirect beneficiaries are of total Iraq population
Qtr 3 2003 'start up'	439,322	777,968	4,326,650	131,250	416,070	6,091,260	22%
Qtr 4 2003	518,349	344,644	11,745,794	226,534	471,923	13,307,244	49%
Qtr 1 2004	1,814,478	162,326	2,143,373	129,564	242,595	4,492,336	17%
Qtr 2 2004	658,816	509,030	45,000	203,680	164,365	1,580,891	6%
Qtr 3 2004	665,265	707,935	638,500	32,200	1,963,950	4,007,850	15%
Qtr 4 2004	414,297	3,267,365	2,263,000	251,695	1,393,900	7,590,257	28%
Qtr 1 2005	1,100,982	1,629,744	2,090,190	616,287	876,305	6,313,508	23%
Qtr 2 2005	534,844	174,000	1,357,425	985,610	415,921	3,467,800	13%
Qtr 3 2005	988,277	.	776,900	543,151	79,320	2,387,648	9%
Qtr 4 2005	26,500	71,496	804,913	740,800	324,775	1,968,484	7%
Qtr 1 2006	.	68,798	1,890,359	618,638	28,000	2,605,795	10%
Qtr 2 2006 (partial)	.	32,500	864,455	47,829	.	944,784	3%
Total	7,161,130	7,745,806	28,946,559	4,527,238	6,377,124	54,757,857	202%
% that indirect beneficiaries are of total Iraq population	26%	29%	107%	17%	23%	202%	

As with indirect beneficiaries, direct beneficiary counts also exceed the estimated total population of Iraq (Table 4.6). In later quarters of ICAP and since the RIG report, estimates of direct beneficiaries have become more modest.

Table 4.6 Direct Beneficiaries

	ACDI/VOCA	CHF	IRD	Mercy Corps	Save the Children	Total	
	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Direct Beneficiaries	% that direct beneficiaries are of total Iraq population
Qtr 3 2003 'start up'	179,847	369,297	2,521,003	145,072	686,238	3,901,457	14%
Qtr 4 2003	177,508	609,434	5,474,718	365,285	1,048,055	7,675,000	28%
Qtr 1 2004	621,176	394,606	939,888	379,148	461,348	2,796,166	10%
Qtr 2 2004	4,262,978	305,487	92,765	114,093	398,135	5,173,458	19%
Qtr 3 2004	329,616	156,557	71,967	137,200	1,404,244	2,099,584	8%
Qtr 4 2004	150,370	1,065,286	925,096	196,886	1,251,706	3,589,344	13%
Qtr 1 2005	898,981	943,507	2,112,371	686,348	394,603	5,035,810	19%
Qtr 2 2005	371,694	31,956	177,248	87,961	275,806	944,665	3%
Qtr 3 2005	269,659	1,800	177,095	117,390	21,117	587,061	2%
Qtr 4 2005	13,240	75,715	305,163	232,774	234,389	861,281	3%
Qtr 1 2006	.	131,081	1,336,085	111,820	5,200	1,584,186	6%
Qtr 2 2006 (partial)	.	59,032	554,874	27,982	.	641,888	2%
Total	7,275,069	4,143,758	14,688,273	2,601,959	6,180,841	34,889,900	129%
% that direct beneficiaries are of total Iraq population	27%	15%	54%	10%	23%	129%	

Perhaps it is understandable that early claims might be exuberant. And certainly a conflating (and inflating) beneficiary figure is the fact that an IP supports multiple projects in the same place at the same time, and also across time. But this is no excuse for lack of a clear methodology for measurement of an indicator – or in the case of indirect beneficiaries, perhaps its simple deletion

Such ridiculous figures lay ICAP open to unnecessary challenges. They encourage the mistaken assumption that all other data collected are of the same low standard. Indeed, IP and USAID staff alike offered comments like “Congress has started to smell something fishy,” and “Numbers like this can come back to bite us.”

Senior managers of various IPs went on to say how eager they are to gain uniform definitions and measurement methods for these and other indicators. The evaluation team concurs that this is an urgent need. Indeed, it should be addressed even before ICAP II goes forward. Whereas recommendations have been made in the past for measuring beneficiaries for some

types of projects (recall Table 4.4), these need to be revisited with a review of current practices. The methodology used to make these estimates should be consistent for all IPs.

The aim of measurement should be the direct attribution of project benefits, for instance by: the number of people who actually use a facility; where no facility existed in the past, the number who use such facilities in other areas (usually this is not the entire population of a catchment area); or increases in the ability to provide more and better services. An example is an IRD project⁸ that claims 1,500,000 direct beneficiaries based on marginal improvements to existing health clinics (see Annex E-1 outliers). Such an attribution is doubtful. When direct beneficiary numbers are high, it generally follows that attribution is low, and at best represents an indirect benefit. A smaller number based on a sound measurement method may not look as impressive, but it will stand up to rigorous examination.

Employment. CAG projects create two types of employment: short-term, which is generated during and as part of project implementation; and long-term, which results from new, permanent jobs created by the completed project. For example, cleaning and repairing an irrigation canal creates the first type of employment, while the completed canal along with newly installed pumping facilities creates new resources (irrigated land) and thus employment opportunities in the cropping sector.

Short-term employment is typically calculated in terms of jobs created by the project contractor, and it is documented by signed time sheets. It is counted both by the number of jobs and the number of workdays. Because these counts are documented, short-term employment is hard evidence of attribution of benefits. Overall the quality of PRS data on this indicator is high.

When it comes to long-term jobs, the ideal way to count these is as the recorded number of salaried positions offered by the firm or institution assisted. MC's tracking sheet defines long-term employment in this way, for instance.⁹ This constitutes evidence of direct project attribution. However, this type of information is not always available, e.g. for more general economic development project such as marketplace construction or installation of an irrigation pump. For business development projects, for example, the probable number of jobs to be generated creation can be part of the business plan that is reviewed by the IP and the CAG. In cases like these, long-term job numbers are performance estimates, which should be supported by the assumptions made.

Of course, since estimates are forward-looking, there is always the risk that jobs may not materialize or may not last. But this does not obviate the need for realistic assumptions. For instance, for rehabilitated vocational or technical schools, some IPs equated the number of long term-jobs created to the number of students (again, see Annex E-1's outliers). But the assumptions underlying this equation are improbable, i.e., that 100% of students will graduate, and that the marketplace will offer 100% of graduates a job or a business opportunity.

Thus, some long-term job estimates currently reported in the PRS should be discounted. A possible discount rate is the current unemployment rate measured annually by COSIT (the GOI's Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology). That said, however, overall the quality of long-term employment data is good, with reasonable attribution.

Contributions. The calculation of beneficiaries' and other groups' contributions to CAG projects was investigated by the evaluation team. IPs' responses to the team's multiple-question e-mail on this and related topics (Annex E-2) showed similarities across IPs in these

⁸ IRD 418, Baghdad, Supply Medical Equipment and Furniture to (Health Administration and 5 Health Clinics in Sadr District), direct beneficiaries estimated at 1,500,000

⁹ Mercy Corps CAP Tracking Sheet Instructions

calculations. All report on three types of contributions – community, LG, and other. All contributions are ultimately translated into US dollar (USD) values for PRS entry.

Project contributions are auditable and count toward achieving the target “match” or cost-share of not less than 15% of total project costs that is required of all IPs. If this match is not met, USAID can deduct the difference from remaining monies due an IP or charge the difference directly to the IP. At one extreme, A/V draws its cost-share entirely from local contributions to projects. At the other extreme, IRD makes it match chiefly from international donation. But whatever the source, all contributions have a documented audit trail.

“Community contributions” consist mainly of in-kind donations of labor, food, materials, and services made by community members to support project development. Since this is an auditable project input, IPs must document how the value of such donations has been calculated. The evaluation team found that the calculation of community contributions was methodologically sound and well documented, and that the quality of data collection was good.

However, it is likely that the figures are underestimated. For one thing, it is often difficult for IPs to obtain correct and timely documentation of community contributions. As one interviewee expressed it, “This is a significant challenge... Collecting documentation is very difficult in Iraq, and is extremely time-consuming for our field staff. Often the community does not have receipts... [So] The documentation requirements often result in only a portion of the community contribution actually being reported.” Another IP manager estimated that community contribution is under-reported by 5% to 10%. (For greater detail, consult Annex E-2.)

All IPs aim for a community contribution of between 15-25% of “total project cost” or value, which they consider to be an indicator of community “ownership” of a project. However, nowhere is “total project cost” operationalized. This could be easily remedied by reference to the project approval documentation that all IPs use. For instance, CHF’s approval procedure includes a project price estimate, followed by the Bill of Quantity (BOQ), a final pricing by experts, and lists of labor contributions and contractor costs.

However, such procedures leave uncertain whether LG, contractor, and “other” contributions are included in the total cost-basis. Given this uncertainty, the evaluation team recommends that “community ownership” be calculated as an index based only on the community contribution, divided by project grant amount plus the community contribution. Such an index yields a value of from 0 to 1, and is easily calculated from existing data. The index is not a summary measure, but is the statistical distribution of the index calculated for each project. A summary measure based total community contribution is like GDP; it lets you say the community is wealthy or poor, but it will not help identify the extent of those who might be impoverished.

When the grant amount is 0, the index is 1. This means a CAG has found alternative funding to execute a project on its own. Such events are indicative of “complete” community ownership and also of CAG effectiveness and sustainability. Thus they should be included in the PRS despite having no monetary support from ICAP. But because such events have had no mandated tracking, to date less than 0.3% of projects in the PRS show zero grant funding. Thus these data, too, are probably understated.

“LG contributions” typically consist of TA, donations of furnishings, land allocations, and supply of equipment (either outright or on loan, as in survey equipment). LG contributions are fairly well-documented although, again, IPs say they sometimes have trouble getting receipts. Land value estimation procedures were not investigated in this evaluation. Since there is not an active and well-documented land or housing market in Iraq, the basis for estimation of land values could be flawed.

“Other contributions” come mostly from international assistance in cash or kind funneled through the IP (recall Chapter 1’s table of ICAP funding), plus in-kind or labor donations by project contractors that go over and above the BOQ requirements. Although “other contributions” are tallied as part of an IP’s match, not all of them are expended at the project level. This means that such non-project-based values cannot be entered in the PRS. Thus, relying on the PRS as the sole source of information on “other contributions” almost certainly underestimates them.

To summarize, there is more confidence in the community contribution data than in LG or “other” contributions recorded in the PRS. Overall, however, the quality of project contribution data is high. At the same time, these data are very likely under-reported across the board.

Project Typology. Project type is not reported uniformly on IPs’ project tracking sheets, nor is this coded into the PRS systematically. Individual IPs have different structures for this fundamental variable, despite benchmark types defined in the various CAs. Table 4.2 above uniformly identified a sector code to be used with the PRS. However, these have not been adhered to. IPs have added or removed codes over the LOP. This all becomes very awkward, to say the least, when project data are entered into the PRS and, thereafter, manipulated for various kinds of aggregate analyses by program objectives (specified in Y2 and Y3 CAs) or other parameters.

The evaluation team therefore compared PRS project descriptions (a text field) with the coding of project types as listed in Table 1.7 in Chapter 1. This comparison revealed that many projects were misclassified or, in 29.5% of cases, unclassified. In the original data provided to the team,¹⁰ projects were classified according to the types shown in Chapter 1’s Table 1.7 as determined by the ICAP CTO and/or Activity Manager. After the team’s survey expert vetted the data file, unclassified projects were reduced to 5.8%.¹¹ This residual consisted of projects for which the coding structure was inadequate.

Table 4.7 illustrates the resulting differences, aligning similar project classifications horizontally and taking PRS sectors as stated in the Y3 Mod as the benchmark. The table shows how codes are inconsistent with the benchmarks, and the codes are not fully propagated to IPs’ coding structures.

There appears to be a pervasive mis-understanding about the purpose of the project-type code among IPs and also USAID/Iraq. As Table 4.7 suggests, at one time or another and by one entity or another, many distinct variables have been conflated in a single classification/code. These include:

- Project sectors – education, health, etc.
- Target beneficiaries of projects – war victims, youth, women
- Source of project funding – implicit in the “war victims” classification and in the breakdown of other classifications such as infrastructure
- Project (or program) objective – humanitarian assistance, business or economic development, civic outreach

¹⁰ Initially, the team received a spreadsheet of ICAP projects up through February 2006, with the classifications shown in Table 1.1 Later, the team received data up through May 2006. But the latter were not coded, and so it was necessary to merge the two datasets in order to transfer the project codes.

¹¹ This is for projects that are completed or underway. There were 4,861 such projects as of the end of May 2006. Approximately 60 more were added between then and the end of July 2006. These were not included in the team’s analyses.

Table 4.7 Comparison of Classifications of Project Type

PRS Sectors per Y3 CA (benchmark)	ICAP Project List Definitions	SC's "Primary" Program Code Descriptions (Dec 05)	Project Types per MC's Tracking Sheet (Jul 06)	Project Sectors per CHF's Tracking Sheet (Aug 06)
A	B	C	D	E
electricity		electricity	electricity	electricity
education	schools/education	education	school	education
health	health	health	health	health
roads and bridges	roads & bridges	transportation	road	roads
water and sanitation	water & sewerage	water	water/sanitation	water
war victims	war victims			
economy	business development/ economic development	economic	income generation	income generation
youth	youth			sports
other	Not elsewhere classified	other		
women				
agriculture				irrigation
public spaces		public spaces		recreational
civic outreach		civic outreach		
humanitarian assistance		humanitarian assistance		
		sanitation		cleaning
		environment	environmental	environmental
		telecom		
				sewage
			infrastructure	construction
			job creation (jobs)	vocational

In an optimal MIS structure, codes are expected to fully describe the possible response universe, with each code being unique and not overlapping with others. The objective is to avoid ambivalent codes. This currently is not the case in the PRS. A prime example is inclusion of "war victims" in the current codes (See Column A in Table 4.7). This is at once a population of target beneficiaries and a reference to funding source, i.e. the "Marla" monies. Furthermore, in terms of project sectors and activities, Marla projects can and do deal with a wide spectrum of sectors, plus a wide variety of activities within a sector. And they can have differing project objectives, including all those bulleted above.

Even more confounding is the fact that sources of project funding may call for a subset of special accounting codes within sources. This conundrum emerged during budget-related reconciliation of PRS data to conform to required IRMO (i.e. IRRF I and II) budget allocations and reporting by sector and sub-sector. However, these had not been communicated to IPs by USAID/Iraq in a timely or coherent fashion (recall Section 3.1). This situation obliged USAID/Iraq managers of ICAP to go back three years into ICAP and more correctly re-assign IRRF sector and sub-sector codes by hand to more than 5,000 CAG projects.

Some IPs have attempted to clarify such muddles by adding to the coding structure. Notably, by the beginning of Y3, SC made provision for recording IRRF I and II funding sources in its project tracking (as per Annex 1 in SC's Semi-Annual Report of Jan-Jun 2005). SC also introduced a "program code" with four levels: primary, secondary 1, secondary 2, and tertiary. For its part, A/V included a detailed project-type identification as page 6 of its Project Application Form.

However, this information was not reflected in A/V's weekly project tracking sheets submitted to USAID/Iraq.

- ❖ *Best Practice: A/V's sheet on project types could be a good starting point for developing a new project-type coding system. Its code structure makes room for many different project types and sub-types, employing 12 major categories with as many as 7 sub-categories.*

In sum, as it currently stands, the PRS contains a mishmash of ambivalent codes when it comes to even a basic classification of CAG projects. A telling datum is that the online MIS currently in use by CRDA (which was the model for the ICAP's PRS) lists more than 100 possibilities for project type. (Interested readers can view these by going to the "projects" menu choice on the home page of the website cited in the opening to this chapter.)

PRS Recommendations

- USAID/Iraq should follow through on its original plan to provide TA to enable IPs to input PRS data online.
- In the absence of a compelling reason, discontinue the indirect beneficiary estimate. It will not stand up to scrutiny.
- Comply with RIG recommendations that "USAID/Iraq develop and implement a plan of action to improve the integrity of the data in the Community Action Program's Project List in order for it to be a more effective monitoring tool and a more accurate and reliable data source for reporting purposes."
- Among other things, this implies renewed attention to the standardization of data definitions under the proposed consortium.

4.2. AN ICAP PROGRAM REPORTING SYSTEM

Program Foci

As adumbrated in Chapter 3, ICAP's present MIS deals only with CAG projects. Unfortunately, it ignores the defining thrust of the Iraq Community Action Program as a whole – which is to foster CAG organization and participation in such projects as a learn-by-doing heuristic for inculcating more general knowledge and principles of Iraqi citizens' hands-on exercise of their newly won democratic freedoms.

Of course, each of the five IPs followed the same, albeit very general, program guidelines (see again Table 1.4 of ICAP foci). From these gross guidelines, IPs charted their particular activities, projects, and program goals. And in their semi-annual reports, IPs addressed progress on overall program objectives as best they could given shifting programmatic foci across the LOP, the lack of an RF and associated indicators, and the absence of any MIS capability for capturing programmatic advances, even had they enjoyed the benefits of an RF.

Under ICAP II, however, this deficient approach to M&E – in which half of any good PRS (i.e., the program part) is "missing in action" -- must be remedied. To this end, it would make sense to convert program foci into program codes within a new, relational PRS wherein the "P" stands for "program" instead of "project." Within such an MIS, relevant sectors, beneficiaries, and funding sources/sub-sources could all be properly identified – but now under the relevant programmatic objectives, and with indicators to capture outcome and impact data.

With this kind of structure, project inputs, activities and outputs (akin to sub-IRs) could be rolled up into program outcomes and impacts (i.e., IRs, and SOs). In this regard, it is fortunate that ICAP guidelines and foci line up fairly well with USAID/Iraq's previous RF and the relevant SO and indicators therein, as well as the new ones under construction at the time of this writing.

This will make for better USAID/Iraq oversight and management of ICAP and reporting on the program to Congress and other interested parties.

A Unified and Expanded PRS Coding Structure

For this to happen, however, the PRS coding structure needs to be unified and improved by systematically re-thinking and, where necessary, adding accounting, project, beneficiary, and program codes keyed to the USG's country strategy statement for Iraq (USAID 2005), the relevant SO of the Mission's PMP as linked to a PMP for ICAP itself, and of course USAID's financial management systems. The latter include some unique reporting requirements, such as USM categories like the Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) and the Commander's Humanitarian Relief & Reconstruction Fund (CHRRF) plus special IRMO requirements under IRRF I and II.

Fortunately, IPs' internal management systems already have some pertinent data systems and procedures for responding to much of the foregoing. Although currently these are not standardized across IPs nor reported to USAID/Iraq in a uniform way (if at all), an example of such best practices that could help in overhauling the PRS coding structure is the following.

- ❖ *Best Practice: SC's December 2005 project tracking sheet included improved codings that captured funding sources, plus primary, secondary and tertiary levels of program as well as project performance.*

Program and Process, Not Just Project

ICAP began under USAID/Iraq's previous RF and its SO 4.2 to "Increase citizen participation in local government decision making." The purpose and statement of work from the program description in IRD's Y1 CA (p. 11) are illustrative of how IPs as a whole responded to this objective.

[the] purpose of the program will be to form Community Action Committees (CACs)¹² to serve as the management structure by which citizens actively engage in identifying, prioritizing and selecting improvement projects to:

1. energize improved citizen participation and intercommunity cooperation;
2. improve social and economic infrastructure;
3. increase incomes and jobs; and
4. improve environmental conditions and practices.

IRD is mindful, however, that *the process of citizen participation, through the formation of these committees, is the true purpose of the CAP rather than the projects themselves.* [italics added].

In other words, process trumps project when it comes to ICAP results. Y2 and Y3 of ICAP continued this emphasis, as per the following bullet points from Modification 02 as to ICAP aims.

- Grassroots democratization
- Critical needs being met while fostering citizen involvement in community development
- Process-driven and demand-based development -- ICAP project funding provides the incentive and the benefit to communities willing to actively engage in the CAP process that results in completed projects that directly benefit their communities
- Formation of informal community action groups (CAGs) through a democratic process to represent their community's needs and priorities

¹² The partners initially referred to community groups using different terminology. CAC was used by IRD, A/V used Community Boards, while MC used Community Development Groups. They later adopted the CAG terminology.

This Y2 modification further emphasized that “The program in each region needs to focus increasingly on the *process* [italics added] by which the communities are engaged, while still maintaining the pace and progress of accomplishments generated from successful project implementation.” Y3 modifications and IP responses continued this emphasis. For example, CHF’s program strategy was, via projects, to “...build...the bedrock for open and transparent *processes* [italics added] between community and local government” (p. 5 of CHF’s Y3 CA). A/V, IRD, and MC all voiced similar strategies to ensure the process of democratic development.

Put another way, projects are the artifacts of a CAG’s ability to work in a democratic fashion internally and with local government to satisfy an identified community need. It is the process of a CAG’s becoming an effective participant in local development that is ICAP’s primary concern. The completion of community projects is an output of CAG development; but the development of the CAG itself and of its members’ understanding and exercise of democratic processes and rights (hopefully also along with salubrious effects on LG agencies) constitute the true outcomes and impacts.

Inadequate PRS Architecture and Indicators

To date, USAID/Iraq has mandated that only ICAP projects (outputs) be routinely monitored and reported (however, see also Section 4.3.) But for all the reasons just cited above, standardized indicators of CAG activity (mainly projects), CAG development processes (including training for CAG and community members, and higher-order programmatic effects (see Section 4.3) need to be crafted and tracked with the same systematic approach and vigor as is presently devoted to CAG projects.

Moreover, for more powerful and meaningful analysis of ICAP as a whole, data at all these levels need to be “inter-relate-able,” so to speak. Unfortunately, the PRS’ present architecture does not permit of any such linkages and analyses, even if the desired indicators existed. This is because the PRS’ architecture is non-relational. Shifting the PRS from its present Microsoft Excel platform to a relational platform such as Microsoft Access is the first step.

Assuming relational capability, the next step is to craft valid, measurable, etc. indicators of programmatic success. To IPs’ credit, they took pains to report at least qualitatively and anecdotally on CAG processes and development in the required monthly and semi-annual reports, even in the absence of any such indicators.

Moreover, IPs themselves were concerned early on with the need for such measures. One example is found in Annex 1 of SC’s December 2003 Semi-annual Report, which presented CAG process indicators keyed to the relevant SO of USAID/Iraq’s RF at the time (Table 4.8). Unfortunately, these indicators seem not to have gone anywhere.

Thus perhaps it comes as little surprise that at a second all-IP conference in Amman held in Fall 2004, both USAID/Iraq and IPs were still struggling with the lack of standardized indicators for real results reporting on ICAP. As the conference report informs (Jawara and Purnell 2004: page 40):

The focus of the monitoring and evaluation discussion was on the identification and adoption of five indicators to better capture and validate the longer-term impact of the [I]CAP process. This type of criteria will strengthen [I]CAP’s ability to substantiate the attainment of its desired legacy and provide evidence upon which to seek future funding. The adopted criteria were:

- # of CAGs trained
- # of trainings held by CAGs

- # of meetings
- # of attendees
- # of CAG members in other leadership roles (profiles)
- # of projects in good condition 3 to 6 months after completion

Table 4.8 SC Indicators for Program/Process


I-CAP Performance Monitoring Plan		Performance Indicator	Unit	Source of data	Baseline	Performance Target	
Results						Year 1	Year 2
SO 4.2	Increase Citizen Participation in Local Government Decision Making	Number of projects completed	Number of beneficiaries	Community Associations			
		Number of beneficiaries of CAP project	Number of beneficiaries	Community Associations			
IR 4.2.1	Increase citizen participation	Number of community associations established	Number of associations	project team			
		Composition of associations is reflective of diversity* of local communities	Percent of associations that reflect community composition	project team			
		Number of citizens participating in community association activities (disaggregated by gender)	Number of citizens	project team, community association, community			
IR 4.2.1	Promote inter-community cooperation	Number of cluster committees meeting at least 3 times a year	Number of committee meetings	Meeting documents			
		Number of joint activities implemented by cluster committees	Number of activities	Implementation reports			
		Number of cross tribal, religious and ethnic activities	Number of activities	Implementation reports			
IR 4.2.3	Improve social and economic infrastructure	Number of projects improving infrastructure	Number of projects	project team			
		Number of civil society projects	Number of projects	project team			
IR 4.2.4	Increase incomes and create jobs	Employment generated	Number of person months	Project team			
		Number of organized economic units that receive direct financial or technical benefit		Project team			
		Number of new businesses created	Number	project team			
IR 4.2.5	Improve environmental conditions and practices	Environment-related organizations/entities created	Number of bodies	project team			
		Environmental activities implemented	Number of activities	Community Associations			

In addition to the foregoing efforts, at least two other IPs (A/V and IRD) identified some higher-order indicators, beyond just project (i.e., output) data. But if ever collected, these measures do not appear to have been reported to USAID/Iraq. And again, SC's early lead in this arena may prove most instructive.

- ❖ *Best Practice: Annex 2 of SC's December 2003 Semi-annual Report appears to incorporate links among projects, community, community group and other projects. (See Figure 4.1 below). This is the kind of concept that would better serve monitoring, evaluation, and reporting on ICAP results, as versus merely outputs.*

“New PRS” Recommendations

- Revise the PRS so that it becomes an online relational database capable of housing and manipulating program as well as project effects, inter-linking SOs, IRs, Outputs, and Activities so as to provide timely management decision making and reporting information at different levels of users and analysis.
- To this end, USAID/Iraq should vigorously support the review and development of all necessary, unified codes for ICAP II M&E and reporting. This should be done in close consultation with IPs and drawing upon best M&E practices of each during ICAP I -- and of course also USAID/Iraq's PMP, once that is finalized.
- Once this review is complete and a new coding structure has been devised, a new PRS should be implemented as originally envisioned, i.e. as an online web-enabled database that all authorized USAID and IP users can access.



The screenshot displays the 'SC/CRS/Caritas ICAP Database' interface. At the top, there are navigation tabs: 'Project', 'Community', 'Community Group', and 'Additional Projects'. The main form is divided into several sections:

- Project Information:** Includes fields for 'Project Title', 'CAG/CDG Name', 'Community', 'Governate', 'District', 'IP project', and 'IP'.
- Project Status:** Includes a dropdown for 'Project Status' and input fields for 'Planned starting date', 'Planned closing date', and 'Planned project cost'.
- Sector:** A section with checkboxes for 'Education', 'Water', 'Health', 'Environment', 'Agriculture', 'Income generation', and 'Community service'.
- Cluster project:** Includes a checkbox for 'Cluster project' and a field for '# cluster communities'.
- Project Completion:** Includes a checkbox for 'Project COMPLETED' and a field for 'Actual Project Cost'.
- Actual Dates and Days:** Includes input fields for 'Actual Starting Date', 'Actual Closing Date', and '# project days'.
- Income and Jobs Created:** A section with input fields for '# businesses assisted', '# businesses created', '# people employed', 'Total # days worked', and '# person days employed'.
- Project Supplies (actual):** A section with input fields for 'Kilometers of potable water pipes', 'Kilometers of sewer lines', 'Kilometers of electrical wiring', 'Kilometers of irrigation lines', and 'Kilometers of roads repaired'.

At the bottom of the form, there are buttons for 'Previous', 'Next', 'Delete', 'New', and 'Close'.

Figure 4.1 Screen Shot of SC's Computerized M&E System for ICAP

4.3. OTHER ASPECTS OF ICAP M&E SYSTEMS

Reporting on Program and Process as Well as Projects

IPs report to USAID/Iraq monthly on ICAP activities. The content of reports differs across IPs, but for the most part it is limited to the sub-program level and it fails to fulfill M&E promises made in IPs' CAs, as bulleted below.

- A/V reports the number of CAGs, but not their activities or performance.
- CHF reports what it calls "basic indicators," but these include only the number of consultations plus various M&E activities.
- IRD reports CAG numbers, but focuses mainly on project activities. Yet on page 38 of its CA, IRD put forward illustrative "goal indicators" that seemed well suited to measuring program performance. However, they seemed also never to have materialized.
- MC's monthly reports relate CAG numbers to an SO and certain IRs, but initially did not mention CAG activities or performance. This despite the fact that MC's CA spoke at length about:

“...monitoring systems...designed to gauge the practical effect of program activities in quantitative and qualitative terms. [I]CAP’s methodologies all permit measurement of their effectiveness over time. For example, civic participation activities will not be measured purely by the number of [CAGs] formed or projects completed... ...the [I]CAP team will use regular polls to provide much-needed baselines against which the impact of participation activities can be measured over time. Additional activities will include measurements of beneficiary satisfaction with the elected committees at the community and cluster level, as well as satisfaction with improved infrastructure and quality of services.”

Later on, MC’s M&E tools were anticipated to include an Empowerment Index to “...understand and gauge the Iraqi people’s view of their control and input into decision-making processes over time” (p 40-41 of MC’s CA)

- SC speaks of Customer Satisfaction Surveys...to assess community views of CAG/CDG performance” (p, 40 of SC’s CA). The evaluation was not able to confirm whether these satisfaction surveys were completed. But again, SC’s monthly reports focus on project completion and the formation of new CAGs with little additional information on CAG performance. SC’s semi-annual reports also note the number of citizens actively participating in the CAGs.

Unfortunately, the evaluation team did not find evidence of the development or application of the useful-sounding M&E tools noted in the above. But by the same token, neither did it find evidence that USAID/Iraq ever demanded much higher-order programmatic M&E from IPs.

Recent M&E Innovations

A/V is presently introducing a broad-based M&E system. Field monitoring forms have been drafted for all aspects of ICAP. They are designed to capture both qualitative and quantitative information on A/V CAGs, both Marla and non-Marla projects, and training. A database has been proposed, but reportedly the monitoring forms are still being tested.

According to Annex 4 of its Data Collection and Reconciliation System, MC recently introduced a Transformative Activity Questionnaire to collect program management information from MC staff, CAGs, and participants in CAG Transformative events. This kind of instrument would be applicable to other activities as well, such as training. It clearly marks a start at performance monitoring. Perhaps most significant is the following IRD effort, however.

- ❖ *Best Practice: IRD has developed a CAG database. Among other things, it incorporates a field for an evaluative score of CAG processes, characteristics, and performance. Using a scale of 1 to 4, these are assessed along 11 dimensions (Figure 4.1). An individual CAG’s 11 scores are summed to yield a single, composite score. This index score is what is then entered in the database.*

#	Dimensions	Evaluation
1-	Self-confidence	
2-	Willingness to change	
3-	Direct effort in the program	
4-	Participation in meeting	
5-	Ownership	
6-	Strategic thinking	
7-	Attendance at meetings	
8-	Number of meetings without IRD	
9-	Gender balance	
10-	Inclusion	
11-	Community gender balance	
	Total	

Your evaluation of your CAGs should be measured according to the following criteria.

Score

Strong	4
Good	3
Fair	2
Weak	1

Figure 4.2 IRD's CAG Evaluation Score Sheet

IRD's score sheet represents a laudable start at capturing CAG processes and performance for greater monitoring and evaluation of program. However, a number of ways in which it might be improved come to mind. For example:

- Individual IP scores on the 11 dimensions should also be reported so that CAG shortcomings can be identified and then remedied through targeted capacity building.
- The 11 dimensions themselves might be expanded to include indicators for CAG interaction with local government, community advocacy, and sustainability.
- Currently, the evaluation is conducted by community mobilizers. To ensure uniform application of the instrument, mobilizers should receive a formal training and a brief written module on the score sheet that includes examples of strong, good, fair, and poor ratings for each dimension.

An ICAP PMP

As noted repeatedly throughout this evaluation, a major design flaw in ICAP I was the lack of a PMP and all that it implies: an RF linked to USAID/Iraq's, and a clear Goal, SO, IRs, Outputs, etc. with equally clear corresponding indicators as per the PMP Toolkit's indicator reference sheets.

Were such an ICAP PMP written today, then as per page 77 of the draft *USAID/Iraq Performance Management Plan: 2006-2008* (shared only confidentially with the evaluation team), the program's formal Goal would be that of the Mission's SO 9: "Responsive and Effective Local Government Strengthened." ICAP's sole SO would equal IR 9.3: "Outreach mechanisms for citizen participation in local development are institutionalized."

Mission indicators envisioned for IR 9.3 point the way to what would become required ICAP IRs or Outputs for USAID purposes, although IPs need not and should not limit themselves to these.

The point here is that Mission-stipulated (as well as other) indicators need to be incorporated into a regular (say, quarterly) monitoring and reporting mechanism available to the CTO. As recommended above, this means a new online PRS where the “P” includes program as well as project indicators.

More specifically, as per the Mission’s draft PMP, any new database structure under ICAP II will need to capture both lower- and higher-order programmatic indicators on CAGs like the following – some quantitative, some qualitative. Note that this list is only tentative.

- Number and types of CAGs.
- CAG membership by sex and age.
- Projects carried out by each CAG, cross-referenced to project data.
- Number of new local activities carried out by CAGs.
- Number of CAGs participating in LG decision-making processes.
- Number of CAGs active in otherwise advocating for community needs with LG structures.
- Number of CAGs successful in so doing, with monetary values of LG contributions or other, qualitative evidence of their success.
- Number of provincial or other LG agencies that have established formal mechanisms for citizen participation as a response to CAG advocacy.
- Number of CAGs with an index score suggesting their continued ability in all the above and other regards that are important to USAID/Iraq and/or IPs.

But once again, none of this can be achieved in the absence of the logical thinking, frame working, and precise indicator construction and operationalization that the discipline of a PMP imposes.

External Evaluations

The present, final evaluation constitutes the only formal external evaluation conducted of ICAP. This is not surprising for at least two reasons: first, ICAP I was very much a year-to-year program due to situational and funding uncertainties; second, under normal circumstances it would be rare to conduct an external midterm evaluation of any program that is only three years long. However, circumstances in Iraq are anything but normal.

For one thing, by all reports the security situation has been steadily deteriorating since 2004. For another thing, the US public’s support for operations in the country seems to be on the wane. Meanwhile, the USG’s plan to install PRTs as the major coordinating conduit for reconstruction is far from complete. Thus under a new three-year award for ICAP, it would be prudent to plan for a “light” midterm evaluation, if only to check on such basics as: the continued validity of RF assumptions in the face shifting politico-military conditions; the quality of program functioning under its new, consortium arrangement; likewise for USAID/Iraq and its multi-part management of ICAP II under the PRT structure; the adequacy of a re-designed PRS and other M&E systems; and so forth.

A midterm evaluation also makes sense given that ICAP I has been extended through December 2006, thus adding another five months to the planned three years of the follow-on program. In view of all the foregoing, a modest midterm would constitute money well-spent.

Further M&E Recommendations

- Along with CAG descriptive data, add CAG performance measures like those incorporated IRD’s CAG database, but with the dimensions clearly aligned with program foci.



- Ensure that the relevant indicators from the final USAID/Iraq PMP are included in ICAP II data collection and reporting systems.
- Budget for a midterm as well as a final external evaluation of ICAP II.

CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION OF ICAP OUTPUTS – CAG PROJECTS

5.1. PROJECT PROCEDURES

Project Selection

CAGs are responsible for identifying and approving the types of projects they wish to undertake. IPs exercise influence over this process by identifying sources of grant funding that are available in certain sectors, e.g., Marla funds. The different IPs utilized, and trained CAGs in, slightly different criteria for the identification and selection of projects. In the aggregate, however, these criteria can be summarized as:

- visibility/transparency;
- feasibility;
- quick impact;
- cost-benefit analysis;
- long-term sustainability;
- community support, involvement and financial contribution; and
- benefit to the community.

However, criteria for economic activities differed somewhat. IRD implemented 75% of such projects under its Economic and Business Development Program (EBDP) using the following categories:

- cooperative societies grant program;
- competitive grants scheme for small and medium private enterprises (SMEs);
- technical assistance via vocational schools and managerial training;
- marketplaces; and
- handicapped assistance via vocational schools and shelter workshops.

Along with a broad and fair distribution of such grants or TA, diversity in the types of businesses assisted is a key consideration. A/V gave priority to agricultural opportunities; CHF focused on developing economic infrastructure rather than on individual businesses; IRD's high valued projects emphasized vocational schools and manufacturing (although IRD has a vast number of projects that assist individual entrepreneurs); MC encouraged market construction and electricity networks; while SC did all of the above.

Moreover, IRD requires that its business development projects incorporate what it calls a social repayment or pass-on. This concept was made famous by Heifer Project International, which requires that recipients of breed stock donations "pass on the gift" of these stock's offspring to other families or groups in their community. IRD does the same with its livestock activities, but it also expanded on this concept.

- ❖ *Best Practice: All IRD business development projects/grantees must make social repayments whereby the recipients donate money, services, products, or materials to schools, orphanages, or needy families in the community where their business is located. The local CAG decides on whether to recommend applicants for such assistance to ICAP in the first place, taking into consideration the planned pass-ons. If applications are approved, the CAG is also responsible for ensuring that promised repayments are made within 12 months' of receipt of an ICAP business-development grant. These repayments are also counted as in-kind contributions to ICAP.*

Project Bids and Contract Approvals

The evaluation team noted no major discrepancies in procedures for bidding, procurement or contracting; nor were any raised in the RIG report. All IPs are long-established USG contractors and thus have proven systems that comply with USG procurement regulations. IPs established tendering committees that conducted bid-openings in all ICAP offices and locations. Committee members consisted of IP logistics, finance, procurement, program personnel etc. Cost analyses were prepared to guarantee that prices offered by bidding companies were consistent with up-to-date market surveys.

To check on IP procedures in bidding, contract, and other regards, the evaluation team reviewed examples of projects files for their documentation vis-à-vis checklists of IP procedures.

❖ *Best Practice: Illustrative of such file systems is MC's, paraphrased in Table 5.1.*

Table 5.1 Illustrative ICAP Project File System

1. Community contact sheet, including names and contact info for all CAG members
2. CAG member information sheets
3. Community information sheet
4. Community priority list and CAG meeting minutes
5. Miscellaneous community documents and correspondence
6. Initial engineering assessment information – engineers' notes, drawings, etc.
7. Copy of the approved project proposal, including project number, beneficiary details and approval form
8. Project agreement, including cost-share details
9. Complete project design and specifications, including estimated budget
10. Original of tendering documents – for projects tendered at the same time with a shared BOQ, include only 1 page referencing the physical location of the original tendering documents
 - a. Invitation to bid with instructions
 - b. BOQ and project timeline forms
 - c. All other documents issued with the project tender
 - d. Tender invitation list of companies and signature sheet
11. Originals of tender results – same as item 10 for projects tendered at the same time with a shared BOQ
 - a. Original (signed and stamped) of bid data registry form
 - b. Bid comparison spreadsheet and selection justification
 - c. Originals of company bids, or copy of the three lowest bids with reference to physical location of original bids
 - d. Memo of justification for lack of competitive bids (if applicable)
 - e. Fax letters from companies not wishing to participate (if applicable)
 - f. Memo of justification for contract negotiations (if applicable)
 - g. Copy of bid receipt and tender package receipt forms
12. Signed and stamped construction/procurement contracts w/ attached BOQ, including both English and Arabic versions
13. Correspondence with the contractor
14. Licenses, including copies of building permits and licenses of key supervisory construction personnel (if applicable)
15. Contractor logbook/site diary
16. Final measurements and quantity calculations
17. Change order memos and BOQs (if necessary)
18. Contract amendments with final BOQs (if necessary)
19. Project monitoring reports
20. Payment history, including records of amounts and dates of all contractor payments, plus copies of all purchase/payment orders

21. Project completion and handover documentation
22. Any other reports or PR documents related to the project.

As adumbrated in Chapter 3, however, IPs naturally experienced some contracting challenges on-the-ground. For instance, unsuccessful bidders occasionally tried to mobilize CAG opinion against winning bidders. In such cases, even though IPs had made every advance effort to inform communities and contractors about USG bidding strictures, they had to invest further time and energy to dampen such conflict. As a result, IPs worked to establish a comprehensive approach to review qualifications of contractors and to invite only qualified bidders. Finally, IPs noted that procurement personnel were saddled with an extraordinary number of bidding procedures and tasks when the Marla projects suddenly came into being, in addition to the already heavy burden of normal projects.

Project Implementation

Across their three years of monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual reports, IPs documented a huge number of project successes. Other notable “success stories” prepared specifically for the present evaluation are included in Chapter 1. That said, all IPs’ regular reports also properly report on various challenges to project implementation. Consider the following “mini-cases” extracted from the reports.

- Sometimes, because communities had very little trust that A/V (or any foreign NGO) would finish the job, the community only took things seriously after contracts were signed. Therefore, after contracts were signed, municipalities expanded the scope of work, they changed the location of projects, they added or changed major items or they decided to do major repair works first. The municipality of Sadia al Shaat changed the river on which a water treatment plant would be located. Kirkuk changed the paving of the Korea market from asphalt to concrete after the contract had been signed, and then decided to do water network repair first, meaning the contractor dug up the market and then was forced to wait a few extra weeks until the municipal water repair work was finished.... water projects in the desert were always tricky as it was impossible for water to reach everyone. Boards had an important role to play in selecting beneficiaries. For example, neighboring villages complained that the water project in Hatamia would not reach them. Hatamia responded that the neighboring villages rarely shared their water resources. The neighboring villages consequently sabotaged the new pipes (from A/V’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2004).
- Security and the omnipresent insecure environment situation created project problems throughout the project cycle. Delay in obtaining government approvals for projects created havoc with project pricing, alienated communities, exacerbated local conflicts, and slowed project implementation.... project approvals got caught in bureaucratic infighting, federal/local squabbles, and turf wars. It sometimes took up to three months to obtain approvals. The date processing factory in Manderley took so long to get approvals that the coop members got jobs and were no longer interested (from A/V’s June 2005 Semi-Annual Report).
- One of the major obstacles encountered, that caused delays in implementation of community projects involved the time-consuming process of applying for and receiving authorization from municipal authorities, and ministries, allowing for commencement of rehabilitation or construction works on the projects. The provision of four schools with computers in Karaka district, took more than three months to obtain approval of all of the signatures and stamps from the Ministry of Education (from IRD’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2005).

Project Completion and Hand-Over

The time it takes to complete a project was calculated from start and end dates reported in the PRS. Some types of projects naturally take longer than others, e.g. construction versus business development. But across the LOP, one would anticipate that implementation time would diminish as IPs gained experience. Figure 5.1 depicts a slight, but general downward trend in mean project duration commencing about the 4th quarter of 2004. This can be ascribed in part to improved efficiencies; but more likely it reflects a shift away from infrastructure projects to business development. As the figure shows, along with Marla projects, business development projects take less time to complete.

Hand-over of completed community-level projects is typically accompanied by official ceremonies to celebrate CAGs' and communities' democratic efforts and to foster their and LG's continued ownership. Even before such ceremonial events, reportedly LG representatives frequently visited ICAP project sites, helping to monitor the project's progress and make it more visible to larger constituencies. All such LG participation was important in strengthening citizens' confidence in LG commitment to constituents' needs. At the same time, such events also highlighted to LG officials the growing accountability and responsiveness demanded of them by their constituents, thanks to ICAP interventions.




Figure 5.1 Mean Project Duration by Type of Project and Quarter

5.2. TYPES AND NUMBERS OF PROJECTS

Analysis of PRS Data

In the following analyses, project type derives from the project description list noted in Chapter 4. Given the known problems with PRS data discussed in Chapter 4, project type classifications are not a precise reflection of program emphasis. The tabular results presented here should therefore be considered only indicative. In the ensuing tables the evaluation analyzed all CAG projects¹³ recorded as “completed” or “underway.” In total 4,861 projects are the subject of this analysis.¹⁴ These include all projects reported to the ICAP CTO his Activity Manager by the end of May 2006.

Analysis of the PRS project list was done using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences or SPSS. It permits the restructuring of existing variables or creation of new ones from the basic data.¹⁵ One of these “created” variables is the quarter (Q) when a project was started. Each project was assigned a calendar quarter based on the start date recorded in the PRS. The first “quarter” includes projects begun before 1 July 2003. The last quarter does not include projects added during June 2006 (although there were very few of these due to budget limitations). The addition of this Q variable made possible Figure 5.1’s analysis; it also permits examination of program changes over time.

Project Portfolios across the LOP

Overview. ICAP started with the famous 50-50-90 initiative, to establish itself quickly on the ground and win credibility with communities. Peak quarters for project development were the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. Q1 and Q2 of 2004 were marked by the Sadr uprising that struck particularly hard in the South and in Baghdad, reducing the ability of community mobilization teams to work in the field.

By the end of 2004, IPs had received nearly 66% of the total funding they were to receive through June 2006. By Q2 of 2005 all IPs had received 80% to 90% of their grant funding (recall Table 1.3). About this time, however, it was unclear whether ICAP would continue for a third year. So there was another drop in the number of new projects. Thereafter, project approval and implementation continued apace until Q2 of 2006 when once again there was uncertainty (and an acute lack of funds) about whether ICAP would be extended.

Early projects tended towards higher value infrastructure. Later, economic and business development projects became the norm. This trend is reflected in the mean and median grant amounts shown in Table 5.2. By Q2 in 2005 business development and Marla projects were dominant. These tend to be low-value grant amounts. Hence the wide discrepancy between the mean and median grant value in Q2 of 2005.

¹³ CAG projects are those that are the result of the CAG development process. In reality some projects included in the PRS list were not the subject of CAG development. These tend to be training sessions or workshops.

¹⁴ For some analyses missing values will result in table totals being lower than 4861. Missing values are excluded from the analyses unless otherwise stated.

¹⁵ In SPSS this is done through recoding continuous variables into categorical variables, and computing new variables by combining existing variables to create an index or ratio.

Table 5.2 Project Numbers and Grant Amounts across the LOP

Calendar Quarter	Number of projects	Percent of Total Projects	Sum of project grants	Mean Project Grant	Median Project Grant
Qtr 3 2003 'start up'	376	7.70%	\$6,528,581	\$17,363	\$5,067
Qtr 4 2003	471	9.70%	\$15,394,054	\$32,684	\$15,179
Qtr 1 2004	298	6.10%	\$14,919,489	\$50,065	\$33,160
Qtr 2 2004	257	5.30%	\$8,960,691	\$34,867	\$13,460
Qtr 3 2004	391	8.10%	\$12,009,200	\$30,714	\$15,735
Qtr 4 2004	515	10.60%	\$18,171,612	\$35,285	\$20,500
Qtr 1 2005	645	13.30%	\$20,880,678	\$32,373	\$12,193
Qtr 2 2005	510	10.50%	\$8,901,023	\$17,453	\$802
Qtr 3 2005	250	5.20%	\$5,497,399	\$21,990	\$1,280
Qtr 4 2005	499	10.30%	\$11,754,348	\$23,556	\$2,396
Qtr 1 2006	450	9.30%	\$14,237,641	\$31,639	\$10,521
Qtr 2 2006 (partial)	192	4.00%	\$6,778,332	\$35,304	\$11,835
Total	4854	100.00%	\$144,033,048	\$29,673	\$10,310

Counts of projects by type and IP are indicative of IPs' differing project emphases. For instance, MC's focus on children as a way to engage communities is clearly reflected in Table 5.3, where education and youth projects dominate this IP's portfolio. IRD emphasized business development more than other IPs, in part due to its Baghdad location. Along with A/V, IRD operates in the most violence-prone areas. Hence these two IPs have the highest numbers of Marla projects. Overall, however, most project activities fall under business development/economic development. IRD accounted for more than 75% of these. (Compare this table with the similar Table 5.11 to see how activities line up with resource allocation.)

Table 5.3 Percentage Distribution of Projects by Type and IP

Implementing Partner	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Marla	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified
ACDI/VOCA	130 16.1%	68 8.4%	65 8.1%	87 10.8%	295 36.6%	83 10.3%	45 5.6%	32 4.0%
CHF	152 27.0%	49 8.7%	127 22.6%	82 14.6%	74 13.1%	43 7.6%	16 2.8%	20 3.6%
IRD	266 13.6%	75 3.8%	63 3.2%	60 3.1%	369 18.9%	1015 51.9%	37 1.9%	70 3.6%
Mercy Corps	192 44.9%	22 5.1%	22 5.1%	73 17.1%	23 5.4%	27 6.3%	42 9.8%	27 6.3%
Save the Children	418 37.7%	90 8.1%	135 12.2%	89 8.0%	57 5.1%	89 8.0%	97 8.7%	135 12.2%
Total	1158 23.8%	304 6.3%	412 8.5%	391 8.0%	818 16.8%	1257 25.9%	237 4.9%	284 5.8%


Changing Emphases. Project emphases changed in response to CA modifications in Y2 and Y3. As can be seen in Table 5.4, at ICAP startup in Q3 of 2003, 42.6% of projects were for schools and education. One year later (Q3 of 2004), the emphasis in new projects shifted to supporting war victims. By Q3 of 2005, however, 69.6% of projects were in business/economic development. These changes respectively reflected: program foci as outlined in the unmodified CA in Y1; the introduction of Marla funding in Y2; and USAID/Iraq's emphasis on economic development and job creation in Y3. Table 5.4's data show that IPs were in fact responsive to all the CA modifications.

Table 5.4 Percentage Distribution of Projects by Type and Quarter*

Calendar Quarter	Project Type							
	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Marla	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified
Qtr 3 2003 'start up'	42.6%	10.9%	8.2%	15.2%	0.0%	5.1%	7.2%	10.9%
Qtr 4 2003	49.5%	4.5%	15.3%	16.1%	0.0%	4.9%	4.0%	5.7%
Qtr 1 2004	32.2%	10.1%	18.5%	22.8%	1.0%	6.4%	4.7%	4.4%
Qtr 2 2004	45.1%	8.6%	7.0%	11.3%	5.1%	9.7%	5.1%	8.2%
Qtr 3 2004	16.1%	7.4%	12.0%	6.1%	35.3%	7.7%	5.6%	9.7%
Qtr 4 2004	26.0%	11.8%	11.3%	8.0%	23.5%	8.5%	2.9%	8.0%
Qtr 1 2005	18.8%	5.7%	8.2%	7.1%	36.0%	11.3%	7.4%	5.4%
Qtr 2 2005	11.2%	3.7%	1.6%	2.0%	17.5%	58.6%	2.7%	2.7%
Qtr 3 2005	10.4%	4.8%	1.2%	1.2%	6.4%	69.6%	3.6%	2.8%
Qtr 4 2005	13.6%	1.8%	5.2%	3.2%	6.2%	57.3%	5.6%	7.0%
Qtr 1 2006	14.7%	3.3%	6.9%	4.4%	19.3%	45.1%	4.0%	2.2%
Qtr 2 2006 (partial)	9.4%	3.6%	4.7%	0.0%	44.8%	31.8%	5.2%	0.5%
Total	23.9%	6.2%	8.5%	8.0%	16.8%	25.9%	4.9%	5.8%

* The percentages shown in Table 5.4 are row percentages

It is important to note that when Marla projects were tacked on to ICAP midway into the program, IPs were forced to reallocate staff and other resources away from core program objectives. Figure 5.2 shows how this mandate influenced activity allocation. In some quarters, Marla activity amounted to more than 30% of total activities. If ICAP were a humanitarian program this would make sense; but instead it is about grassroots democracy. Nevertheless, IPs proved to be very innovative in building Marla projects into the CAG concept and approach, mainly leaving it to CAGs to identify recipients worthy of Marla support.


Figure 5.2 The Impact of Marla Projects

Employment. As noted above, Y2's and especially Y3's modifications to the CA emphasized income and employment generation. Again, IPs responded, shifting to more and more projects generating long-term jobs. Figure 5.3 represents the percent of projects that generated at least one such job.

This is a more significant shift than might at first be apparent. Early CAG projects focused mainly on short-term employment. This was in part a response to the 50-50-90 initiative. But also, as ICAP matured, it was able to focus less on stabilization and more on long-term development. This accorded with USAID guidance in the various modifications. Figure 5.4 identifies projects that reported only short-term employment generation, i.e. at least one short-term but no long-term jobs. The change in emphasis is quite clear.




Figure 5.3. Changes in Long-term Employment Over Time




Figure 5.4 Diminishing Emphasis on Short-term Employment

Table 5.5 details the magnitude of long-term jobs created -- initially mainly via schools and education, but later primarily through business development projects as per CA modifications. AV and IRD have been the leaders in this arena. But overall, CAG projects reportedly have created more than 30,000 long-term jobs. This is a reasonable estimate, bearing in mind certain caveats discussed in Chapter 4 -- notably the need to discount job figures linked to vocational school rehabilitation or expansion). Still, the evaluation team found that the quality of estimates reported in the PRS has improved, and hence the values in Table 5.5 are generally reliable.

Table 5.5 Long Term Employment, by Project Type and IP

Implementing Partner	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Marla	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified	Total
ACDI/VOCA	188 3.8%	196 4.0%	7 0.1%	1185 23.9%	446 9.0%	2671 53.9%	254 5.1%	7 0.1%	4954 100.0%
CHF	104 20.4%	150 29.4%	24 4.7%	84 16.5%	61 12.0%	42 8.2%	18 3.5%	27 5.3%	510 100.0%
IRD	9639 48.0%	332 1.7%	25 0.1%	6 0.0%	217 1.1%	9672 48.1%	53 0.3%	148 0.7%	20092 100.0%
Mercy Corps	607 61.1%	21 2.1%	0 0.0%	44 4.4%	40 4.0%	83 8.4%	159 16.0%	39 3.9%	993 100.0%
Save the Children	1380 33.1%	417 10.0%	18 0.4%	252 6.0%	125 3.0%	1567 37.6%	224 5.4%	188 4.5%	4171 100.0%
Total	11918 38.8%	1116 3.6%	74 0.2%	1571 5.1%	889 2.9%	14035 45.7%	708 2.3%	409 1.3%	30720 100.0%

The PRS also records the gender of long-term job recipients. (Again, see Chapter 4 regarding documentation and data quality for long-term employment). Table 5.6 repeats Table 5.5 but with a gender dimension. Overall, more long-term jobs were created for men than for women. This is not surprising given low labor-force participation rates for women in Iraq – only 14.2% as compared to men’s 73.7% (COSIT 2003). In this context, long-term jobs generated by CAG projects can be seen as equitable.

The major source of long-term employment was business development projects, specifically IRD’s (for an exemplary list, see again Table 1.7.) These tended to be micro-grants. In the case of IRD, women were favored for such grants. MC fared less well in terms of gender balance in job creation. But its AOR represents the most traditional one, where tribal and religious leaders continue to exert a strong influence and women rarely work outside the home.

Table 5.6 Gender Distribution of Long-term Employment, by Project Type and IP

Implementing Partner	Gender of Long Term Employment	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Maria	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified	Total
ACDI/VOCA	Male	94	120	7	680	280	2049	178	7	3415
	Female	50.0%	61.2%	100.0%	57.4%	63.1%	76.7%	70.1%	100.0%	69.0%
	Total	188	196	7	1185	444	2671	254	7	4952
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
CHF	Male	52	89	24	74	23	11	18	27	318
	Female	50.0%	59.3%	100.0%	88.1%	37.7%	26.2%	100.0%	100.0%	62.4%
	Total	104	150	24	84	61	42	18	27	510
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
IRD	Male	6148	272	21	6	114	4069	48	142	10820
	Female	63.8%	81.9%	84.0%	100.0%	52.5%	42.1%	90.6%	95.9%	53.9%
	Total	9639	332	25	6	217	9672	53	148	20082
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mercy Corps	Male	406	9	0	44	36	70	122	29	716
	Female	66.9%	42.9%	0.0%	100.0%	90.0%	84.3%	76.7%	74.4%	72.1%
	Total	607	21	0	44	40	83	159	39	993
		100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Save the Children	Male	818	260	17	221	116	868	178	130	2608
	Female	59.3%	62.4%	94.4%	87.7%	92.8%	55.4%	79.5%	69.1%	62.5%
	Total	1380	417	18	252	125	1567	224	188	4171
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Male	7518	750	69	1025	569	7067	544	335	17877
	Female	63.1%	67.2%	93.2%	65.2%	64.0%	50.4%	76.8%	81.9%	58.2%
	Total	11918	1116	74	1571	889	14035	708	409	30720
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As detailed in Chapter 4, PRS data on short-term employment are well-documented, with strong attribution to CAG projects. ICAP created more than 81,000 such jobs (see Table 5.7). AV and MC were the major contributors. The largest number of short-term jobs derived from school and education projects; the second largest came from business/economic development projects; and in AV’s case, large-scale agriculture projects were also important.

Table 5.7 Short-term Employment, by Project Type and IP

Implementing Partner	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Maria	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified	Total
ACDI/VOCA	3208	4746	3524	2165	1482	7626	1346	886	24983
	12.8%	19.0%	14.1%	8.7%	5.9%	30.5%	5.4%	3.5%	100.0%
CHF	1844	1127	2220	2049	1748	534	431	3196	13149
	14.0%	8.6%	16.9%	15.6%	13.3%	4.1%	3.3%	24.3%	100.0%
IRD	3960	608	830	625	1275	1409	581	501	9789
	40.5%	6.2%	8.5%	6.4%	13.0%	14.4%	5.9%	5.1%	100.0%
Mercy Corps	8565	1129	992	2174	528	992	1932	822	17134
	50.0%	6.6%	5.8%	12.7%	3.1%	5.8%	11.3%	4.8%	100.0%
Save the Children	4531	1817	2475	1390	950	1780	1660	1643	16246
	27.9%	11.2%	15.2%	8.6%	5.8%	11.0%	10.2%	10.1%	100.0%
Total	22108	9427	10041	8403	5983	12341	5950	7048	81301
	27.2%	11.6%	12.4%	10.3%	7.4%	15.2%	7.3%	8.7%	100.0%

Overall, 96% of the short-term jobs created went to men. In addition to the COSIT labor-force statistics cited above, for stabilization purposes it makes sense to hire men. Furthermore, many of these jobs were in construction, mainly as laborers on CAG contracts. Still, IPs might consider encouraging contractors to hire more women in appropriate positions by adding a gender factor to contractor qualifications. SC wins kudos for its rate of 12.7% females in short-term jobs. This achievement suggests that other IPs could do better in this regard, although attribution may have more to do with project mix than with gender policy.

Table 5.8 Gender Distribution of Short-term Employment, by Project Type and IP

Implementing Partner	Gender of Short Term Employment	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Marla	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified	Total
ACDI/VOCA	Male	3170	4654	3519	2092	1474	7434	1331	884	24558
		98.8%	98.1%	99.9%	96.6%	99.5%	97.5%	98.9%	99.8%	98.3%
	Female	38	92	5	73	8	192	15	2	425
		1.2%	1.9%	0.1%	3.4%	0.5%	2.5%	1.1%	0.2%	1.7%
CHF	Total	3208	4746	3524	2165	1482	7626	1346	886	24983
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Male	1834	1119	2209	2037	1740	510	427	3189	13065
		99.5%	99.3%	99.5%	99.4%	99.5%	95.5%	99.1%	99.8%	99.4%
IRD	Female	10	8	11	12	8	24	4	7	84
		0.5%	0.7%	0.5%	0.6%	0.5%	4.5%	0.9%	0.2%	0.6%
	Total	1844	1127	2220	2049	1748	534	431	3196	13149
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mercy Corps	Male	3960	608	830	625	1275	1409	581	501	9789
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Save the Children	Total	3960	608	830	625	1275	1409	581	501	9789
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Male	8280	1113	970	2135	528	700	1930	792	16448
		96.7%	98.6%	97.8%	98.2%	100.0%	70.6%	99.9%	96.4%	96.0%
Total	Female	285	16	22	39	0	292	2	30	686
		3.3%	1.4%	2.2%	1.8%	0.0%	29.4%	0.1%	3.6%	4.0%
	Total	8565	1129	992	2174	528	992	1932	822	17134
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Male	3964	1007	2475	1389	846	1345	1589	1589	14204
		87.5%	55.4%	100.0%	99.9%	89.1%	75.6%	95.7%	96.7%	87.4%
	Female	567	812	0	1	104	435	93	54	2066
		12.5%	44.7%	0.0%	0.1%	10.9%	24.4%	5.6%	3.3%	12.7%
Total	Total	4531	1817	2475	1390	950	1780	1660	1643	16246
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Male	21208	8501	10003	8278	5863	11398	5858	6955	78064
		95.9%	90.2%	99.6%	98.5%	98.0%	92.4%	98.5%	98.7%	96.0%
Total	Female	900	928	38	125	120	943	114	93	3261
		4.1%	9.8%	0.4%	1.5%	2.0%	7.6%	1.9%	1.3%	4.0%
	Total	22108	9427	10041	8403	5983	12341	5950	7048	81301
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Project Direct Beneficiaries

Chapter 4 has already dealt with weaknesses and anomalies in measuring direct and indirect beneficiaries of CAG projects. Interestingly, more than 70% of the former were recorded by the end of 2004. Possibly as a result of the RIG report, counts of direct beneficiaries were reduced for the remainder of ICAP.

Table 5.9 looks at the gender distribution of direct beneficiaries. It shows that, overall, this was fairly balanced. Since for most projects direct beneficiaries comprise the population living in a given "catchment area," one would expect beneficiary distributions to reflect the demographics of the area. A possible exception to this are youth projects. They tend to involve sports facilities; and traditionally boys are more active in sports than girls. This fact is reflected in a gender imbalance in such projects.

Table 5.9 Gender Distribution of Project Beneficiaries, by Project Type and IP

Implementing Partner	Gender of Direct Beneficiaries	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Marla	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified	Total
ACDI/VOCA	Male	195918	1314493	447314	716770	67939	241017	62002	791066	3836519
		54.6%	52.7%	48.8%	52.6%	65.5%	52.3%	66.2%	52.3%	52.5%
	Female	162758	1180452	470008	647022	35855	219881	31589	721568	3469133
		45.4%	47.3%	51.2%	47.4%	34.5%	47.7%	33.8%	47.7%	47.5%
CHF	Male	358676	2494945	917322	1363792	103794	460898	93591	1512634	7305662
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Female	119769	1017303	941513	274364	2876	89271	41722	52105	2538923
		55.0%	45.4%	50.2%	47.5%	44.5%	45.6%	80.3%	47.7%	48.1%
IRD	Male	97797	1225241	933232	302711	3583	106475	10204	57092	2736335
		45.0%	54.6%	49.8%	52.5%	55.5%	54.4%	19.7%	52.3%	51.9%
	Female	217566	2242544	1874745	577075	6459	195746	51926	109197	5275258
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mercy Corps	Male	220115	2831580	587820	2612184	61145	194639	132073	706633	7346189
		53.7%	52.9%	46.0%	48.7%	61.5%	42.9%	54.6%	47.4%	50.0%
	Female	190097	2518158	689090	2754427	38282	259321	109854	782855	7342084
		46.3%	47.1%	54.0%	51.3%	38.5%	57.1%	45.4%	52.6%	50.0%
Save the Children	Male	410212	5349738	1276910	5366611	99427	453960	241927	1489488	14688273
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Female	426255	126128	58832	387823	36605	63097	193283	124590	1416613
		55.4%	66.9%	49.3%	45.9%	66.8%	50.1%	79.0%	49.0%	54.4%
Total	Male	342584	62445	60518	457976	18188	62955	51263	129417	1185346
		44.6%	33.1%	50.7%	54.1%	33.2%	49.9%	21.0%	51.0%	45.6%
	Female	768839	188573	119350	845799	54793	126052	244546	254007	2601959
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Male	365702	461373	798693	474043	83653	232746	297900	504553	3218663
		53.8%	49.3%	51.0%	49.8%	54.3%	46.8%	70.6%	51.0%	51.9%
	Female	314300	475353	768313	477955	70501	264341	124085	485191	2980039
		46.2%	50.7%	49.0%	50.2%	45.7%	53.2%	29.4%	49.0%	48.1%
Total	Male	680002	936726	1567006	951998	154154	497087	421985	989744	6198702
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Female	1327759	5750877	2834172	4465184	252218	820770	726980	2178947	18356907
		54.5%	51.3%	49.2%	49.0%	60.2%	47.3%	69.0%	50.0%	50.9%
Total	Male	1107536	5461649	2921161	4640091	166409	912973	326995	2176123	17712937
		45.5%	48.7%	50.8%	51.0%	39.8%	52.7%	31.0%	50.0%	49.1%
	Female	2435295	11212526	5755333	9105275	418627	1733743	1053975	4355070	36069844
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Recommendations

- Once the PRS has been revised (see Chapter 4), the types of project summary tables displayed throughout this section are recommended as useful tools for regular monitoring of activities, on-going program management, and monthly reporting.
- In the context of Iraq, the gender distribution of long-term jobs has been satisfactory, but it should be strengthened in the South.
- For short-term employment, consider adding a gender factor to contractor qualifications, but first vet this idea with CAGs.
- Pay more attention to gender equity in youth projects; especially when it comes to sports facilities.

5.3. PROJECT COSTS AND OWNERSHIP

Project Resource Allocation

Table 5.10 shows how IPs allocated their project grants over time. The percentages in the table are row percents and the percent of total grant funding per quarter. The total grant amount for the quarter is shown, as well as grant amount under each project type. High-value projects remained in the school and education sector throughout the LOP, where most project funds were invested. Business development projects are more frequent but have a lower grant value; they also require a higher community contribution. They received increased resources as ICAP progressed.

Table 5.10 Resource Allocations, by Project Type and Quarter

Calendar Quarter	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Marla	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified	Total
Qtr 3 2003 'start up'	\$2,986,408 45.7%	\$443,096 6.8%	\$1,394,198 21.4%	\$1,182,579 18.1%	0.0%	\$101,685 1.6%	\$179,587 2.8%	\$241,028 3.7%	\$6,528,581 100.0%
Qtr 4 2003	\$7,004,916 45.5%	\$349,348 2.3%	\$3,193,278 20.7%	\$3,601,846 23.4%	0.0%	\$386,112 2.5%	\$293,295 1.9%	\$565,259 3.7%	\$15,394,054 100.0%
Qtr 1 2004	\$4,004,717 26.80%	\$1,447,387 9.70%	\$3,481,015 23.30%	\$2,817,104 18.90%	\$145,221 1.00%	\$1,796,960 12.00%	\$795,735 5.30%	\$431,350 2.90%	\$14,919,489 100.00%
Qtr 2 2004	\$3,024,594 33.80%	\$700,949 7.80%	\$602,275 6.70%	\$2,266,480 25.30%	\$164,084 1.80%	\$1,048,489 11.70%	\$630,839 7.00%	\$522,981 5.80%	\$8,960,691 100.00%
Qtr 3 2004	\$2,363,356 19.7%	\$1,142,832 9.5%	\$1,768,591 14.7%	\$719,240 6.0%	\$2,217,913 18.5%	\$1,134,043 9.4%	\$1,132,184 9.4%	\$1,531,041 12.7%	\$12,009,200 100.0%
Qtr 4 2004	\$5,255,765 28.9%	\$3,439,359 18.9%	\$2,647,998 14.6%	\$1,581,050 8.7%	\$2,013,805 11.1%	\$1,528,159 8.4%	\$359,905 2.0%	\$1,345,571 7.4%	\$18,171,612 100.0%
Qtr 1 2005	\$7,413,542 35.5%	\$1,556,046 7.5%	\$2,697,113 12.9%	\$1,923,201 9.2%	\$2,008,706 9.6%	\$2,262,291 10.8%	\$2,205,833 10.6%	\$813,946 3.9%	\$20,880,678 100.0%
Qtr 2 2005	\$2,732,391 30.7%	\$1,417,524 15.9%	\$621,656 7.0%	\$689,652 7.7%	\$811,548 9.1%	\$1,360,676 15.3%	\$835,362 9.4%	\$432,214 4.9%	\$8,901,023 100.0%
Qtr 3 2005	\$1,970,624 35.8%	\$632,739 11.5%	\$109,700 2.0%	\$192,725 3.5%	\$382,636 7.0%	\$1,308,825 23.8%	\$669,010 12.2%	\$231,140 4.2%	\$5,497,399 100.0%
Qtr 4 2005	\$3,378,898 28.7%	\$683,378 5.8%	\$1,312,448 11.2%	\$824,971 7.0%	\$652,273 5.5%	\$1,956,221 16.6%	\$1,265,440 10.8%	\$1,680,719 14.3%	\$11,754,348 100.0%
Qtr 1 2006	\$4,784,409 33.6%	\$1,059,577 7.4%	\$2,461,578 17.3%	\$1,069,379 7.5%	\$1,489,417 10.5%	\$1,864,800 13.1%	\$1,209,880 8.5%	\$298,601 2.1%	\$14,237,641 100.0%
Qtr 2 2006 (partial)	\$1,288,926 19.0%	\$481,670 7.1%	\$1,083,167 16.0%	0.0%	\$1,204,272 17.8%	\$1,858,363 27.4%	\$771,068 11.4%	\$90,866 1.3%	\$6,778,332 100.0%
Total	\$46,208,546 32.1%	\$13,353,905 9.3%	\$21,373,017 14.8%	\$16,868,227 11.7%	\$11,089,875 7.7%	\$16,606,624 11.5%	\$10,348,138 7.2%	\$8,184,716 5.7%	\$144,033,048 100.0%

As noted in earlier chapters, each IP has its own strategy for meeting ICAP objectives, and each works in a significantly different operating environment. A/V allocated its project resources primarily to water and sewerage or business/economic development. CHF's CAGs apparently thought roads and bridges served their needs best, although they also opted for a good spread of resources to other project types. IRD focused in on schools (vocational as well as normal) and business development. MC's strategy was to excite communities via projects benefiting children. More than half MC's CAG grants went to schools/education or youth projects. SC also emphasized schools and education, agreeing to rehabilitate more than 100 schools at the request of USAID/Iraq's Project and Contracting Office.

Table 5.11 Resource Allocation, by Project Type and IP

Implementing Partner	Schools/ Education	Health	Roads & Bridges	Water & Sewerage	Marla	Business Development/ Economic Development	Youth	Not elsewhere classified
ACDI/VOCA	\$3,179,444 15.5%	\$1,831,143 8.9%	\$2,693,742 13.2%	\$4,115,178 20.1%	\$2,094,319 10.2%	\$4,113,575 20.1%	\$1,888,405 9.2%	\$546,306 2.7%
CHF	\$5,072,245 17.9%	\$3,840,588 13.6%	\$8,445,359 29.9%	\$4,646,770 16.4%	\$2,459,956 8.7%	\$2,182,484 7.7%	\$832,161 2.9%	\$786,712 2.8%
IRD	\$10,204,106 30.4%	\$4,431,425 13.2%	\$3,680,348 10.9%	\$2,195,619 6.5%	\$3,136,141 9.3%	\$7,114,281 21.2%	\$1,559,965 4.6%	\$1,296,011 3.9%
Mercy Corps	\$16,710,942 54.0%	\$1,522,625 4.9%	\$1,340,511 4.3%	\$3,018,670 9.8%	\$1,525,064 4.9%	\$836,326 2.7%	\$4,167,844 13.5%	\$1,825,845 5.9%
Save the Children	\$11,041,809 35.8%	\$1,735,269 5.6%	\$5,244,243 17.0%	\$2,895,890 9.4%	\$1,882,715 6.1%	\$2,388,558 7.8%	\$1,899,763 6.2%	\$3,729,842 12.1%
Total	\$46,208,546 32.1%	\$13,361,050 9.3%	\$21,404,203 14.9%	\$16,872,127 11.7%	\$11,098,195 7.7%	\$16,635,224 11.5%	\$10,348,138 7.2%	\$8,184,716 5.7%

Project Costs and Benefits

Using PRS data, the evaluation team investigated the cost of creating long-term employment. "Cost" was defined as amount of project grant divided by the total of long-term employees hired upon project completion. Table 5.12 summarizes the resulting findings. The universe of analysis for this table was all CAG projects that reported generating at least one long-term job. Rows one and two of the table respectively show the mean and median cost of generating one long-term job.

Table 5.12 Cost of Long-term Employment Generation

	<i>Schools/ Education</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Roads & Bridges</i>	<i>Water & Sewerage</i>	<i>Marla</i>	<i>Business Development/ Economic Development</i>	<i>Youth</i>	<i>Not elsewhere classified</i>	<i>Total</i>
Mean Cost of Generating One LTE	\$ 14,585	\$ 7,861	\$ 16,501	\$ 20,274	\$ 4,339	\$ 1,183	\$ 17,121	\$ 11,259	\$ 6,115
Median Cost of Generating One LTE	\$ 7,390	\$ 4,463	\$ 14,345	\$ 14,840	\$ 2,826	\$ 330	\$ 9,264	\$ 4,550	\$ 1,468
Number of projects reporting LTE	369	96	15	92	312	1118	94	63	2159

The two types of projects that created the most long-term employment were schools/education and business/economic development. For all but the latter type, the cost of creating a long-term job is considerable. This is because non-business/economic development projects typically entail a much higher investment, yet they require much lower community contributions. The conclusion is that – if ICAP is to continue to be used for long-term job creation -- then IRD's EBDP likely offers the best model from ICAP experiences. However, this objective still needs to be reconciled with ICAP's overall objective of building grassroots democracy through CAGs that advocate for community interests and constructively engage with local government.

Surprisingly, it is not that much cheaper to generate short-term employment (Table 5.13). The median cost of creating a long- or short-term job is roughly the same. However, the mean cost of the former is much higher. These findings suggest that, on a per-job basis, some projects are spending much more than others to generate long-term employment. This is evident in Table 5.12's high costs for infrastructure types of projects (roads and bridges, water and sewerage). In Table 5.13, the lowest cost for short-term jobs falls under 'Not elsewhere classified'. As discussed in Chapter 1, this category features projects like trash and garbage clean-up campaigns.

Table 5.13 Cost of Short-term Employment Generation

	<i>Schools/ Education</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Roads & Bridges</i>	<i>Water & Sewerage</i>	<i>Marla</i>	<i>Business Development/ Economic Development</i>	<i>Youth</i>	<i>Not elsewhere classified</i>	<i>Total</i>
Mean Cost of Generating One STE job	\$ 2,717	\$ 8,135	\$ 4,987	\$ 3,307	\$ 2,215	\$ 3,972	\$ 2,298	\$ 1,514	\$ 3,429
Median Cost of Generating One STE job	\$ 1,579	\$ 1,650	\$ 2,000	\$ 1,539	\$ 1,300	\$ 1,999	\$ 1,660	\$ 866	\$ 1,500
Number of projects reporting STE	966	257	409	372	641	520	220	192	3577

Although ICAP has a mandate to generate employment and increase incomes within its overall D&G thrust, it would be both wrong and unrealistic to expect the program to become a significant engine of job creation in Iraq. Nevertheless, some efficiencies in this arena might be gained through encouraging certain types of projects over others when short- or long-term employment is the aim. It is also true that focusing too strongly on this element of ICAP can divert CAGs from their primary focus on community action and advocacy.

Project Contributions

As explained in Chapter 4, the PRS' project contribution data are of a high standard. Table 5.14 summarizes the value of contributions as compared with project grant funding. In the table, please note that the latter is not the base value for calculating the match called for in the CAs.

Rather it is the total amount of grant funding allocated to projects as recorded in the PRS tracking data sheets.

As shown in Table 5.14, IRD was able to leverage the greatest “other” contributions; but it was less successful than other IPs in encouraging LG contributions. A/V and CHF do not solicit and/or receive donations from other international organizations, so they have a stronger incentive to garner community and LG contributions in order to achieve the required project cost-share of 15%. SC appears to have done well with both local and “other” contributions. MC had the lowest such contributions. MC explained that the population in its AOR has long been accustomed to government hand-outs. However, this explanation is not entirely convincing, since IPs in adjacent provinces have achieved significantly higher levels of community and LG contribution.

Table 5.14 Project Resources versus Project Contributions, by IP

Implementing Partner	Project Grant Amount	Community Contribution	Local Government Contribution	Other Contributions	Total
ACDI/VOCA	\$20,462,112	\$3,097,413	\$6,852,684	\$440,364	\$30,852,573
CHF	\$28,266,275	\$5,937,695	\$7,703,304	\$136,707	\$42,043,981
IRD	\$33,617,896	\$6,058,752	\$2,481,395	\$9,125,925	\$51,283,968
Mercy Corps	\$30,947,827	\$2,455,689	\$2,566,867	\$1,822,700	\$37,793,083
Save the Children	\$30,818,089	\$8,906,297	\$7,451,606	\$2,060,375	\$49,236,367
Total	\$144,112,199	\$26,455,846	\$27,055,856	\$13,586,071	\$211,209,972

Finally, all IPs use the level of community contributions to leverage LG as well as “other” contributions.

Project Ownership

Chapter 4 put forward an index of project ownership based on a community's contribution in relation to project grant amount. Such a calculation can be an indicator of the extent to which communities have “bought into” the CAG process. Recall that the proposed index ranges from 0 to 1. If this scale were adopted, then as shown in Table 5.15, A/V would score lowest and IRD highest. SC did well, but MC did not. And overall, because of IRD's stiff requirements (reportedly 40%), business development projects garnered the greatest contributions.

The low rank for A/V has a distributional basis that means a great many A/V projects had zero contributions. In actuality, however, this finding might be spurious. For one thing, A/V has a high proportion of Marla projects, for which minimal community contributions are expected. But also consider the following extract from A/V's Monthly Report of April 2006 (p. 10) about documentation problems that may be unique to the non-permissive AoRs.

....many communities contributed significantly to the success of a project without offering any documentation, or without documentation meeting the standard of leveraging. How could this happen? Often, the community's bureaucrats changed, and new officials refused to offer any written record of participation in an American project. Or they weren't sufficiently familiar with the project or the NGO to want to give receipts. On at least two occasions, the local responsible official was killed, and his successor refused to give telltale documents, even though the local contribution was fully completed. Once, a municipal office was bombed, with all the financial records burned, or at least unsalvageable. Most communities were very happy to fulfill their local contribution, but very reticent about leaving a written probative record.

Table 5.15 Ownership Index, by IP and Project Type

Implementing Partner	Mean	Median
ACDI/VOCA	0.06	0
CHF	0.12	0.08
IRD	0.22	0.27
Mercy Corps	0.07	0.02
Save the Children	0.19	0.15
Total	0.16	0.09
Type of Project	Mean	Median
Schools/Education	0.12	0.08
Health	0.12	0.04
Roads & Bridges	0.14	0.09
Water & Sewerage	0.13	0.09
Marla	0.02	0
Business Development	0.33	0.35
Youth	0.16	0.09
Not elsewhere classified	0.11	0.04
Total	0.16	0.09

Table 5.16 identifies the number of projects with a community contribution greater than zero, based on an SPSS variable created from the PRS data. Here, A/V compares favorably with other IPs. Also, CHF shows community contributions to all its projects. To control for possible bias from Marla projects, the same table was re-run as Table 5.17, excluding all Marla projects.

Table 5.16 Community Contributions, by IP

Implementing Partner	Does the CAG Project Have a Community Contribution?			
	Yes		No	
ACDI/VOCA	219	27.2%	586	72.8%
CHF	563	100.0%	0	0.0%
IRD	1381	70.6%	574	29.4%
Mercy Corps	334	78.0%	94	22.0%
Save the Children	849	76.5%	261	23.5%
Total	3346	68.8%	1515	31.2%

Table 5.17 Community Contributions by IP, Excluding Marla Projects

Implementing Partner	Does the CAG Project Have a Community Contribution?			
	Yes		No	
ACDI/VOCA	217	42.5%	293	57.5%
CHF	489	100.0%	0	0.0%
IRD	1380	87.0%	206	13.0%
Mercy Corps	319	78.8%	86	21.2%
Save the Children	798	75.8%	255	24.2%
Total	3203	79.2%	840	20.8%

A/V's proportion of projects with community contributions improves when Marla projects are excluded, but it is still far below other IPs'. This deserves an explanation since community ownership of CAG projects is a vital precept of ICAP. A/V may need to review its mobilization and documentation processes. Or it may simply be that most of A/V's AOR is not permissive enough to apply the CAG process that lies at the heart of ICAP.

One further aspect of project ownership is LG contributions (See Table 5.18). Here A/V shines and all other IPs do very respectably except for IRD. On the face of things, LG contributions

could serve as a proxy indicator of the strength of the relationship between a CAG and its local government.

Table 5.18 LG Contributions, by IP

Implementing Partner	Does the CAG Project Have a Local Government Contribution?			
	Yes		No	
ACDI/VOCA	341	42.4%	464	57.6%
CHF	178	31.6%	385	68.4%
IRD	87	4.5%	1868	95.5%
Mercy Corps	158	36.9%	270	63.1%
Save the Children	279	25.1%	831	74.9%
Total	1043	21.5%	3818	78.5%

Recommendations

- Regular monitoring of grant allocations using (revised) PRS analyses can be a good tool for program management. To these ends, incorporate the types of data-summary tables presented in this chapter into regular monthly reports.
- To the extent that creation of long-term jobs is an ICAP priority, these are most cost-effectively promoted through business/economic development projects. But be aware that such projects risk diverting CAGs from their primary focus on community action and advocacy.
- The ownership index proposed by the evaluation team could prove useful if taken in conjunction with well-documented summary measures of community contributions. It provides a basis for measuring the distribution of contributions.
- A/V should request a workshop for its community mobilizers from CHF on how to encourage community contributions.
- Conversely, IRD should do likewise with A/V, on how to encourage LG contributions.
- A/V should review permissiveness conditions in its AOR and, depending on the findings, possibly shift mainly to a stabilization model there.
- Set a performance target for the percent of projects with community contributions. (With the possible exception of A/V, 100% is achievable.)
- Set a performance target for the percent of projects achieving LG contributions, and use this as an indicator for the effectiveness of CAG/LG linkages.

5.4. PROJECT STANDARDS, QUALITY, PERFORMANCE

In the absence of an ICAP RF and associated indicators -- and thus any direct and systematic evaluative data in the PRS as to project quality, standards, or performance -- this section explores other ways to assess these parameters.

The 50-50-90 Initiative

As noted in Chapter 1, ICAP began with a “quick-start” approach designed rapidly to install projects and thereby build social and political. Based mainly on the evaluation team’s interviews plus their intensive review of IP’s reports concerning Y1 of ICAP, this initiative produced both positive and negative findings as to project quality.

- Under 50-50-90, IPs felt phenomenal pressure to cut corners on the participatory CAG process in order to make their project counts. Some appear to have resisted this pressure better than others (notably MC and SC), opting to do fewer but “better” projects in term of process even though it meant falling short of the mandated targets.
- Naturally enough, during this period all IPs began with relatively modest projects with a median grant amount of just over \$5,000 in the first quarter. On the other hand,

according to one knowledgeable HQ interviewee, some IPs responded by “simply putting up a blackboard in a school and calling this a ‘project’.”

- Certainly, less was done in the way of gaining the full trust and working cooperation of traditional community leaders and especially local authorities – if only because LG structures were (and in some places still are) in some disarray at the time that ICAP began.
- At the same time, at least two IPs admit they were struggling to find their core competencies (see MC’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2004) or to apply such competencies in the Iraqi context (SC’s focus on children). And most IPs were grappling with how to apply community development models and recognized D&G strategies from other countries to the Iraq context, where communities had no prior experience of democratic action (see e.g. IRD’s Semi-Annual Report of December 2003). Project quality can be assumed to have suffered accordingly.

Project results from this start-up period of ICAP are perhaps best summarized in the following words from SC’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2004 (p.8): “...the intent of the 50-50-90 target and design, of course, was to give...implementers and the participating communities a series of quick victories in carrying out early successful projects. These often small victories – some actually quite major – were...instrumental for instilling confidence and a sense of accomplishment in the...communities to encourage their further commitment and growth. Although often an untidy process, it can be said that it did achieve the purpose – communities were recruited, projects were completed, needs were met...”

ICAP Audit

By late 2004, projects seemed to be on much a surer footing and proceeding with great success according to a program audit by USAID’s Regional Inspector General. The audit concluded that ICAP “...achieved 98 percent of its intended outputs in the areas of citizen participation, inter-community cooperation, local government cooperation, employment generation, and addressing environmental concerns” (RIG 2005:5).

However, this report did recommend 10 corrective actions to be taken under USAID/Iraq oversight. Virtually all of these dealt with aspects of the PRS and assuring the quality of data therein. These issues have already been covered in Chapter 4. Still, part of one recommendation merits repeating here. Also mentioned in Chapter 3, it is: “As the security environment permits, USAID expatriate staff will conduct site visits to the projects and offices of the Implementing Partners” (*op. cit.*:16).

Evaluation Site Visits

USAID/Iraq’s response to the foregoing RIG recommendation was “Highly challenging in the current insecure environment.” While this assessment is perhaps even truer today, site visits are not impossible. As noted in Chapter 2, evaluation team members were able to visit IP and LG offices in three AORs, plus two project sites in one of these. Had time permitted, they could have visited several others. As the RIG report attests, such first-hand contact and inspection is crucial for gauging quality in any program or project.

To this end, the following, selected mini-cases from team visits are offered as instructive. Since they involve so few AORs and IPs, however, readers should note that they must be considered as anecdotal rather than representative.

Box 5.1. ICAP Projects from the Perspective of a Provincial Governor

In an evaluation interview, Wassit Province's Governor confirmed that local authorities do indeed understand and are genuinely involved in CAG processes. He stated that he was thoroughly pleased with ICAP's work, and went on to describe how the program has created significant human capacity, encouraged constructive citizen advocacy, developed much-needed income generation opportunities, and provided an important platform for improved communication and coordination between local government and constituent communities. The Governor also commented on how well CAGs are connected not only to his own office but also to the Provincial Council.

The Governor stressed that CAGs are fully empowered to make independent decisions about projects that citizens themselves prioritize. He told how, although his office had undertaken its own needs assessment throughout the province, he had never tried to impose these findings on CAGs, nor interfered with them in any other ways. On a light note, he commented that "Our own [government] facilities are desperately in need of renovation, but it is clear that ICAP is solely concerned with community improvements." The Governor underscored the value and importance of CAGs given that highly informed and concerned persons are CAG members, such as university professors, engineers, teachers, doctors, and mukhtars (tribal leaders).

Finally, the Governor mentioned that one of the main differences between ICAP and other programs is how widely its staff and methodology have been accepted. "It is sincerely a project of and for the people; and since citizens throughout the region recognize this, it is a model that government itself is attempting to institute where feasible." Many of the procedures for project prioritizing, fair and transparent tendering, monitoring, and community participation are ones that his government is now encouraging its departments to adopt.

Box 5.1 points to an unanticipated positive impact of ICAP, that is: the degree to which local authorities may also learn significant new skills by simple exposure to ICAP methodologies, and may even adopt certain ICAP procedures in an effort to their own work. Consider the following case.

Box 5.2. A PC Chair Speaks Out for ICAP Projects

A visit with the Chair of the Wassit Provincial Council (PC) underscored the Governor's point that ICAP is an effective mechanism for targeting community participation, especially since the PC is where citizens from all levels of society come to "...cry for improved services, and so we try to transform their suffering into projects. For this we need ICAP's assistance."

The Chairman explained that although his occupation is university professor, his political role forces him and the Council into new and often unwanted positions. He used his own neighborhood as an example of how other non-ICAP projects created confusion and dissatisfaction. "The point is not to build for the sake of building, but also to build skills that contribute to a better Iraq in the near future." In this regard, Chairman considered ICAP an important transformative process.

When asked if communities truly comprehend this process, he responded they do, but that the more important question is how to promulgate this process more widely. He indicated that ICAP is trusted not only in the PC, but also and equally important "out on the streets." He noted that ICAP has genuine impact but that it is difficult to put into words how exactly it does so. The Chairman concluded by emphasizing that the PC's position is to follow up this lesson by likewise prioritizing needs and focusing in impact.

One of the project sites visited by an evaluator was Kut's newly opened Regional Performing Arts Center. It was designed to serve the educational and peace-building interests of the community by promoting the arts as a way to "build new human beings" willing and able to counteract violence and terrorism.

Box 5.3. Kut's Regional Performing Arts Center

The regional Arts Council believe that its educational and peace-building aims can be advanced via high-quality cultural, musical, dramatic, and other performances to and by school-aged children and the community at large. Although the Center is only three months old, the Council is confident that major impacts will be realized as young people are trained to utilize their natural talents and skills.

Events are tailored to the level and individual needs of student participants. Special branches of the arts, particularly in music and drama, are being introduced for the first time. This has attracted growing numbers of girls and women because they are excited and motivated to participate in performances linked to traditional music and dance. In the Council's view, ICAP has made an invaluable contribution to the future of their community: "What Mercy Corps and ICAP did in Kut is something not even the government can accomplish at this juncture. Even people with disabilities benefit from the program, something unimaginable until now."

With the new center, the Council aspires to carry its message and model to the national level by hosting important national as well as regional events. For example, they have officially requested permission from the National Arts Council in Baghdad to facilitate Iraq-wide arts competitions in the near future.

Another telling mini-case of what even a very simple CAG project can achieve is the following, from IRD's work in the Baghdad AOR based on an evaluator's interview of CAG members themselves.

Box 5.4. A "Marla" School Project

"The teachers didn't even have a desk to sit at." This is the way the principal of one Baghdad school began her story of ICAP assistance. The school had a large number of students whose families had been innocent war victims. As a CAG member, the principal applied to and won a Marla grant to improve conditions at the school. Together with her CAG, she got all the necessary approvals from her Neighborhood Advisory Council (NAC) and also informed the Ministry of Education (MOE) of the plans for improvement. The Marla money served to furnish the schoolrooms, including some fans to combat Baghdad's broiling temperatures, which can reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit and more. It also stretched to install a few computers and air-conditioning for them.

Results were immediate. For one thing, absenteeism dropped precipitously. For another, children started better marks on their exams and higher grades overall. According to the principal, "Before, they were just too hot to think."

Parents were so appreciative of the changes that, in addition to thanking the principal profusely for her initiative, now they, too, pitch in at the school in myriad of ways. For example, they have organized themselves to serve as safety guards -- which in Iraq means rather more than just crosswalk duty. Also, parents now donate cleaning supplies, equipment, and labor to help keep the school clean. And the father of one student, a dentist, offers students free check-ups.

When MOE officials visited the school, they roundly congratulated the principal -- who now almost glows with pride over her and the CAG's achievements. And the NAC was so impressed that it extended another program of its own through the school, to distribute free cooking gas to poor families in the neighborhood.

CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF ICAP OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS – CAG MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRACY DIVIDENDS

6.1. Principles and Practices of CAGs

Principles of CAG Mobilization

Aside from training for IP staff plus normal program management and administration, all ICAP activity takes place with and through CAGs. CAGs are the heart and soul of ICAP. As the COP of one IP aptly put it, “If you take away the CAGs and their ability to identify and implement projects, you no longer have [I]CAP, but something completely and fundamentally different.”

Although CAG stands for “community action group,” in fact CAGs are not limited to communities or villages *per se*. They may also be formed on the basis of a city neighborhood, existing or new farmers’ cooperatives or enterprises (like a women’s sewing or rug-making shop), civic groups (like the arts center of Chapter 5), or institutions like hospitals, retirement homes, or colleges. While the bases of CAG composition and coverage can vary and while IPs’ approaches to CAG mobilization differ somewhat (see next section), there is a common core.

CAGs are created by stimulating people to mobilize into groups for common action. All IPs have developed a formal set of mechanisms for establishing initial contact with community leaders, local authorities, and ordinary citizens through town-hall-style meetings. Each IP also has Community Mobilization Teams (CMTs) of one sort or another who are responsible for holding this and ensuing meetings in which interested community members are elected as CAG officers or board members; sub-committees or working groups may also be designated.

CMTs then work intensively with these groups to build their skills in prioritizing, planning, and advocating for their communities needs [see CAG training below] and implementing local-level projects to meet them – ideally linking with relevant LG agencies in the process. After successfully completing one or more projects, CAGs are encouraged to join together in clusters to work on projects of interest to several communities. Clusters can also serve as a vehicle for mitigating or forestalling conflict among diverse groups by bringing them together on projects of mutual concern.

Borrowed from MC, Figure 6.1 below offers a flow diagram illustrating in greater detail the various steps in the CAG process, beginning with mobilization and then moving on to project selection, implementation, and in MC’s case, ultimately graduation.

Practices of CAG Mobilization

As noted, each IP mobilizes and works with CAGs in slightly different ways, if only because each inhabits a different operating environment. IPs also have slightly different terminologies.

As of their December 2005 Semi-Annual Report, CHF had established 435 active Community Associations (i.e., CAGs) where “...the root of community participation methodology is the formation and maintenance of community-elected...Associations...comprised of 8-12 community members that voluntarily participate in [I]CAP’s development initiatives and receive capacity building and training, equipping them with development planning tools, decision-making, communication, and conflict resolution skills” (CHF Semi-Annual Report of January 2004, p. 5).

Community Mobilization Phases




Figure 6.1 Schematic of the Mobilization Process

Over approximately 2.5-years in Iraq, SC developed an estimated 344 CAGs using the following approach, described in its Semi-Annual Report of December 2003, p.3

One of [I]CAP's challenges, recognized early on, was the need to first build the human capacity to mobilize communities. Unlike in most parts of the world, it was not possible to hire people skilled and experienced in grassroots organization and community development. Using experienced, talented expatriate staff and consultants, SC organized and launched an extensive community mobilization team (CMT) capacity-building strategy... at the same time as receiving the training... the CMTs were actively working on rapid mobilization in the selected communities. In each community, the CMTs took the following steps:

- Held an initial meeting with community leaders to explain ICAP, confirm interest, and prepare for the PRA;
- Conducted the Initial Assessment with participation of the communities;
- Held a second meeting to form the CAG, identify CAG officers, and begin identification of project priorities;
- Provided technical assistance and other support for project selection and design, through several project cycles in many cases; and
- Provided support to the CAGs in monitoring project implementation”.

A/V's strategic approach differed from other IPs'. Although it entailed essentially the same basic processes, instead of CAGs as defined by the other IPs, A/V promoted much larger and less

geographically based Community Boards. These were elected to serve as the primary link between A/V support teams and plural communities. (One wonders if this might explain Chapter 5's finding of lower community contributions in A/V's case.) Boards were required to be independent of LG, yet also to include representatives of LG agencies and work closely with them in implementing projects. As one interviewee commented, "This was a tough balancing act in an environment used to command and control." Boards also sub-divided into working groups that prepared project proposals, liaised with board members, and spearheaded community initiatives. At the time of the evaluation 54 such boards were up and running, engaged with 181 communities.

In mobilizing what it terms Community Development Groups (hereafter, simply CAGs), MC takes several additional pre-steps, as it were, ahead of those displayed in Figure 6.1. These are:

- Information gathering on the community;
- Introduction of ICAP to local authorities, leadership and community members;
- Selection of a community for a follow-up visit;
- Follow-up visit to the community;
- Selection by the community of representatives to attend community meeting (25 people or more); and
- Community meeting and election of CAG officers (5 to 10 people).

In addition, MC appears to be the only IP that has a graduation plan for mature CAGs, so it can then turn its attention to new CAG formation and, thereby, wider dissemination of the ICAP process. Perhaps this in part explains Chapter 5's findings about wide community knowledge and LG adoption of these processes in MC's AOR.

❖ *Best Practice: MC has instituted a policy of CAG "graduation" from ICAP.*

Initially, MC promoted the recruitment to CAGs of local authorities, sector specialists, and influential persons such as teachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and mukhtars. However, this raised the possibility of elite capture of the CAG process in a deeply traditional AOR already dominated by tribal leaders. So MC took steps to "flatten the hierarchy," establishing a workable environment where minority and marginalized groups could adequately voice their opinions. By all accounts, this appears to have been accomplished quite successfully. MC developed 244 CAGs.

IRD formed 447 CAGs following much the same mobilization process as shown in Figure 6.1 and with added pre-steps akin to MC's. An interesting anecdote underlines how widely the CAG process became known in Baghdad. The DCOP described to the evaluation team how – after learning about other CAGs -- some 10 groups of citizens self-organized following the same processes and then presented themselves to IRD asking to be included in ICAP.

In CI's case, not all its CAGs are community-based; and all are still in a very preliminary stage of development. This is because CI works in the least permissive areas of Iraq (e.g., around Felluja and Ramadi in Al Anbar province). CI has formed approximately 50 CAGs, about 40% of them based on existing institutions such as a Union of Doctors.

Mobilization Outcomes and Impacts

Because CAG data were omitted from the "old" PRS, it is today difficult to obtain consistent or aggregate information about even descriptive aspects of CAGs. Usually information on CAGs and CAG clusters was reported in IPs' Semi-Annual Reports; but the level of detail and systematicity in such data fluctuated across reports and IPs. This is evident from the variety of sources used in constructing Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Overview of CAGs

IP	Province	CAGs Formed	Male Members	Female Members	Total Members	Cluster Groups Formed
ACDI/VOCA	Arbil	3				
	Dohuk	1				
	Sulaymaniyah	4				
	Diyala	8				
	Ninawa	13				
	Salah ad Din	15				
	At Tamim	10				
	Total	54	351	96	447	?
	Percent		79%	21%		
CHF	Babil	170				
	Karbala	151				
	Najaf	133				
	Total	454	3778	667	4445	81
			85%	15%		
CPI	Al Anbar	44				
	Percent					
IRD	Baghdad	441	3706	1803	5509	?
	Percent		67%	33%		
Mercy Corps	Maysan	59	863	251	1114	31
	Qadissiyah	72	700	240	940	17
	Wassit	113	868	172	1040	60
	Total	244	2431	663	3094	108
	Percent		79%	21%		
Save the Children	Basrah	155				
	Dhi Qar	66				
	Muthanna	43				
	Total	264	2448	760	3208	68
	Percent		76%	24%		
Table Total		1457			16703	257
Sources: A/V, Semi-Annual Report Dec 05; CHF, Mar 06 Monthly plus estimates from CAG list; CPI, from CAG list; IRD, CAG Database; MC Tracking Sheet Summary Aug 06; SC, estimated from CAG lists.						

That said, across the LOP, an estimated 1,457 CAGs were organized, with a total membership of 16,703. These groups spanned rural and urban contexts; many and very different kinds of projects (recall Table 1.7); and male, female, and mixed-gender groups (see Table 6.1). A typical CAG had 10 to 12 members, but could range from 3 to as many as 68 (e.g. an MC-supported library committee). Gender composition varied widely. Approximately half of CHF's and MC's CAGs had no female members.

However, all IPs indicated that their CAGs often included LG officials. Recall that MC actively promoted this mix. Among other things, LG members can inform about required government procedures, speed LG approval of CAG projects, and sometimes facilitate LG contributions to projects. Also, "In some communities SC has explicitly included a member of the local council on the CAGs, anticipating that the benefits of CAG training may be transferred through this person to the local governmental body" (SC Semi-Annual Report for July-December 2003:21). IRD provided the evaluation team with a list, by district, of the number of Neighborhood and District Advisory Council (NAC, DAC) members who were also CAG members. This figure was

75, some of whom participated in the focus group held by one evaluator with members of 17 IRD CAGs.

- ❖ *Best Practice: IRD systematically tracks the number of CAG members who win elective LG offices.*

The CA also envisioned the formation of clusters of CAGs. IPs defined these in similar ways. For example, SC saw them as “Building on work that has already started with the CAGs ... [cluster] members are also representatives of their CAGs...” (SC CA, p. 30). MC wrote that “Once individual communities have demonstrated their commitments to inclusive participation, successfully contributed match requirements..., and shown accountable and transparent leadership within the elected community groups under the initial mobilization process, the [I]CAP Team will facilitate joint meetings with...clusters of communities that share resourced based priorities” (MC CA, page 31). For IRD, “Clusters will be two or more communities that associate for mutual benefit...based upon location ... [and] ... common interests, activities or challenges” (IRD CA, p. 31).

Table 6.1 notes the formation of 257 clusters. (Likely the numbers for A/V and IRD are undercounted, however.) As a rough rule of thumb, clusters tended to take on relatively larger-scale infrastructure rehabilitation or construction. Electricity network extension, water, drainage, irrigation, roads and healthcare facilities were typical. Part of the concept behind clusters was that they could serve to mitigate conflict by mobilizing conflicting groups around initiatives of mutual interest and benefit. But outcomes or impacts in this regard were never systematically reported.

A key evaluation question was: how many of the 1500-some CAGs that were formed still remain active today? Determining this proved illusive, however. The evaluation team asked IPs to provide lists of active CAGs, where “active” was defined as CAGs with whom IPs remained engaged in some form or another, or whom IPs could at least still contact. CHF and IRD were able readily to identify such CAGs; but other IPs were less certain. Using CHF and IRD as markers, still-active CAGs range around 40% to 45% of all CAGs formed. But this is a very rough estimate that would benefit from a more rigorous definition of “active” and a database that records the date of an IP’s last contact with a CAG.

Some CAGs carried out only one project, after which they became inactive; but most went on to implement added ICAP-assisted projects, strengthening both their project and process skills thereby. Several IRD CAGs interviewed by one evaluator produced records of over 100 completed projects each. These were all groups that extended large numbers of individual Marla and/or business development grants. A/V has done likewise. In both these IPs, CAGs (or boards) vet and approve applicants. Successful applications then appear as multiple projects under the sponsoring CAG.

Unfortunately, no exact measure exists for CAGs with multiple projects. In order to estimate this, the evaluation team’s survey expert compiled Table 6.2 from duplicate district and community name combinations in the PRS project list.¹⁶ This exercise assumed that more than one project in the same “community” was likely implemented by the same CAG. The results suggest that, very approximately, 31% of CAGs did more than one project.

¹⁶ PCO school rehabilitations done by SC were excluded since these were not associated with CAGs.

Table 6.2 Percentage of CAGs that Implemented Multiple Projects, by IP

Implementing Partner	Number of CAG Projects				
	1	2	3	4	5 or more
ACDI/VOCA	43%	12%	7%	8%	30%
CHF	89%	10%	1%	1%	0%
IRD	60%	15%	8%	4%	14%
Mercy Corps	77%	14%	5%	1%	4%
Save the Children	63%	17%	6%	3%	10%
Total	69%	14%	5%	3%	9%

As noted in Chapter 5 and as per MC's graduation policy above, some CAGs have successfully mounted projects on their own, using what they learned under ICAP but without financial assistance from the program. And especially in Baghdad, very large CAGs have spawned several smaller CAGs, the better to target their work to more community-specific needs. As noted above, knowledge of the CAG model has even stimulated some groups to self-organize along the same lines, in hopes of gaining ICAP support. This jibes with all IPs' statements that they no longer have to seek out communities for CAG mobilization. Rather, as one IP manager put it, "Now people are always knocking on our doors." Finally, a number of CAGs have formally structured themselves into non-governmental or civil-society organizations (NGOs, CSOs), as discussed in Section 6.4.

Interestingly, a scan of MC's sequentially organized list of CAGs hints at a possible trend over time towards existing institutions and issue-oriented groups as the bases for CAG formation. This is evidenced by names like Wheelchair Distribution Committee, Diwaniya Technical Institution, Shamiyah Youth Center, Amarah Artists, Ophthalmic CAG, Bird Flu Awareness Campaign, and Kids' Theater. If true, this could represent a departure from the concept of grassroots democracy-building to something else.

What this "something else" might be is not certain; but it could suggest, again, an excessive emphasis on projects over processes. On the other hand, projects like MC's Kut Art Center or Children's Drama can (and have) been used to instill and disseminate lessons about conflict mitigation and citizen's/women's rights; and work with disabled persons has included transporting them to voting stations. Or, it could be that since MC works in only urban areas in one of the most favorable operating environments in Iraq, perhaps this shift reflects a deeper understanding of different community needs there. In any case, the question bears some further investigation.

Mobilization Recommendations

- Complete the PRS' input and output data on projects by adding outcome and impact data (i.e., on CAGs). Although already noted in Chapter 4, this recommendation bears repeating here.
- Study MC policies and procedures for CAG graduation, with an eye to designing such for all IPs, plus an ICAP II exit plan.
- Review the merits and thrusts of CAG formation on the basis of pre-existing or issue-oriented groups vis-à-vis the program's primary mandate of fomenting grassroots democracy.

6.2. CAG CAPACITY BUILDING

CAG Capacity-Building Topics, Delivery, and Materials

As noted in Chapter 5, the 50-50-90 initiative at ICAP start-up pressured IPs to focus on CAG projects over processes. So as Y1 wound down, IPs slowed their project efforts somewhat, the better to build CAG capacity in a number of skills. Of course, in preparation for project work, all CAGs received at least some initial training in functional topics like community mobilization, participatory appraisal, democratic meeting methods, and of course project identification and – as ICAP and CAGs alike matured – details of needs assessment, project design, proposal preparation, approvals, contracting, record-keeping, monitoring, and other aspects of project implementation. This “boot camp” capacity-building, so to speak, took place mainly during CAG meetings with CMT members.

By Y2 and on into Y3, however, ICAP was able to offer more formal training in a wider range of topics to CAGs and also community members more generally. Most notable were workshops in leadership and communication, conflict mitigation, organizational or business management, and information technology (IT).

Table 6.3 summarizes the CAG training data that were available to the evaluation team. All IPs claimed to keep good records of CAG trainings or other types of learning events, even though these vital data were somehow overlooked in PRS construction. However, when asked to supply the evaluation team with their training records, only three IPs responded (A/V, IRD, and MC). Note that these data are at best illustrative because different IPs categorize training in different ways. Also, triangulating from other sources, the evaluation team found that the data tendered were clearly incomplete, even as to topics; and they are assuredly under-reported.

Table 6.3 CAG and Community Training Data from A/V, IRD, and MC

Training Topic	No. Work-shops	Males	Females	Total
A/V Community Mobilization		25	11	36
A/V Intro to Conflict Resolution		259	66	325
A/V Advanced TOT* Skills		51	4	55
NGO Creation (with ICSP and LGP)		47	11	58
A/V Subtotals		382	92	474
IRD Project Process OJT*	continuous	1225	2275	3500
IRD CAG Empowerment		23	12	35
IRD Leadership and Communication		15	5	20
IRD IT	3	80	90	170
IRD Teacher Training	1	100		230
IRD Subtotals	6+	1443	2512	3955
MC Rights-Based Approach to PWDs*	1	13	2	15
MC Empowerment for PWDs	3	n.d.*	n.d.	n.d.

Training Topic	No. Work-shops	Males	Females	Total
MC PWD Organizational Capacity	2	19	2	21
MC TOT	1	11	1	12
MC IT for Trainers, Community LG	various	25	6	31
MC PWD Conference	1	8	1	9
MC Subtotals	8+	76	12	88
Grand Total	45+	1901	2616	4517

* TOT = training of trainers. OJT = on-the-job training. PWDs = persons with disabilities. n.d. = no data.

Except for IRD's basic training for CAGs, virtually all the items listed in Table 6.3 took the form of workshops, and all occurred in 2005 or 2006. It can be seen that, together, the three IPs provided more formal, targeted training to over 1,000 CAG and community members, with a largely reasonable gender balance for Iraq. What might this figure be had CHF and SC submitted their records? Perhaps at least another 1000? If so, that would represent about 10% percent of CAG members countrywide. These figures would of course be several thousands higher had all IPs included data on all CAG basic training, as IRD did.

An interesting finding in Table 6.3 is that MC has occasionally extended training (in IT) to community-level LG members. While this is doubtless another reason for the excellent relations that MC and its CAGs enjoy with LG (recall Chapter 5's boxes), this approach overlaps with LGP's mandate. MC might have done better to mount co-trainings with this related program. That said, several best practices emerged from a review of Table 6.3' data plus supporting materials.

❖ *Best Practices:*

- *A/V has coordinated some of its training with related USAID/Iraq programs.*
- *IRD uses a simple 1-to-5 scale for trainees to evaluate each of its workshops.*
- *MC's focus on disabled persons represents a creative targeting of Marla funds.*

IPs were also requested to give the evaluation team an inventory of the training materials they used for CAG capacity building. These included manuals, guides, packets, etc. on:

- Participatory rural appraisal;
- Project implementation processes;
- Project evaluation processes;
- Advocacy for communities;
- Training of trainers;
- Basic conflict resolution; and
- NGO establishment.

CAG Capacity-Building Outcomes and Impacts

With more and better capacity building plus OJT from doing a first project, by all and very credible accounts, active CAGs quickly became able thereafter to assume most of the project development, implementation, and oversight work that mobilizers initially performed on their behalf. Certainly, an IRD focus group of 20 CAG leaders representing 17 CAGs directly (and perhaps another 100 indirectly) could not say enough about how much they appreciated all the training they received. They especially praised the workshops in leadership and conflict

resolution given to some 41 IRD CAGs in Y2 and Y3. The focus group urged that such training promptly be extended to all CAGs.

The team also heard from other IPs about the popularity of conflict-resolution training among all types of CAG and community members, but especially youth. Interviewees reported that trainees found these lessons useful not only in organizational and community interactions but also within their own homes! In terms of other types of training desired by CAGs, the advice of the IRD focus group is probably representative: management, accounting, public relations (for fundraising), and democracy. For these and other workshops, reportedly all CAGs would like some form of certification --although presumably this would also call for some form of testing.

The IRD focus group went on to make an intriguing recommendation for capacity building. To wit: whenever and wherever feasible in terms of security conditions and travel distances and costs, open up workshops to members of multiple CAGs (including those of other IPs) instead of delivering training CAG-by-CAG to all members. With some kind of registration procedure, this strategy might allow individuals who are truly interested in a given topic to self-select; reach a larger number of CAGs; and provide more opportunities for inter-CAG learning of many sorts.

Focus-group participants also clamored for more multi-CAG meetings in which to trade ideas and experiences, and more meetings such as the focus group itself -- in which people knowledgeable about CAG successes and failures in different AORs could speak. Participants also requested exchange visits between CAGs contemplating a particular type of project and CAGs that had already implemented similar projects, plus written "stories" on the same. These recommendations and ideas seem to have come about in part due to the following kinds of dialogue between participants and the evaluator.

- ? One man complained that a proposal from his CAG to build a school for girls was denied, leaving the community's female children to travel many dangerous miles to an appropriate school. In response, the evaluator informed how -- after rehabilitating its local school -- a CAG in another AOR successfully approached the MOE about dividing the school day and adding another teacher so that boys could attend in the morning and girls in the afternoon. After mulling for a moment, the man allowed as how this might work for his community too, at least until they could garner funding from other sources for their dream of a proper girls' school.
- ? Using the example of his CAG's numerous grants of sewing machines to individual women, a man wondered whether it might make more sense, and greatly broaden benefits, to establish a sewing "factory" in which both men and women could work. The evaluator responded with mention of a similar sewing shop (albeit only for women) mounted by MC, plus a pickle factory supported by A/V that employed men as well as women.

Another outcome -- even impact -- of ICAP capacity building was that CAGs felt more confident about approaching LG for proposal approvals, project contributions, and inclusion of community concerns on government agendas. This assessment is supported by numerous and suasive accounts during evaluation team interviews (recall Chapter 5's boxes). Equally important, it is supported by increasing incidences of LG contributions over time to truly public-oriented CAG projects. Table 6.4 is illustrative. Note that it excludes individual Marla and business/economic development projects, which properly do not attract LG contributions.

Table 6.4 Growing LG Contributions to Publicly Oriented CAG Projects

Calendar Quarter	Local Government Contribution	
	Yes	No
Qtr 3 2003	17.9%	82.1%
Qtr 4 2003	15.6%	84.4%
Qtr 1 2004	37.7%	62.3%
Qtr 2 2004	29.7%	70.3%
Qtr 3 2004	36.8%	63.2%
Qtr 4 2004	38.3%	61.7%
Qtr 1 2005	46.8%	53.2%
Qtr 2 2005	49.2%	50.8%
Qtr 3 2005	51.7%	48.3%
Qtr 4 2005	36.8%	63.2%
Qtr 1 2006	50.6%	49.4%
Total	33.4%	66.6%

Finally, a very real and positive yet unanticipated impact of CAG capacity-building is that quite a number of (often “ordinary”) members – female as well as male -- have applied their lessons in democratic action more directly, by standing for and even winning elected LG positions. Because it was unanticipated, this impact has not been systematically monitored and reported. However, every IP is able readily and proudly to cite concrete examples of such impact. In the most dramatic of such cases (as documented by evaluation-commissioned focus groups with IP mobilizers), one member of an MC CAG went on to become Vice Governor of Diwanyia Province.

To sum up, the following quote from a participant in the IRD focus group (endorsed by the rest of the group) illustrates what CAG mobilization and capacity-building are capable of achieving.

In the past, we were used to the government as the ‘giver’ and we behaved accordingly. But now, having worked with... [ICAP]...we have another way to think and act: identifying our problems, prioritizing, and then solving them ourselves. This gave us something to live for.

Capacity-Building Recommendations

- Make sure the “new PRS” tracks capacity building for CAGs and others.
- Promptly expand post-basic-training workshops to all active and new CAGs in topics that have proven both popular and effective in advancing ICAP’s grassroots democracy goals. To date, such topics appear to include leadership, conflict resolution, and IT.
- Offer some type of workshop certification.
- Look for synergies and efficiencies in capacity building both within and across IPs and related USAID/Iraq programs, such as: sharing best-practice training materials; opening up workshops to members of multiple CAGs, whether of the same or different IPs (as feasible); and conducting co-trainings, e.g. with ICSP and LGP.
- Compile an anthology (in Arabic) of “success stories” for different types of projects from all IPs, for use as a reference in basic CAG trainings.
- Expand the definition of capacity building to include exchange visits among CAG members (as feasible).

- Do likewise for cross-IP presentations by knowledgeable staff (including CMT members) on CAG experiences in various types of projects.
- Track the number, gender, and background (see Section 6.4) of CAG members who stand for/win election to LG offices as another indicator in the “new PRS.”

6.3. CAG INTERACTIONS WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A Framework for Analysis of CAG-LG Interactions

As per the CA’s Modification 02 discussion of “What is [I]CAP,” “Process driven, demand-based development” is vital to encouraging CAGs to engage and hold accountable LG agencies as part of these citizen groups’ self-reliant development and as part of democracy-building in Iraq generally.

In other words, CAG processes are anchored in community driven-development action and advocacy. ICAP operates at the juncture of such bottom-up processes with the top-down institutional strengthening of LGs implemented by USAID/Iraq’s LGP II. As a landmark World Bank (WB 2005) study warns, however, initiatives like ICAP may risk promoting parallel institutions in countries where government is seen as impossibly corrupt or incompetent.

To assess this risk, the evaluation team applied the comparative framework from this WB study to ICAP, but substituting AORs for what were different countries in the original study. Further, A/V’s AOR was divided in two due to major differences in security conditions and thus ICAP operations. The resulting division is: A/V(KRG), i.e. areas under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government; and A/V(Other), i.e. areas lying inside the highly conflicted Sunni Triangle.

The WB framework embraces three key concepts of community-government relations plus a 4 x 4 matrix for assessing each of the three in terms of the enabling environment for their actions and interactions. The three concepts are:

- opportunity space -- the range of possibilities offered by the enabling environment.
- co-production -- shared responsibility among multiple stakeholders for delivery of certain goods and services, usually involving joint financing and implementation; examples are schools that are community-built and -maintained but staffed by publicly paid teachers, or government-funded infrastructure projects that also rely on community contributions.
- accountability -- this exists when intended beneficiaries (i.e., citizens) can: make providers of goods and services (such as LG) answer for the type, quality, quantity, and distribution of deliverables; and influence the local priorities articulated in LG’s planning and execution of annual budgets.

The corresponding matrices provide for assessment of both CAG and LG constraints and opportunities with regard to each concept across four dimensions of the enabling environment: legal/functional/regulatory, political, fiscal, and administrative. These matrices were circulated to all IPs to garner their views on current or potential CAG-LG relationships at the time of this evaluation. All but CHF responded.

Outcomes and Impacts of CAG-LG Interactions

Per the Framework. Overall, SC responded on all three matrices that LGs were constrained and CAGs enabled. But other IPs partners ranged widely in their assessments – except for CHF, which again did not respond.

Table 6.5 presents IP responses on the first concept, opportunity space. There, it can be seen that for the legal dimension, A/V(KRG) and MC both defined LG as enabled and CAGs as constrained. These responses make sense because there has been a functioning KRG

government since 1992; and MC's uniformly Shia AOR has elected its political leaders. But in other IPs' AORs, neither LG nor CAGs are perceived as enabled in the legal dimension.

Table 6.5 Opportunity Space for Interactions

	A. LGs and CAGs Constrained	B. LGs Constrained, CAGs Enabled	C. LGs Enabled, CAGs Constrained	D. LGs Enabled, CAGs Enabled
1 Legal, Functional, Regulatory Dimension	AV(OTHER), CI, IRD: LGs and CAGs have few significant functions and domains.	SC: LGs have few significant responsibilities. If permitted, CAGs can implement in many sectors.	AV(KRG), MC: LG functions significant and well-defined. CAGs can operate in few domains.	None: LGs have significant, well-defined functions. CAGs can act in many sectors.
2 Political Dimension	None: LGs and CAGs lack popular legitimacy and credibility.	CI, IRD, SC: LGs lack popular legitimacy and Credibility. CAGs are representative, credible, and accountable.	AV(KRG/OTHERS): LGs are credible and legitimate. CAGs lack popular legitimacy and credibility.	MC: LGs and CAGs are credible, legitimate, and independent.
3 Fiscal Dimension	AV(OTHERS), CI, IRD: LGs and CAGs have few and tightly constrained resources.	SC: LGs have few and tightly constrained resources. CAGs are well-resourced and have discretion to deploy their resources to local priorities	AV(KRG), MC: LGs are well-resourced and fiscally autonomous for local services. CAGs are financially constrained.	None: LGs are well-resourced, fiscally autonomous. CAGs are financially well-resourced.
4 Administrative Dimension	AV(KRG/OTHERS), CI, IRD, MC: LGs lack staff (or skilled staff) and are weak in organizational and implementation capacity CAGs' implementation experience is limited.	SC: LGs lack staff (or skilled staff) and are weak in organizational and implementation capacity. CAGs are skilled, and experience d with collective action.	None: LGs are adequately skilled and Staffed. CAGs have little implementation and collective action experience.	None: LGs are adequately skilled and staffed. CAGs are skilled, and Experienced with collective action.

On the political dimension of opportunity space, with the exception of A/V IPs see CAGs as representative, credible, and accountable. On the fiscal dimension, A/V (KRG) and MC see LG as well-resourced; but other IPs consider both LG and CAGs constrained. All IPs responded that LG is organizationally weak and that CAGs still lack experience.

Co-production (see Table 6.6) is especially important to ICAP because this is where LG contributions are enabled or constrained. But LG legitimacy is questioned in the Sunni Triangle area (CI and AV(Other)); thus co-production with CAGs are unlikely there. In general LG is seen as less likely to contribute due to its "few discretionary resources." The one exception is the KRG. IRD indicated that it thought both LG and CAGs had the capacity to contribute. But this is a surprising response given IRD's very low levels of LG contributions (recall Chapter 5).

Table 6.6 Co-production Interactions

	A. LGs and CAGs Constrained	B. LGs Constrained, CAGs Enabled	C. LGs Enabled, CAGs Constrained	D. LGs Enabled, CAGs Enabled
1 Legal, Functional, Regulatory Dimension	AV(OTHERS): Limited opportunity for co-production of services by LGs and/or CAGs.	IRD, MC, SC: LGs authorized/able in only a few sectors to effectively enter into service delivery partnerships even when CAGs take the initiative.	AV(KRG), CI: LGs have significant responsibility but are unlikely to engage CAGs partnerships for service provision.	None: Both LGs and CAGs have authorized roles in service provision. Complementary roles and appropriate linkages can produce effective partnerships.
2 Political Dimension	AV(KRG/OTHERS), CI, IRD: LGs and CAGs have limited abilities to legitimately influence service mix and quality.	MC, SC: LGs have few incentives to respond to citizen/CAG initiatives. CAGs can represent citizen interests and priorities, but likely focus on partnerships with local state bodies or NGOs that provide services.	None: LGs are able to legitimately aggregate citizen interests and priorities. CAGs are less representative and legitimate; and their service regime likely dominated by LG plans, budgets, and management.	None: Both LGs and CAGs able to legitimately represent popular interests. Coordination and negotiation of multiple CAG priorities at LG level may produce citizen-responsive co-production.
3 Fiscal Dimension	CI, AV(OTHERS): LGs and CAGs have limited opportunities for allocation of local resources to finance services.	IRD, MC, SC: LGs are likely weak since they have few discretionary resources. CAGs are able to contribute to their own priorities. Both may need to rely on local state bodies to finance partnerships.	AV(KRG): LGs have discretionary resources for priority services but CAGs unable to contribute. Thus LGs likely act as suppliers and CAGs at best may represent service consumers (not co-producers).	None: Both LGs and CAGs have discretionary resources for services. Systems that integrate and account for their contributions can promote effective co-production.
4 Administrative Dimension	CI: Both LGs and CAGs have limited organizational basis and capacity to enter into partnerships	MC, SC: LG implementation capacity often depends on the central state, and capacity enhancement is supply-driven. CAGs can develop capacity to pursue their priorities.	None: LGs may become capable of entering into service-delivery partnerships, but CAGs rarely capable of effectively fulfilling their potential role in service co-production.	IRD: Both LGs and CAGs have capacity to contribute to service production. Definition of roles and relationships can be based on comparative advantage of each.

In fact, at least some PCs have recently been given “development” budgets. These could be targeted by CAGs through the PRT as a source of LG co-production. One option would be to cost-share CAG grants and PC discretionary funds for larger projects.

When it comes to accountability on the legal dimension most IPs indicated that CAGs’ role was to pressure LG to improve services, as per CA precepts (see Table 6.7). Not surprisingly, IPs saw LG as less legitimate than CAGs, given Iraq’s history of a non-benign dictatorship. On the fiscal dimension, plainly CAGs were considered more likely to be accountable than LG. Administratively, LG was seen as having limited capacity to inform or learn about citizen concerns, as compared to CAGs.

Table 6.7 Accountability Interactions

	A. LGs and CAGs Constrained	B. LGs Constrained, CAGs Enabled	C. LGs Enabled, CAGs Constrained	D. LGs Enabled, CAGs Enabled
1 Legal, Functional, Regulatory Dimension	None: Both LGs and CAGs likely to focus accountability upward, at best pressuring deconcentrated state service providers.	SC: LGs play a minor role in service provision. CAGs likely focus their advocacy on pressuring deconcentrated state service providers rather than LGs.	AV(KRG/OTHERS), CI, IRD, MC: LGs may be major service providers while CAGs play a limited role. Thus CAGs may focus on pressuring LGs to improve services.	None: Both LGs and CAGs can provide services (individually and jointly via co-production). Thus each can provide a venue for citizen influence over service providers.
2 Political Dimension	AV(KRG/OTHERS): Limited ability for LGs and CAGs to legitimately represent citizen priorities and interests vis-à-vis service providers. Likely to result in limited downward accountability.	CI, IRD, MC, SC: LGs are often less legitimate and less responsive to community advocacy whereas CAGs can legitimately represent citizen interests and priorities.	None: Empowered and responsive LGs can provide a venue for aggregating citizen priorities, but CAGs unlikely as legitimate channels for transmitting them.	None: Both LGs and CAGs can legitimately reflect citizen priorities. Electoral and other representative mechanisms at both levels may improve responsiveness.
3 Fiscal Dimension	AV(KRG/OTHERS): Both LGs and CAGs have few Resources. At best they may advocate to state bodies re: budget allocations, and monitor state expenditures at local level.	CI, IRD, MC, SC: LGs allocate or manage few resources and so are not likely to be the focus of accountability. CAGs can be held accountable by citizens for resources they allocate or manage.	None: LGs allocate and manage significant resources, providing a principle venue for social accountability via participatory planning, budgeting, and expenditure monitoring. Resource-poor CAGs probably marginal.	None: Both LGs and CAGs can allocate and manage resources, so participatory planning, budgeting, and expenditure monitoring may increase responsiveness and efficiency of resource use at both levels.
4 Administrative Dimension	AV(OTHERS), CI: LGs and CAGs have limited capacity to collect, analyze, or transmit information. Result likely to be limited accountability of governance and service provision.	IRD, MC, SC: LGs may have limited capacity to collect, analyze, or transmit information to citizens. CAGs may play a significant role in informing citizens and transmitting their views to local state bodies.	AV(KRG): LGs may be able to implement local decisions and inform citizens about resource use and services delivered. Thus LGs likely a greater focus for accountability than generally weak CAGs.	None: Both LGs and CAGs may be capable of implementing local decisions and informing citizens about resource use and services delivered, thus creating venues for accountability at both levels.

At a broader level, the International Republican Institute regularly conducts polls in Iraq to gauge citizen perceptions of government. One question it asks relates to all three WB framework concepts: “Do you approve or disapprove of the new Iraqi government?” The most recent poll (IRI 2006) shows regional disparities in responses (see Figure 6.2 below). Sunni areas (which include the North) are clearly alienated; so one can expect less opportunity space for CAG-LG interactions there, along with reduced LG and community contributions.

To sum up, the WB study (2005:9) makes several observations pertinent to ICAP.

Skepticism about LGs, often corroborated by partial attempts to link communities to local governments, militates against exploiting real opportunities that may exist to strengthen the citizen-LG interface. CDD [community-driven development] practitioners often use the skepticism about LG functioning as a justification to perpetuate pure direct support to communities through parallel structures. Yet...several actions...can set local governments on an appropriate path, and create an appropriate platform for CDD and broader civic engagement interventions:

- Strengthen electoral systems, especially local electoral systems, and ensure regular elections;
- Improve access to information through formal and informal mechanisms;
- Clarify functional assignments of local governments;

- Match financing with functions and ensure adequate local fiscal discretion combined with fiduciary oversight and good practices; and
- Develop performance standards and outcomes with adequate monitoring systems.




Figure 6.2 Do you approve or disapprove of the new Iraqi government?

However, tackling such issues requires macro policy dialogue to strengthen the decentralization framework. A CDD operation is not an appropriate instrument to address such mostly structural policy issues. Rather, *CDD operations need to coordinate with macro decentralization policy reform processes in order to strengthen the structural incentives which affect local government performance and accountability* [italics added].

In other words, in partnering CAGs with LGs, it is critical to understand the underlying fundamentals of a supportive decentralization framework, and how to sequence possible decentralization reforms and LG accountability with efforts to build a citizen interface with LG.

Contributions to CAGs. It is useful to compare the assessed co-production interactions in the foregoing matrices with actual performance. To this end, Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present LG and community contributions by province and IP. Note that the corresponding analyses are couched in terms of high or low “yes/no” incidences of contribution rather than dollar values of LG contributions.

Table 6.8 Local Government Contributions, by Province and IP

IP	Province	Local Government Contribution			
		Yes		No	
AV(KRG)	Dahuk	0	0.0%	1	100.0%
	Arbil	14	100.0%	0	0.0%
	Sulaymaniyah	43	64.2%	24	35.8%
AV(Other)	At Tamim	81	42.4%	110	57.6%
	Diyala	52	41.6%	73	58.4%
	Salah ad Din	71	28.4%	179	71.6%
	Ninawa	41	38.0%	67	62.0%
CPI	Al Anbar	39	86.7%	6	13.3%
IRD	Baghdad	87	4.4%	1872	95.6%
CHF	Babil	65	33.0%	132	67.0%
	Karbala	90	43.5%	117	56.5%
	Najaf	23	14.5%	136	85.5%
MC	Al Qadissiyah	52	42.3%	71	57.7%
	Wassit	51	25.1%	152	74.9%
	Maysan	55	53.9%	47	46.1%
SC	Dhi Qar	40	21.4%	147	78.6%
	Basrah	145	19.9%	584	80.1%
	Muthanna	94	48.5%	100	51.5%
Total		1043	21.5%	3818	78.5%

Overall, incidences of LG contributions are low. This is largely due to the fact that, while IRD accounted for 40% of all completed projects, LG contributions to IRD projects were low. This finding contrasts with Table 6.6 on co-production, where IRD opined that both LG and CAGs were enabled and had the capacity to contribute to service production. Thus Table 6.8's low result for IRD is suspicious. It could reflect inadequate IRD accounting procedures for LG contributions.

A/V(KRG) rated LG potential for co-production as high; and LG contributions in there were in fact high. However, A/V(Other) seems to have performed better than indicated in Table 6.6. This is especially true for CI. It could be that A/V and CI are overly skeptical in their verbal statements about LG commitment to project development, given that their actual accounting of LG contributions is reasonable.

For MC, recall that it has local offices in each province, Al Qadissiyah and Maysan seem to be able to encourage considerable LG contributions, but not Wassit. This may be a management issue for the Wassit office. MC has a very close working relationship with LG agencies in Wassit, especially in Kut (recall Chapter 5's boxes); so clearly the relationship is enabled. Thus the Wassit office should press for greater LG contributions, using Al Qadissiyah's and Maysan's figures as general targets.

As with a number of other materials requested by the evaluation team, CHF did not respond to this matrix exercise. But it appears that Najaf has significantly lower LG contributions than the other two provinces in CHF's AOR. Since CHF has very high citizen contributions (see Table

6.9), it should be in a strong position to leverage larger LG contributions in Najaf. Finally, in SC's AOR, both Basrah and Dhi Qar Province show low LG and high community contributions. So the same recommendation as for Najaf holds for these two provinces as well.

Table 6.9 Community Contributions, by Province and IP

IP	Province	Community Contribution			
		Yes		No	
AV(KRG)	Dahuk	1	100.00%	0	0.00%
	Arbil	4	28.60%	10	71.40%
	Sulaymaniyah	25	37.30%	42	62.70%
AV(Other)	At Tamim	55	28.80%	136	71.20%
	Diyala	26	20.80%	99	79.20%
	Salah ad Din	44	17.60%	206	82.40%
	Ninawa	28	25.90%	80	74.10%
CPI	Al Anbar	36	80.00%	9	20.00%
IRD	Baghdad	1381	70.50%	578	29.50%
CHF	Babil	197	100.00%	0	0.00%
	Karbala	207	100.00%	0	0.00%
	Najaf	159	100.00%	0	0.00%
MC	Al Qadissiyah	105	85.40%	18	14.60%
	Wassit	146	71.90%	57	28.10%
	Maysan	83	81.40%	19	18.60%
SC	Dhi Qar	165	88.20%	22	11.80%
	Basrah	587	80.50%	142	19.50%
	Muthanna	97	50.00%	97	50.00%
Total		3346	68.80%	1515	31.20%

When it comes to community contributions, only A/V's incidence is low. This could be due to A/V's stated difficulties in documenting contributions (recall Chapter 5). However, CI has been able to document a high incidence of citizen participation in equally, if not more, challenging environs. Moreover, A/V also shows low incidences of citizen contribution even in permissive parts of the KRG.

CAG-LG Recommendations

- Alert Iraq's National Capacity Development Program (NCD) and USAID/Iraq's ICSP and LGP to needs for capacity building in locales where LG is especially weak.
- Meanwhile, give particular mentoring to CAGs in such locales.
- Increase LG awareness of CAG processes in LGs' own and other AORs. To this end, recall Chapter 3's suggestion of a brochure in English and Arabic, plus the IRD focus group's idea of a compilation of "stories" from other CAG experiences in other AORs.
- USAID/Iraq should bear in mind the importance of macro issues of decentralization in relation to ICAP. In particular, the LG law (on which LGP is currently advising) should be ushered through the Council of Representatives.
- IRD should review its procedures for recording and/or obtaining LG contributions.
- A/V needs to do the same for community contributions.

- CHF and MC should review practices in their high-performing provinces for lessons learned about how to leverage greater LG and/or community contributions in low-performing ones (including those now assigned them from SC's former AOR).
- All IPs should set targets for the incidence of LG contributions, because this could be a documentable proxy indicator of CAG linkages to LG.

6.4. SUSTAINABILITY OF CAGS AND DEMOCRACY DIVIDENDS

Sustainability and Democracy Issues

Much discussed by the evaluation team was the extent to which CAGs could or should: aim to evolve into CSOs; become permanent self-sustaining grassroots organizations, given that they were originally envisioned in the CA as informal entities; “wither away” as NACs, DACs, PCs, and other LG becomes stronger, better funded, and (partly as a result of CAG outcomes and impacts), more responsive, equitable, and accountable to their constituencies, including minority or marginalized groups; or possibly take some other form, such as targeted on-again/off-again re-coalescence around critical advocacy issues that might strike at any long-term democracy dividends from CAG formation and ICAP generally.

The evaluation team did not resolve this discussion; nor was it their place to do so. But this issue should be given serious thought in designing ICAP II and an exit plan from it. A key consideration in this regard is the extent to which ICAP has or should collaborate with other relevant USAID/Iraq programs, as depicted in Figure 6.3.




Figure 6.3 Institutional Landscape of ICAP and related USAID/Iraq Programs

In the future, the plan is for PRTs to coordinate all USG activities of any sort in their respective provinces. This includes interactions of USAID/Iraq IPs – mediated by the PRT's USAID representative -- with the USM and DOS for reasons of IP staff security (vis-à-vis, e.g., up-to-the-minute military intelligence of potential unrest, related dangers of friendly fire, and so forth), USG diplomatic aims, and of course coordination across varying USG and USM entities' development and democracy efforts.

Details of all these inter-relationships remain to be defined (recall Chapter 3's recommendations). However, the present report is able to say a few words about ICAP's past

collaboration with related USAID/Iraq programs, plus present and future implications for CAG sustainability and democracy-building in this regard.

Sustainability and Democracy Outcomes and Impacts

Based on all the data and analyses presented thus far in this evaluation report, Table 6.10 summarizes findings about the sustainability of CAGs and/or their democracy dividends in a series of pro, indeterminate, and con factors.

Table 6.10 Factors in CAG Sustainability and/or Democracy Dividends

Factors in Pro	Comments
Communities and LG alike are sincerely appreciative of CAG achievements.	This came out time and again in the evaluation, especially in interviewees' comparison of ICAP to other efforts that consisted of empty promises or appeared corrupt or nepotistic.
Many CAGs have continued for the LOP.	Self-explanatory.
Many CAGs have done multiple projects.	<i>Ceteris paribus</i> , CAGs capable of executing more than one project are more likely to persist.
IPs no longer have to "advertise" for CAGs.	Quite the contrary. By all accounts, citizens are actively initiating contact with IPs in order to become CAGs, even pre-organizing themselves along CAG lines.
CAGs have increased the value of their LG contributions	This is true over time and in the aggregate.
Some CAGs have mounted projects independent of ICAP support.	As mentioned by CHF, CI, and IRD, a few of these self-started projects were humanitarian. The PRS lists 15 projects requiring no ICAP funding: nine of these relied primarily on "other" contributions; four were entirely LG-funded; and two were supported mainly by community contributions. Recall that such projects are almost certainly under-reported in the PRS.
Some LGs have adopted CAG processes.	These processes include, e.g., citizen involvement, greater transparency, and increased attention to minority or marginalized groups.
Indeterminate Factors	Comments
Many CAGs include LG officials as members.	This can be a pro in terms of informing CAGs about LG procedures and resources, winning the necessary LG approvals, and facilitating LG contributions. But it could be a con if it means elite capture of CAGs.
Some CAGs have mobilized around pre-existing institutions.	This can be a pro in terms of not re-inventing the wheel or over-burdening communities with too many, and thus unsustainable, voluntary organizations. But it can be a con if the ultimate democracy-building thrust of ICAP is vitiated.
Quite a number of CAG members go on to stand for/win elective LG offices.	As well as enhancing CAG-LG interactions in the short term, this could be one of the truly long-term impacts of CAGs insofar as members apply their ICAP democracy lessons in their LG positions. But it needs to be verified that such members were not all influential people or lower-level LG officials that might have gone on anyway to stand for election or higher office.
As mentioned anecdotally by	The assumption is that such organizations will have better

CHF and IRD managers, a few CAGs have become or have spun-off NGOs or CSOs. ¹⁷	access to funding and training through ICSP's resource centers. But without longitudinal M&E, this does not equal proof of long-term sustainability <i>per se</i> . Also, there is a question as to how many such organizations Iraq could realistically sustain.
Per-project incidence of LG contributions remains low, but....	This may well be due to ICAP's mid-2005 mandate to shift to Marla and business/economic development projects. To the extent that such "projects" centered on individuals or their families, then quite properly LGs should <u>not</u> invest in them. In fact, LG contributions to publicly-oriented projects seem to be increasing.
Factors in Con	Comments
CAG members worry about out-of-pocket and opportunity costs. Also, they want ICAP to fund CAG offices, furniture, equipment, and operating expenses.	This came to light in the IRD focus group, where participants underscored personal expenses (like photocopying, transport, and communications) and days taken off from their regular jobs for many CAG-related meetings and tasks. When it came to demands for office space, etc., they seemed not to make the link to possibly becoming a CSO.
Some CAGs have experienced contracting difficulties due to large USM projects in their area.	Specifically, cases were reported of contractors opting for USM over CAG projects because they can earn more, with less red tape and oversight, on the former.

In view of the pro and indeterminate factors above, on balance the prospects for CAG sustainability and democracy dividends are promising – at least to the extent that CAG actions remain in the public as versus the private sphere (e.g., individual Marla and business/economic development "projects.") But by the same token (i.e., the indeterminate and con factors), it is clear sustainability and democracy dividends are still some way off.

As managers from all IPs repeatedly emphasized, some CAGs "get it" when it comes to the larger citizen-action and democracy-building aims of ICAP. But many don't, including perhaps a majority of inactive CAGs plus many active ones). In any case, especially with ICAP's stop-start funding and related losses in community credibility, it is far too early to expect nation-wide impacts in this regard. Not to mention decades of dictatorship, still-incomplete legal reforms as to decentralization and LG, plus continuing turmoil in many parts of Iraq (especially the Sunni Triangle).

Certainly, the long-term sustainability of CAGs *per se* will depend on their ability to muster non-ICAP funding, whether from their own communities, LG agencies and initiatives, other USAID or USG/Iraq sources, or international bodies. And in fairness, some of such funding should be earmarked for basic CAG operational expenses. If the history of foreign aid for development tells us anything, it is that volunteerism cannot long endure in the face of significant out-of-pocket and opportunity costs to poor or hard-pressed volunteers. In the short-term, ICAP II will need to consider how best to achieve a firmer financial footing for CAGs. Based on the present or earlier chapters of this evaluation report, strategies to explore are noted in the recommendations below.

The CA and its Modification 02 hypothesized that ICAP could help identify nascent NGOs or CSOs from among CAGs, which would then benefit from assistance in institutional strengthening and programming. An example of IP intentions in this respect was IRD's Y3 plan

¹⁷ On a somewhat humorous note, IRD managers also told of a few CSOs that re-styled themselves as CAGs in order to access ICAP resources.

to: evaluate its CAGs' progress on membership, meeting attendance, number and quality of completed projects, leadership, and LG interaction; guide selected CAGs from this evaluation in a further self-assessment; and lastly, mentor a resulting short list of CAGs capable and interested to become formal civil-society organizations, for subsequent referral to ICSP. Unfortunately, the evaluation team found little evidence of IP follow-through on such plans.

This finding is representative of minimal ICAP collaboration with related USAID/Iraq programs (see again Figure 6.3), notably: Izdihar; LGP; and in Baghdad and other major cities, potentially the new CSP.

Izdihar crosscuts all these programs insofar as it may provide micro-credit for their business/economic development activities. LGP works with LG agencies in a top-down fashion to address many of the same ends as ICAP's bottom-up efforts through CAGs, i.e.: to build stronger and more democratic LG institutions that collaborate with, are responsive to, and held accountable by citizen action and advocacy initiatives. CSP is designed to respond to inter-urban areas of major cities that, because of continuing violence, are not amenable to CAG development. IRD is the lead IP on this program, which is slated to start in seven neighborhoods of three districts of Baghdad. There, CSP will work with NACs and DACs to identify projects for reducing violence – especially via employment opportunities for male youth. If and as such projects are successful, IRD will need to write a plan for incorporating the relevant neighborhoods and districts into ICAP II and its larger, long-term aims of citizen action, advocacy, and democracy building.

A partial exception to the foregoing assessment of non-collaboration is ICSP. As per Table 6.3, at least A/V wisely took advantage of ICSP to mount some joint capacity-building events -- although these appear to be less extensive than originally envisioned (see A/V's Monthly Report of April 2006 and the discussion therein of plans for CAG observation of LG trainings and proceedings). For its part, SC held various coordination meetings with ICSP on how to use their respective organizations' human and other resources synergistically (SC Monthly Report of December 2005). In addition to garnering training for CAGs from ICSP resource centers, it seems SC CAGs also coordinated with numerous ICSP NGOs and CSOs.

- ❖ *Best Practice: SC linked its CAGs with 25 NGOs and CSOs fostered by ICSP. These ICSP groups spanned organizations devoted to the disabled (blind, deaf, mute, crippled), cultural activities (e.g., dance, drama), farmers, health, human rights (including political and war prisoners), orphans, and women.*

Sustainability and Democracy Recommendations

- CAGs should use their relatively high rates of citizen involvement and donations to leverage LG contributions.
- In tandem with USAID/Iraq and especially LGP, the consortium should strategize how CAGs can best access PRT's PC development funds, whether independently or via ICAP cost-shares.
- USAID/Iraq and the consortium also need to strategize together on how, through PRTs, better to coordinate USG and CAG projects in a given locale.
- Both USAID/Iraq and the consortium should review the CAG → to CSO paradigm to see if it remains valid for democracy-building and, if so, institute mechanisms for achieving it (especially if ICSP is discontinued).
- Work intimately with PRTs (and so USM) via USAID/Iraq's PRT representatives.
- Alert CAGs to Izdihar sources of credit (where available), especially for business/economic development grants.
- Identify win-win collaborations with LGP to acquaint CAGs with mechanisms for transparency and civic participation and LG. For instance, when an LG agency plans to



hold public hearings or otherwise seek citizen input, LGP should help ensure that ICAP is informed, so interested CAGs can mobilize to attend or respond.

- Under ICAP II plus IRD's new CSP grant, IRD will need to make a plan for transitioning from the latter to the former – in the process damping competition over ICAP versus CSP resources.
- Follow SC's lead in linking CAGs with existing NGOs and CSOs for greater impact.



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ANNEX A:

Scope of Work for Iraq Community Action Program Evaluation With Revised LOE / USAID Iraq

I. Strategic Objective to be Evaluated

To assist Iraq's transition to democracy, USAID initiated a comprehensive program in support of Democratic Governance described in the USAID/Iraq Transition Strategic Plan¹⁸, and outlined in the Results Framework (RF). Strategic Objective 3 of the RF encompasses Intermediate Result 3.2 "Build Capacity of Civil Society to Advocate for Their Interests."

Since USAID/Iraq began its efforts in Iraq in 2003 very little has changed in regards to Iraq's ability to effectively run the country without outside help – institutions, the economy and its capacity to delivery social services are still weak. Although there have been marginal improvements significant challenges still lie ahead before Iraq can stand on its own feet.

USAID is implementing two civil society initiatives, the Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP) and the Civil Society and Media Program. Both initiatives address the demand side of governance by focusing on citizen involvement in political processes and issues-based advocacy.

CAP fosters direct citizen involvement in the rehabilitation of Iraq, enabling Iraqis to address the local needs in their respective communities. Through this grassroots democratization program, citizens have been forming local community groups to identify and prioritize the needs of their communities and develop projects that address those needs. These community groups work collaboratively with local government officials, enabling a constructive dialogue to form between local officials and their constituents on how best to address local needs. Through this program, citizens develop basic advocacy skills.

The purpose of this SOW is to review the CAP projects being implemented through grants to five international, private, voluntary organizations: ACDI/VOCA, Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), International Relief and Development (IRD), Mercy Corps, and Save the Children. CAP works nationwide and has implemented projects in social and economic infrastructure development, including employment and income generation, health, water, sanitation, environmental clean-up, schools, market relocation and playground refurbishment.

II. Background

The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime has opened a new chapter in Iraqi history. After decades of tyranny, Iraqis are now starting to build a free civil society. The former Ba'athist regime did not encourage the development or formation of community or civil society organizations. Despite the country's unstable political situation, communities across the country are experiencing an increase in small, community-level action groups and organizations thanks in part to USAID and its implementing partners.

Since the war, many groups have formed voluntary organizations to address some of the basic needs and services of the Iraqi people such as security, water, electricity, education and health. With this in mind, USAID is working to build a cadre of civil society groups in Iraq by identifying, developing, and strengthening Community Action Groups (CAGs). To assist in achieving the

¹⁸ November 2005, but also relevant may be the previous Iraq Strategy Statement.

goal USAID has engaged five partners through cooperative agreements.¹⁹ With experience from CAP, CAGs are expected to mobilize community demand for higher quality public services. Further, project permit requirements have helped connect community-based demand for government services as expressed in CAP projects to municipal governments.

Meanwhile the governance of Iraq has been rapidly changing, moving towards a more decentralized structure.

The Iraq national government is organized into 18 provinces (also known as governorates). Each province has traditionally had a governor and a provincial advisory council. Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) enabled by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and by relevant Administrative Orders, members to the Provincial Councils (PCs) were elected by popular vote, and the PCs became legislative bodies with expanded powers.

The PC elections were held in January 2005 concurrently with the elections to the Transitional National Assembly (TNA). After the TNA concluded its work on the constitution, a popular referendum was held on 15 October 2005. This referendum validated the new constitution. The new constitution then enabled a new round of elections to the 'permanent' Council of Representatives (COR). This latter election was held on 15 December 2005. The formation of the Iraq Government is currently underway. Once formed, the government will call for new local elections, and it is anticipated that current PC members will change. The constitution provides for decentralization -- the Ministries of Finance and of Municipalities and Public Works are both pressing for enhanced local autonomy.

III. Existing Information from the Partners

In their respective Cooperative Agreements, the CAP partners are mandated to form CAGs. The CAGs are the implementation tool for the CAP. To date it is estimated that more than 1,400 CAGs have been formed or engaged by the CAP partners. These CAGs have been catalysts for as many as 5,000 community projects. However, many CAGs are purposely built for a limited duration, and it is estimated that currently active CAGs number between 50 and 100 for each of the partners. Partners that are the object of this evaluation are: Save the Children, IRD, Mercy Corps, ACDI/VOCA and CHF. The table below of comparative activities illustrates the level of support for each of the partners.

Partner	Obligation	Areas of Operation	Approx. Number of CAP Activities Implemented per Partner ²⁰
ACDI/VOCA with Counterpart International	47,050	Al Anbar, Salah ad Din, Diyala, At Tamim, Ninawa, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk	800
CHF	47,100	Babil, Najaf, Karbala	433

¹⁹ Cooperative agreements define program descriptions that outline the proposed work of the partner; whereas contractual agreements required a more formal adherence to a SOW related to the Mission Strategy and Results Framework.

²⁰ Extracted from the Project Reporting System, CAP Project List

IRD	64,000	Baghdad	1,262
Mercy Corps	47,050	Wassit, Qadissiyah, Maysan	335
Save the Children	53,600	Dasrah, Dhi-Qar, Muthanna	1,043

Each of the partners operates in separate designated governorates. As seen in the table, IRD has received the highest level of funding to cover the Baghdad region. CAGs formed thus far can be classified by thematic area, with emphasis changing according to program strategy. CAG emphasis has recently transitioned to focus on employment creation and on creating demand for government services among community interest groups.

Reporting requirements and indicator development for the 5 partners are specified in their co-operative agreements. IBTCI will ensure that the evaluation team has available the basic documentation from each of the CAP partners.

IV. Purpose of the Evaluation

The respective cooperative agreements will have been in place for three years by mid year 2006. Consistent with a new USAID program strategy, the mission now wishes to evaluate the CAP program in its entirety. This evaluation should provide guidance and corrections for any new CAP program envisioned in the future. The Mission to determine if objectives were achieved, including job creation, conflict mitigation, and community development; and for lessons learned in the event of a follow-on project.

The CAGs are the critical mechanism for implementation of CAP. As such, the focus of the CAP evaluation is to examine the efficacy of the CAGs as tools to achieve the program objectives as stated in the cooperative agreements and vis a vis USAID's Results Framework and Strategic Objective. The evaluation seeks to understand whether or not the CAP communities have become cooperative partners with their respective local governments and have been effective in promoting community-determined interests. The evaluation will also determine whether the communities have been able to achieve transparency while working to implement community projects.

The evaluation will focus on the "after intervention" results of the CAGs. The evaluation will be retrospective in working to identify CAG successes and failures (ultimately encapsulated in a statement of lessons learned). The evaluation will also be forward looking with respect to how the lessons learned might be applied to the future CAP activities and the PRT concept. There is a further need to specify whether or not there was collaboration among the CAP partners.

V. Evaluation Questions

The CAP vision is to promote participatory governance by developing community action groups that identify, prioritize and advocate for resolution of community issues. With this in mind, the following questions will be asked of the key contributors from each of the five partners. These questions aim to identify problem areas and achievements in the organizations. Underlying these questions are the cooperative agreement program descriptions as well as the monthly and quarterly reports submitted by the CAP partners to USAID.²¹

21 The CAP evaluator will use the CAP Structured Key Person Interview Form to prepare answers to these questions.

Partner Questions:

- Staffing levels, staff resources available to implement the program descriptions.
- Security issues related to program implementation (what is the state of the enabling environment)
- List any obstacles to implementation (other than security) that you encountered
- Number of trained community organizers?
 - Did the community organizer use standard training modules developed by the program?
 - Which modules have proved most effective?
 - Number of CAGs formed since program inception, and during the past one-year?
- Results from any internal assessments that may have been done?
 - Corrective actions from the assessments that may have been implemented?
- What program management steps were taken to ensure that the Statement of Work was achieved?
 - Were indicators developed to monitor the program? If so, what are they?
 - If yes, was there regular reporting on these indicators?
 - Other means for reporting on or tracking CAG activities (e.g., database of CAGs)
 - What are the characteristics of the CAGs you have been developing?
 - From the management point of view, what characterizes a successful CAG?
 - Were you aiming to develop CAGs of a particular type, e.g., women's groups, infrastructure development, advocacy for special groups (Iraqi war victims), economic development.
 - Number, location and type of CAGs formed
 - Number, location and type of active CAGs
 - Number of Cluster Groups that were formed
 - Number and type of cluster activities
 - How many CAGs formed each Cluster Group
- Provide a list of reports submitted to USAID or other donors
- Provide a list of internal reports prepared for purposes of program management
- Provide internal project audit reports
- What are the major program achievements? What factors do you consider important to determine achievements? E.g., transparent vetting process? Positive cooperation and communication? Efficient use of funds? Etc...
 - Single most important achievement?
- What are the lessons learned, including the most important, since the onset of the CAP?
 - Did you work together with the other CAP partners on any level?
 - If so, explain how you worked together?
 - What recommendations do you have to improve the working relationships among the other CAP partners?
- What steps have been taken to coordinate CAP activities with other agencies that may be active in the same area (e.g., Civil Society and Media Program, Local Governance Program I and II, military Civil Affairs)
 - In October 2005, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative began; has the CAP responded to the initiative?
 - What experience/concerns do you have in working with the PRTs in the past and in the future?

CAG Questions:

The CAG development process uses trained community organizers to explain CAGs to the community. A typical CAG has 12-15 members from the community. The actions of the CAG are intended to benefit the community at large, or that segment of the community that is the focus of the CAG activity. Community organizers facilitate new CAGs through capacity building activities. A CAG questionnaire has been designed (see Annex II). The questionnaire is intended to assess the performance of the CAGs and to help validate the support they were given by the CAP partners. Further, the CAG questionnaire seeks to evaluate the performance of the CAGs as advocates and as viable institutions.

An objective stated in the cooperative agreements is to create cluster groups. Cluster groups form when more than one CAG comes together to address a common issue or need that crosses community boundaries. Cluster groups could form around wider public works issues such as water, sewer, roads or schools. When community boundaries are based on ethnic, religious or other social class distinctions then the cluster groups can provide a basis for conflict mitigation. The CAG questionnaire provides a series of questions designed to show that CAGs do cross community boundaries to work in a cooperative spirit.

VI. Evaluation Methods:

Design Strategy

A key assumption is that the units of analysis for the evaluation are the partner institutions and the community action groups. Other possible units of analysis would be households within the communities where the CAGs are operating. Analyses such as community satisfaction with CAG activities and projects might be answered through household surveys in the communities. However, selecting a credible sample of households in each community requires knowledge about the scope of the CAG activity and nature of the community.²² It is unlikely that there will be sufficient data available to make statistical comparisons of findings on CAGs between provinces.

Key informant interviews are suggested for answering Partner Questions listed above. Here the unit of analysis is the cooperative partner. Questions about the CAG are to be answered through the collection of survey data where the unit of analysis is the CAG. A well executed, stratified sample design with a tested questionnaire and field manuals is anticipated. Sample stratification by partner/region is intended to permit comparison of partners with respect to their development of CAGs. Local Iraqi firms may be subcontracted to execute the CAG survey.

Data Analysis Plan

Analysis of the CAG data will explore key variables²³ cross-tabulated by partner, type of CAG and location. Exploratory multivariate data analysis is encouraged, but depends on the reliability of the data (this will be at the discretion of the evaluators). The data set is expected to be a part of the deliverables. Ideally, templates for proposed tables should be completed before field work begins, and take place concurrently with the questionnaire design.

The evaluation will use data from the project reporting system (PRS) to analyse data on CAG projects. The analysis will look at estimates of long term employment, short term employment

²² It is the nature of some projects to attract broad-based community interest, while others might be limited to a specific neighborhood within a community. Using the same sample design in each community could yield unreliable results. The expected percentage of households in the community with knowledge about a project will vary significantly between communities.

²³ Key variables are those that answer the proposed questions.

and the number of beneficiaries noted by type of project. If possible the analysis is to include the cost per beneficiary achieved by the projects. The evaluation will also look for duplications in project reporting, and at the outliers of reported values such as for long term employment. The purpose is to validate project reporting methods and estimate comparative achievement in long term employment and in the number of beneficiaries reached by the projects.

Survey Method

Design a representative stratified sample of approximately 30 CAGs for each of the 5 Partners²⁴. The sample should be selected from a sample frame of all known active CAGs. Information on the CAGs is to be provided by the CAP partners. Unit of analysis will be the CAG, but interviews will be with CAG members, preferably the head or key persons in the CAG. Questionnaire preparation has been an important part of the methodological development.

VII. Team Composition

- Expat Survey specialist to design CAG survey – to coordinate with Iraqi sub-contractor who will administer the survey.
- Expat Community Action Program evaluators (2 CAP experts) to review the key person interview form, carry out key person interviews in Iraq, and to write up the results of those interviews and the sample of CAGs..
- Local contractor to implement the survey design, (estimate field work at a rate of 2 CAGs per day for each field specialist). (1 team manager, 2 field supervisors, 10 field monitors – 2 for each CAP region)
- Data analyst to prepare table templates (1 Data Analyst expert), validate the data, to prepare completed tables based on the templates, possible exploratory data analysis.

VIII. Schedule and Logistics

Schedule for Monitoring CAP

Activity/Schedule	# Expats:	# person days	# Iraqi Monitors	# days	Total Person Days	
					Expat	Iraqi
Pre-travel research and planning: design data analysis, design key person interviews, design CAG sample, prepare report template. Review background documentation.	Two CAP experts and one survey specialist	10			20	
		10			10	
Travel to Iraq	2 expats	2			4	

²⁴ Overall some 1400 CAGs have been created. Some CAGs have a limited duration such as those that are specifically project oriented and may no longer exist. Sampling procedure would need to consider replacement procedures when selected CAGs no longer exist.



Team Preparation Meeting/planning (TPM) with Iraqi staff and USAID. Refine evaluation SOW as necessary	2 CAP experts	2	1 team manager; 2 fld supervisors; 10 fld monitors	2	4	26
Training Field Monitors, field test survey instruments, Implement the sample of CAGs; expats do key informant interviews	2 CAP experts	14	1 team manager; 2 fld supervisors; 10 fld monitors	14	28	156
Data consolidation, report drafting, debriefing	2 CAP experts; 1 data analyst	13 5	1 team manager; 2 fld supervisors	2	26 5	6
Travel to USA	2 expats	2			4	
Final Report preparation	2 expats	22 (CM) 5 (DW)			27	
TOTAL LOE (without travel) for:					120	188
CAP Evaluator – McCorkle		61				
CAP Evaluator – Warmke		44				
Survey Specialist / Data Analyst – Herr		15				
		8			8	
Travel days billable:						

Note 1 – some of the above items have already been carried out by the local monitors or Baghdad based Survey Specialist / Data Analyst.

Note 2 – The Survey Specialist / Data Analyst will also participate in various meetings and on an as and when needed basis. This is not reflected in LOE above.

IX. Reports

In Iraq, the evaluation team will provide one or more interim briefings to USAID as requested. A final, full briefing on findings and recommendations will be provided at a time specified by USAID and a draft report outline will be submitted prior to departure.

The final report will be provided to USAID no later than 7 working days after receipt of comments from USAID on the draft. It is anticipated that USAID review of the draft will require up to two weeks, with comments to be returned to the team for final editing of the report.



Deliverables:

1. A summary report of findings outlined below.
2. Documented data from the CAG Survey.



ANNEX B:

List of Contacts

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title / Position</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Location</u>
Uday Adid Al-Adeli	Deputy Head of Office	Mercy Corps	Kut
Enass Al-Jabori	Deputy Director /Community Participation	CHF	Hilla
Sinan Al-Najjar	CAP Program Manager	CHF	Hillah
Shymaa Al-Qhadi	CAP Program Assistant	USAID	Baghdad
Latef Al-Torfa	Governor/ Wassit Province	Government of Iraq	Kut
Anika Ayrapetyants	Desk Officer	Counterpart	Washington, DC
Emad Baraya	DCOP		
Hassan Baroudy	CTO for LGP II	USAID	Baghdad
Robert Beckman	Interim COP	IBTCI	Baghdad
Rudolph von Bernuth	VP & Managing Director	Save the Children	Washington, DC
Ed Birgells	CTO for CSP	USAID	Baghdad
Paul Butler	Country Director & COP	Mercy Corps	Sulaymaniyah
Brad Camp	Regional Representative	USAID	Erbil
Carol Conragan	DG Advisor	USAID	Washington, DC
Linda Crawford	Deputy Program Officer	USAID	Baghdad
Christine Crumrine	DCOP	OSC (A/V)	Kirkuk
Ali Daher	Community Development		
Fortunat Diener	Director M&E	OSC (A/V)	Kirkuk
Katherine Donahue	Program Office, PSC		
Munqeth Dughir	CEO	IIACSS	Baghdad
Mercedes Fitchett	Private Sector Development Advisor	USAID	Baghdad
Rich Fromer	Management Associate	CHF	Washington, DC
Javanshir Hajiyev	Deputy Head of Office	Mercy Corps	Sulaymaniyah
Waddah Hamdy	Regional Director, SC	ADF	Hilla
Joe Hand	Security Manager	Kroll	Baghdad
Marty Hanrady	Director, D&G/PRT Office	USAID	Baghdad
Tom Harley	Security Manager	Kroll	Baghdad
Mohammad Hazim	Program Manager	IIACSS	Baghdad
Tamara Heimur	Project Coordinator	ACDI/VOCA	Washington, DC
Harvey Herr	Survey Expert	IBTCI	Baghdad
Shirley Hoffman	Director, Program Office	USAID	Baghdad
David Holdridge	Regional Director	Mercy Corps	Amman
Andrew Huff	Assoc. Program Officer	CHF	Washington, DC



Sally Iadarola	VP Europe & Asia	ACDI/VOCA	Washington, DC
Robert Jacobi	Acting COP	IRD	Baghdad
Sam Jones	Senior Program Officer	Counterpart	Washington, DC
Yaghdan Jrew	CTO for IBTCI	USAID	Baghdad
Ahmed A. Kareem	Senior Program Officer	Counterpart	Baghdad
Shah Kerez Khan	Director CD	OSC (AV)	Kirkuk
Sonia Khush	Program Manager	Save the Children	Washington, DC
Rafael Khusnutdinov	Security Specialist	Save the Children	Washington, DC
Jayant Kalotra	President	IBTCI	Washington, DC
Farooq Koryoka	Community Mobilizer	IRD	Baghdad
	Team Leader		
Diana Landsman	Director Finance & Admin.	CHF	Amman
Arlene Lear	Desk Officer	Counterpart	Washington, DC
Zena Isma'eel Mahmood	Senior Community Mobilizer	IRD	Baghdad
Paul Majorowitz	Senior Program Officer	Mercy Corps	Washington, DC
Andrew Manhart	Provincial Program Manager	IRMO (State Dept)	Erbil
Hoppy Mazier	Country Director	CHF	Amman
Constance McCorkle	Evaluation Team Leader	IBTCI	Washington, DC
Michaela Meehan	Democracy Specialist	USAID	Washington, DC
Michael Miller	President	ADF	Washington, DC
Lloyd Mendes	Provincial Council Advisor	RTI	Mosul
Abdalla Mohammed	Regional Program Director	RTI	Erbil
	LGP II		
Ian O'Brien	Economic Dev. Officer	IRD	Washington, DC
Mohammed Odey	DCOP	IRD	Baghdad
Bruce Parmalee	Regional Director	CHF	Washington, DC
	Middle East & Africa		
Bob Richey	Communications Officer	IRD	Baghdad
Mohammad Hassan Saber	Chairman Provincial	Government of Iraq	Kut
	Council Wassit Province		
Cynthia Scarlett	COP	IBTCI	Baghdad
John Schamper	Acting Director	USAID	Baghdad
	Economic Growth		
Leona Spinks	Public Finance Advisor	RTI	Kirkuk
	PRT Kirkuk		
Donna Stefano	Senior Program Officer	CHF	Washington, DC
Wameedh Taie	Senior Community	IRD	Baghdad
	Mobilizer		
Dimitrije Todorovic	CTO for ICAP	USAID	Baghdad
Bob Van Heest	Director	IBTCI	Washington, DC



Shahla Muhammad Waliy	Country Director	Counterpart	Baghdad
Dar Warmke	Evaluator	IBTCI	Washington, DC
Sarah Warren	Senior Program Officer	Mercy Corps	Washington, DC
Minnie Wright	Former Director D&G/PRT Office	USAID	Washington, DC



ANNEX C:

Final Workplan and Schedule

(revised 15 July 2006 after 14 July USAID/Iraq meeting, for re-negotiation)

Approach and Methodology

In formulating the following work methodology statement, IBTCI has cleaved closely to the approved Statement of Work (SOW), which underscores the democratic governance thrust of ICAP described in USAID/Iraq's Transition Strategic Plan 1, outlined in the Mission Results Framework (RF) SO3/IR 3.2 to "Build capacity of civil society to advocate for their interests." IBTCI has adopted the following broad definition of community participation and the strengthening of community capacities under the ICAP mandate as:

CAP will compliment other USAID initiatives by implementing demand-side projects that promote civil participation, revitalize essential infrastructure, create employment, and income generation opportunities, and address critical environmental problems, ... will create community committees responsible for identifying and prioritizing community needs, mobilizing community and other resources, and monitoring project implementation, ...broader cluster committees will be formed with representatives from various community committees to increase participation and cooperation on issues of regional concern, and to promote ethnic, religious, and tribal cooperation, and ... strengthen capacity of local communities to better identify and manage underlying tensions and strain, that left unaddressed, could fuel violence among Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious groups. (Source: RFA, No. M-OP-03-A409. April 9, 2003).

The purpose of this evaluation is to find, describe, and verify successes and failures in USAID/Iraq's capacity building efforts, primarily focused at the community level. ICAP was implemented over the previous 3 years by 5 Implementing Partners (IPs). They include:

1. ACDI/VOCA - teamed with Counterpart International (CI)
2. Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF)
3. International Relief and Development (IRD)
4. Mercy Corps (MC)
5. Save the Children (SC)

The evaluation approach is necessarily broad and inclusive given that IPs are responsible for different Areas of Responsibility (AORs), and project activities. Strategic approaches and community profiles to be evaluated also vary widely. Each IP has also drawn upon the skills of many other institutions in their work. These range from university research centers, to international civic organizations (such as Junior Achievement International) to private development-engineering firms, as well as regional and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Iraq. Some IPs have also been successful in leveraging additional resources for ICAP or related programs from private enterprise, One example is donation of sports equipment from Nike company.

Blending these elements together, ICAP's basic approach is:

- through the formation of informal Community Action Groups (CAGs), to foster direct citizen participation in the rehabilitation of Iraq at the local level via numerous small- and medium-sized development projects; and
- in that process to provide Iraqis with hands-on opportunities to learn and practice



principles of democracy, transparency, inclusiveness (of religious, ethnic/tribal, gender, and age differences), and citizen advocacy to government

With this larger aim in mind plus the possibility of follow-on ICAP activities, the present evaluation will take a dual perspective by:

- looking back (as per a final evaluation) at what ICAP has achieved across its 3 years of operation, not only tangibly but also intangibly
- looking forward (as in a midterm evaluation) to how a follow-on project might be best designed as per best practices and lessons learned to date

The IBTCI Evaluation Team (hereafter simply “team”) composed of one survey expert resident in Iraq, one expert on ICAP- style projects with long-term Iraq experience, and one team leader who is a specialist in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) with decades of experience in evaluating USAID projects implemented by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) like those participating in ICAP. In conducting its evaluation the team will:

- (i) Evaluate CAGs and their core functions.
- (ii) Assess relevant IP management structures in the complex context of contemporary Iraq
- (iii) Determine the extent to which ICAP activities have impacted community understandings and behaviors, identifying specific successes, failures, and/or problems encountered

To accomplish these objectives, the team will respond point-by-point to the issues and detailed questions posed in Parts IV and V of the SOW using the data sources, methods, and subject groups as indicated in the following workplan.

Workplan

Washington DC and In-Country Tasks/Activities

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 1- 12 June | <p>Preliminary, Unscheduled Activities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Working by phone, fax, and e-mail, team refines and finalizes a questionnaire to be applied to a random sample of CAG officers and members throughout Iraq▪ With IBTCI headquarters staff, various logistic and pre-planning matters discussed and arranged▪ Collection of the five IP original proposals and all required 2005-2006 reports to USAID/Iraq. These were duplicated and organized into a dual series of notebooks for the team’s use |
| 12- 17 June | <p>Initial Planning and Document Review</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Team introductions and meetings to review evaluation requirements and define work tasks/activities, schedule, and roles▪ Initial review of IP proposals and reports▪ Interviews with USAID personnel in DCHA’s Democracy and Governance (D&G) Unit, plus gathering of USAID background and guidance documents for D&G▪ Scheduling of IP interviews in Washington DC area▪ Invitations sent to all IP offices in Iraq for proposed workshop in Erbil, tentatively scheduled for 2-3 July (see below) |

- 19- 24 June Interviews, Logistics, Design, Workplanning
- On-going design of IP data tables/templates, and preliminary design of all-IP workshop in Erbil
 - Continued collection of documents and data from IPs
 - Structured interviews with each IP HQ in the DC area
 - Travel to Ft. Belvoir to obtain CAC cards, and prepare for departure to Iraq
 - Preparation of the present evaluation workplan and methodology for submission to USAID by 23 June
 - Team travel to Iraq

In-Country Tasks/Activities

- 27 Jun Evaluators arrive IZ
- whole-team meetings and initial definition of team roles and responsibilities
 - refine list of key questions regarding ICAP activities and review SOW
- 28-29 Jun Meet with USAID/Iraq D&G Unit
- review evaluation SOW, and workplan, key questions
 - develop a common understanding of expectations, requirements and limitations of the evaluation
 - identify issues, concerns or problems
- 29-30 Jun Prepare for all-IP evaluation workshop in Erbil
- design workshop presentation outline and data compilation templates for IPs to use/fill out
 - disseminate same to all IPs
 - develop focus-group guides for use with IP field staff
- 1 Jul Travel to Erbil
- evening introductions and informal meetings with IP attendees
- 2-3 Jul Conduct evaluation workshop for IP senior staff in Erbil
- describe evaluation approach and explain purposes of workshop
 - plenary IP presentations of ICAP activities Y1-Y3, according to structured outline, tables/templates provided by the team
 - Q&A / discussions at the end of each presentation
 - evaluation team conducts semi-structured interviews privately with 4 groups of IP representatives
 - IPs prepare success/learning stories and worst/best cases illustrating lessons learned and best practices
 - second round of plenary presentations on stories and cases, and lessons learned for follow-on ICAP activities
 - Q&A / discussions at the end of each presentation
- 4-6 Jul Travel back to IZ, and field work in Erbil
- designated team members return to IZ and review, discuss, consolidate workshop results, work on fresh logistics, etc.

- one team member remains in Erbil for individual interviews with non-IP individuals plus a pre-test focus group with Iraqi field staff of ACDI/VOCA
- 7-10 Jul Team meetings in IZ
 - type up and compile whole-team notes to date, from: USAID/DC and Iraq, interviews with IP HQs in DC, IP workshop presentations, interviews with IP senior managers, focus group pre-test, other individual interviews
 - informal analysis of all such data to date
 - acquire and read added non-IP documents with implications for ICAP
- 11 Jul Field visit to Al-Kut
 - one team member travel to/from Al-Kut to meet with: Governor; Head of PC; CAG members of Al-Haidariya Youth & Sports Center, including visit to facility; CAG members of Performing Arts Center, including visit to facility
 - other team members as for 7-11 Jul
- 12-13 Jul Various
 - team interview with senior IRD managers
 - design added instrument on CAG links to local government, per World Bank study
 - identify and obtain additional documents or data
 - team meeting with ICAP CTO and Program Assistant at USAID/Iraq to discuss work to date and upcoming mid-term briefing
 - team flex meetings, and meetings on midterm briefing
 - prepare briefing materials and presentation
- 14 Jul Mid-term briefing for USAID/Iraq
 - participants include ICAP-CTO, Contracts Officer, CSP-CTO and others
 - present initial evaluation activities, preliminary findings, lessons learned, recommendations, and also challenges/lines of inquiry
 - design and discuss next steps
 - adjust evaluation schedule and LOE as agreed with USAID/Iraq
- 15-23 Jul Initial data analysis
 - do aggregate analyses and re-arrays of data gathered from workshop presentations and from completed data compilation templates submitted by IPs
 - mine ICAP Project Reporting System (PRS) for extraction and array of any data and trend lines of use for the evaluation
 - construct data tables or graphics as required for inclusion in the various evaluation deliverables
 - meet with IICASS to agree on terms for focus groups with field staff
- 19 Jul Field visit to Baghdad
 - one team member travel to Baghdad to meet with members of various IRD CAGs, plus visit one CAG project site
 - other team members as for 15-23 Jul

- hopefully, IICASS begins focus group interviews with IP field staff
- 20-23 Jul On-going throughout time in-country
 - overseeing field staff focus groups by IICASS
 - conduct added interviews with non-IP individuals/entities related to ICAP (e.g., IRMO, NCT, USAID, USG)
 - continue analyses of all data as they become available
 - develop findings and conclusions for initial draft report
 - write and submit summary of evaluation findings based on data available to date to USAID/Iraq
 - hopefully, o/a 23 Jul IICASS begins random survey of CAGs
- 24 Jul Exit briefing for USAID/Iraq
 - participants include Mission Director
 - present evaluation findings, lessons learned, and the way forward
 - Q&A / discussion and verbal USAID comments
- 25 Jul Team leader departs IZ
- 25-30 Jul Various tasks by team survey and CAP experts
 - oversee focus groups and random survey of CAGs by IICASS
 - survey and CAP experts on team continue to draft portions of reports
 - CAP expert concludes contract and departs IZ
 - submission of rough draft report portions based on data available to date to USAID/Iraq

In-Country and Washington DC Tasks/Activities

- 1-15 Aug Continued report write-up plus analysis of new, IICASS data received
 - Team leader amplifying and refining draft report portions, and preparing standard annexes
 - CAG survey completed along with ICASS entry of data therefrom
 - Team survey expert begins analysis of CAG survey data
 - Field staff focus groups completed, transcripts written up and checked by team survey expert
- 16-31 Aug Analysis of last data to arrive, and completion of all final-draft evaluation deliverables
 - Focus group transcripts forwarded to team leader in Washington DC, for qualitative/thematic analysis and incorporation into relevant report portions and annexes
 - Key data tables constructed and analyzed for CAG survey by team survey expert
 - Survey tables, accompanying summary-analysis comments, and annexes forwarded to team leader for incorporation into report
- 1 Sep
 - Submission of draft final report to USAID/Iraq



- 7 business days for USAID to return comments to IBTCI (to be confirmed)

10-15 Sep Finalization of report

- USAID comments to IBCTI
- Team leader revise draft final report accordingly
- IBCTI do professional formatting and production of final report
- Submission of final report to USAID/Iraq

ANNEX D:

Methods and Instruments

D-1: IP HQ STAFF INTERVIEWS

About the Evaluation

HQ staff should already have received the evaluation SOW. Following is some additional, general information.

1. Relative roles of the evaluation team members:
 - (a) Mr. Harvey Herr for M&E, statistical analysis of survey and other data, and M&E, plus long-term experience in Iraq -- where he is currently a resident IBTCI staff.
 - (b) Dr. Constance McCorkle for M&E methodology, long-time experience with external evaluations of PVO projects/programs for USAID, and M&E design work for an ICAP-like World Bank Social Fund Project (in conflict-ridden Angola).
 - (c) Mr. Dar Warmke, for evaluation content as per his long-time and on-site management and operational experience with ICAP-style programs in conflict situations (e.g., in Serbia/Montenegro, elsewhere), plus first-hand Iraq experience.
2. Overview of the general evaluation workplan:
 - (a) 2 weeks' document identification and review plus PVO HQ meetings in US by McCorkle and Warmke (who departed 24 June for Iraq) assisted by Herr and other IBTCI staff in document acquisition.
 - (b) An in-country survey headed up by Herr, who is currently posted long-term in Iraq.
 - (c) Approximately three weeks for the whole team together in-country for: interviews with central and decentralized AID/Iraq staff, relevant military personnel, other knowledgeable individuals in Baghdad; an all-PVO workshop with COPs, DCOPs, Finance, and one other staffer; focus groups with PVO national field staff and CAGs.
 - (d) Final write-up of evaluation reports by all three team members, working electronically from their respective home/posting locations.
3. This "final" evaluation is really more like a midterm evaluation in that -- in addition to looking back at what was achieved or not, and why or why not -- it also looks forward to lessons learned and recommendations for a likely follow-on ICAP program, but one with some significant changes, such as:
 - (a) work within a PVO consortium;
 - (b) added and/or different funding, from USM sources as well as/instead of USAID;
 - (c) different placement of the project under a new AID/Iraq Results Framework and PMP;
 - (d) new relations with PRTs, i.e. Provincial Reconstruction Teams;
 - (e) and doubtless many other factors that the evaluation team (and PVOs) will learn of in due course and the ever-changing context of Iraq.
4. In terms of "looking back and looking forward," this evaluation represents a rich opportunity for ICAP PVOs to:
 - (a) re-consider lessons learned from their own experiences and the evaluation recommendations from their past ICAP-like efforts (e.g., in Central Asia, Lebanon, Serbia, other);
 - (b) with expert M&E guidance from the evaluation team, amass, array, and analyze various types of process, results, and impact data on ICAP that are not currently captured in regular reports or the PRS;
 - (c) apply such self-reflection and data arrays in a follow-on proposal;
 - (d) relatedly, apply them for realistically benchmarking and baselining/targeting indicators for same.



- *5. Please, can you provide us with any other internal/external or informal/formal assessments/evaluations that were done of your ICAP -- beyond the regular required reports? Ditto for any internal project audit reports.

Finally, we realize that HQ staff may not be able to respond to some of the questions we will be asking. That's ok. Just answer to the best of your ability, or simply say that such questions should better be posed in Iraq (and if possible, to whom in particular).



D-2: HQ INTERVIEW GUIDE

Management

1. Please describe the management, financial, backstopping, representation, fundraising, or other responsibilities of HQ vis-à-vis your ICAP project -- including formal reporting systems from the field to HQ.
2. Were/are there any issues that proved especially difficult or easy for HQ in managing the ICAP?
3. Given your answers above, what best practices or recommendations might you highlight for a follow-on project design?

Human Resources

1. The team will be asking for data on USAID/W, USAID/Iraq, PVO/expat, and also PVO/national staffing levels and turnover on the ICAP, year-by-year. But here we would be interested to learn:
 - (a) What were staffing levels and turnover in HQ management? Were these more or less normal? If not, why not? (e.g., A/V restructuring)
 - (b) Based on prior experiences, do you feel that in-country levels/turnover in both expat (E) and Iraqi (I) staff were normal/expectable for a ICAP-type project in a conflict situation? If not, why not?
2. Given your answers above, what best practices or recommendations might you highlight for a follow-on project?

Program Design and Implementation

1. The ICAP model was drawn from similar programs in Lebanon, Serbia, and elsewhere. Aside from security issues, to what extent were best practices and lessons learned from those experiences incorporated in your PVO's ICAP design?
2. What obstacles to ICAP implementation were posed by security considerations across Y1-Y3?
3. What other kinds of obstacles arose across Y1-Y3? E.g. from:
 - (a) Year-to-year shifts in USAID and other stakeholders' earmarks or collaborative requirements (such as the Leahy/Marla Ruzicka fund for War Victims or collaboration with DOD/USM and their PRTS, emerging GOI structures at various levels, other bi- or multi-lateral donors).
 - (b) Programmatic tracking and reporting (i.e., M&E) problems attendant upon any of the above.
4. Given your answers above, what best practices or recommendations might you highlight for a follow-on project?

Program Outcomes and Their Spread Effects/Sustainability

1. What are you really "proud of" as significant achievements of your ICAP -- unanticipated as well as anticipated? Why/how do you think these came about?
2. What stand out as significant programmatic shortcomings of ICAP -- unanticipated as well as anticipated? Why/how do you think these came about?



3. If not already mentioned in 1 or 2 above, please comment specifically on ICAP outcomes for:
 - (a) Democracy and Governance (D&G) – since ICAP was funded with D&G resources; and
 - (b) The War Victims component – especially, creative mechanisms to fold it into the larger ICAP model.
4. If all funding were to end as of the conclusion of the no-cost extension of ICAP, how sustainable do you think which outcomes might be? Please cite any illustrative examples.
5. Given your answers above, what best practices or recommendations might you highlight for a follow-on project?

Coordination and Consortia Considerations

1. Please comment on the level of coordination between your PVO and other AID programs including LGP (RTI), and ICSP (ADF) as outlined in the original proposal.
2. At the HQ level, how has your organization coordinated with the other four IP HQs across ICAP's three years?
3. Are you aware of any important ways in which your ICAP differs from the other four ICAPs in Iraq -- whether in management, staffing, design, implementation, outcomes, or anything else?

Anything Else

1. You would like to add?
2. You would like to ask the evaluation team?

Thank you very much for taking the time and trouble to meet with members of the evaluation team.



D-3: SUCCESS STORY TEMPLATE

MONITORING AND EVALUATION
Success and Learning Story Package
GUIDELINES AND TOOLS FOR WRITING
EFFECTIVE PROJECT IMPACT REPORTS

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Version 1.0



Since 1943, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) has held the privilege of serving the poor and disadvantaged overseas. Without regard to race, creed, or nationality, CRS provides emergency relief in the wake of natural and man-made disasters. Through development projects in fields such as education, peace and justice, agriculture, microfinance, health and HIV/AIDS, CRS works to uphold human dignity and promote better standards of living. CRS also works throughout the United States to expand the knowledge and action of Catholics and others interested in issues of international peace and justice. Our programs and resources respond to the U.S. Bishops' call to live in solidarity—as one human family—across borders, over oceans, and through differences in language, culture, and economic conditions.

The American Red Cross helps vulnerable people around the world prevent, prepare for, and respond to disasters, complex humanitarian emergencies, and life-threatening health conditions through global initiatives and community-based programs. With a focus on global health, disaster preparedness and response, restoring family links, and the dissemination of international humanitarian law, the American Red Cross provides rapid, effective, and large-scale humanitarian assistance to those in need. To achieve our goals, the American Red Cross works with our partners in the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and other international relief and development agencies to build local capacities, mobilize and empower communities, and establish partnerships. Our largest program is currently the Tsunami Recovery Program which is improving community health and preventing disease outbreaks, supporting communities as they rebuild their lives and reestablish their livelihoods, and helping affected Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their communities develop disaster preparedness capabilities.

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Preface

Monitoring and evaluation are core responsibilities of ARC and CRS program managers and help ensure quality in our programming. *Success and Learning Story Package* is one in a series of 10 M&E training and capacity building modules that ARC and CRS have agreed to collaborate on under their respective Institutional Capacity Building Grants. These modules are designed to respond to field-identified needs for specific guidance and tools that does not appear to be available in existing publications. Although examples in the modules focus on Title II programming, the guidance and tools provided have value beyond the food-security realm.

Our intention in producing the *Success and Learning Story Package* is to provide readers with a document that helps them respond to FFP's original request for short stories as part of their regular reporting requirements. The *Package* provides brief guidance on how to write good impact stories that will address the needs of a number of audiences, including FFP. Underlying the *Package* is a desire to improve the learning associated with the human impact of project implementation.

As you use *Success and Learning Story Package* in your everyday work, you may have comments or suggestions for improving it. We are very happy to receive feedback that will inform future editions.

Please send any comments or suggestions for improving this edition of *Success and Learning Story Package* via e-mail to Alice Willarda@usa.redcross.org and Guy Sharrock@crs.org.

Acknowledgements

Many of the core analytical concepts and tools in this module are based on the work of Constance McCorkle, the former Senior Technical Advisor on Monitoring and Evaluation for CRS. We wish to also thank Guy Sharrock (CRS/Baltimore) for his various editorial contributions, Velida Dzino (CRS/Bosnia), Stephen Nkoka and Jennifer Lentfer (CRS/Malawi) and Patricia McLaughlin (ARC/Washington) for reviewing drafts and/or providing information on key references that we have included. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the work of Tracy Hightower (ARC/Washington) who helped shepherd the document through its final stages.

Acronyms

ARC	<i>American National Red Cross</i>
CRS	<i>Catholic Relief Services</i>
EOP	<i>Emergency Operations Project</i>
FAM	<i>Food Aid Management</i>
FFP	<i>USAID's Office of Food for Peace</i>
HIV/AIDS	<i>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</i>
M&E	<i>Monitoring and Evaluation</i>
ORT	<i>Oral Rehydration Therapy</i>
PVO	<i>Private Voluntary Organization</i>
W/H	<i>Weight/Height</i>



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Introduction

In Fiscal Year 2003, USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) requested that short narratives of Title II activities and impacts be included as part of annual results reports. A number of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), coordinating under the Food Aid Management (FAM) project's Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Working Group, decided to address the need for guidance on how to write clear and consistent "impact stories" that would serve a variety of purposes and audiences, including FFP.

To this end, working group members collected a score of past stories from their PVOs' existing files. These were then analyzed for content and style by, respectively, one member of the group and the Head of Marketing and Communication at the respective PVO.²⁵ As anticipated, the sample varied widely in content, style, and overall quality from program to program and from organization to organization. From their analysis of this variation, the two-person team produced preliminary lists of key topics and basic stylistic "do's and don'ts." These items were further analyzed and refined by members of the M&E working group as a whole, with added inputs from communication and editorial personnel from various PVOs collaborating in this task.²⁶

The working group's goal was to produce the present package of guidance for harmonizing the formats of what it has termed "success" and "learning" stories. The success stories are defined as descriptions of "when, what, where, how, and why" a Title II project has succeeded in its objectives and perhaps even had unanticipated, positive effects. The learning stories narrate cases of unanticipated project difficulties or negative impacts, how these were identified and overcome, and what was learned from the experience that may be helpful to other or future projects.

The result is this *Success and Learning Story Package*. It gives suggestions and guidance so that stories can be prepared in a way that consistently provide the type of impact information that would be most useful to FFP for its reporting and other communications needs, while also furnishing PVOs with better information to highlight accomplishments to local counterparts, private donors, and internal constituencies.

The components of the package consist of:

- ❖ Background and instructions (what you are reading now);
- ❖ A suggested list of "do's and don'ts" concerning story information, stylistics, tone, etc.;
- ❖ A filled-in, sample template consisting of questions to be answered so as to provide the necessary information for a complete and meaningful narrative;
- ❖ Examples of stories written from the sample template (one written better than the other according to the instructions here); and
- ❖ A blank template for you to fill in with *your story*.

Instructions

²⁵ Dr. Constance M. McCorkle, Senior (HQ) Technical Advisor for M&E, and Mr. Paul Tillman, both of Catholic Relief Services.

²⁶ Task Organizer: Trisha Long (FAM); Contributors: Judy Bryson (Africare); Erica Tarver (Africare); Elizabeth Dalziel (ACDI-VOCA); Constance McCorkle (CRS); Paul Tillman (CRS); Mara Russell (FAM); Paula Bilinsky (FANTA); Keith Wright (Food for the Hungry); Roger Burks (Mercy Corps); Tom Ewert (Mercy Corps).

The package is largely self-explanatory; but, perhaps a few points should be noted. For instance, overall, the template asks for:

- *Project-specific* and *participant-specific* information, e.g., what the project is trying to do, often in a single component of the project, and how specific participants have experienced the project's impact on their lives;
- Both *qualitative* and *quantitative* information, e.g., not only what a project component is trying to do and how certain participants are affected, but also what is that component's geographic or demographic coverage, and how many such participants (or even non-participants) can be expected to benefit; and,
- *Intended, positive impacts*, but also *unintended positive and negative impacts* – and in the latter case, what corrections or mitigations are being taken.

The template is explicitly geared for gathering key details for Title II success and learning stories by or from those who know them best: project participants and staff in the field. However, this is not to say that others who are familiar with particular project (e.g., regional or technical support staff or evaluation consultants) cannot use the template as well. Although it was designed with Title II efforts in mind, it can be adapted to many other types of projects and programs.

The template is also designed to be adaptable to how a PVO typically collects, compiles, and writes up information for its results reports as well as for other reporting and outreach purposes. Again, the package's primary purpose is as a guide or a checklist for field staff to first, understand what type of information is needed for a good Title II story, and second, systematically collect and record that information. With regard to collection, note that it is not always necessary to interview a participant to fill in the template. But if interviews are conducted, be sure to tell interviewees why the interview is being done and how the information from it will be used.²⁷

Once the template information is collected and recorded, field staff might themselves write up their Title II success and learning stories using the other tools in the *Success and Learning Story Package*. In some PVOs, field staff may rely on regional or headquarters staff or consultants to do so for them.

No matter which of these routes is taken, however, copies of the filled-out templates should always be shared with headquarters' communication units. Such information is invaluable to them for producing stories and other materials aimed at multiple audiences besides just FFP (e.g., other donors, the public, and local or other partners around the world).

The template can be used as often as deemed necessary by project and PVO headquarters staff. At a minimum, however, it should be used once per year in preparation for the annual Title II results reports.

Finally, it is hoped that the template will itself serve as an incentive for providing story information by clarifying what information is needed; by simplifying the process of collecting and organizing the information; and, above all, by showcasing field staffs' successful work in overcoming difficulties and achieving project objectives. That said, some PVOs have provided

²⁷ If interviewees do not want their names to appear in the story, pseudonyms (false names) can be used instead.



incentives for staff to provide story information. Examples are: a small amount of money for an office party upon completion of the story (ies); a small bonus to the staff who gathered the information; alternatively, a trophy or certificate; in documentation other than FFP reports, perhaps a personal photo and short acknowledgement of the staffers' work, etc.

Feedback on this package would be greatly appreciated. Please send it to the person who sent you this template. It will be collected and analyzed to see how the template could be improved.

Specifically, please answer the following questions:

Did using this template make writing your Title II success story easier? harder? no difference?

How could the template be improved?

BOX 1. RECOMMENDED DOS AND DON'TS FOR TITLE II SUCCESS STORY WRITING

DO these when filling in the template:

- ❖ Tell the stories of individuals who are being served as well as the communities to which they belong.
- ❖ Include quotes from beneficiaries, project and partner staff, relevant government workers, etc.
- ❖ Provide brief background credentials on any staff that are quoted (e.g., number of years experience, M.D., MPH, etc).
- ❖ Include details that will help non-technical readers understand the information given in context (e.g., “a healthy person’s weight/height ratio is 100 per cent - anything less than 80 per cent is considered dangerous”).
- ❖ Check your math: if you use statistics, they should add up correctly.
- ❖ Provide a dollar equivalent when reporting how much something costs or how much a person earns in local currency. Put costs in their contexts (versus local average income or cost of living).
- ❖ Help the writer and reader put your work in perspective, by explaining things such as: a) costs relative to average income in an area, or, b) why a development organization would be concerned about natural resource extraction, or, c) the definition of microfinance.
- ❖ Remember that the information you give will be used for multiple purposes (e.g., donor reports, press releases).
- ❖ Ensure that a native speaker *of the language in which the story will be written* proofreads any information in the story template when this information is written by a speaker of another language.

DON'T do these when filling in the template:

- ❖ Over-dramatize the information (e.g., “she often experienced chest pains while weeding in the *pesticide-soaked* soil”) – this may lessen credibility.
- ❖ Make qualitative statements that might cause skepticism about the impartiality of the program (e.g., “Baghya is a *beautiful* girl” – does this mean the program only helps pretty girls?).
- ❖ Portray local cultures or indigenous knowledge as backward or out-dated. (e.g., “The Sori farmed by traditional methods, which led to a noticeable decrease in crop yields.”).
- ❖ Make up an individual just to fill in this template! Base your story on a real person whose existence can be independently verified.
- ❖ Dehumanize beneficiaries by using clinical terms (e.g., “150 of these children were *rehabilitated*” versus “150 of these children regained their health and strength”).
- ❖ Attempt to over-simplify complex issues such as child labor or land tenure; this can also harm credibility.
- ❖ Assume the reader will understand common industry terms and conventions (e.g., referring to “the hungry season” without explaining what that means, or writing that a program helps “the women and children of the community” – why not the men?).
- ❖ Use jargon, acronyms, or foreign words without explaining what they mean.
- ❖ Forget to mention the country you are working in! Do not assume that the reader will know where you are if you mention only a major city in the country.

Box 2. Basic Project Information Datasheet

1. Grant #: XX-XXX-XXXXX
2. Date this information was filled in: *Month, Day, Year*
3. Project title: *Full title*
4. Donor(s): *USAID's Office of X*
5. Start and end dates of project: *Year - Year*
6. Total number of beneficiaries (direct and indirect): *XX, XXX*
7. Project location: (communities, districts, regions, country): *Be as specific as possible.*
8. Food aid commodities used, how used, and amounts: *Provide details.*
9. Names (first names and surnames) of all individuals who contributed information for this story (yourself and project participants):
10. Contact people – name and email address of whom to contact if a question arises regarding information on this form:
11. Reference documents (e.g., annual reports, related journal articles) – title, date, and location:
12. Are local partners or other organizations involved? Who are they? (Be sure to spell out acronyms.)
13. Are there photos available (or attached) that relate to this information? If yes, who took each photo, and what does it show (please provide a caption)? When were the photos taken?

Sample – Specific Story Information

1. What are the project's strategic objectives (SOs) as stated in the results framework?

IMPROVED AGRICULTURAL LIVELIHOODS FOR TARGETED TRIBES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN.

2. Which of the SOs (or component of them) does your story address?

THE LIVESTOCK COMPONENT.

3. Who are the primary beneficiaries of the project?

The Lafon, Acholi, and Lango tribes in Southern Sudan, who are being affected by drought and also conflict with groups in the North.

4. What special characteristics of any subgroup(s) of beneficiaries lead them to be involved with this project component?

THE TARGETED TRIBES ARE CURRENTLY SUFFERING PARTICULAR HARDSHIPS.

5. What activities does the project undertake to achieve its objectives/the SO in question?

THE PROVISION OF HEALTH CLINIC SERVICES AND COMMUNITY FEEDING CENTERS.

6. What kinds of communities/beneficiaries are being targeted for these interventions? Why?

AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND IN 10. BELOW.

7. What are the beneficiaries' predominant livelihoods?

Farming and stock raising.

8. What is the landscape and climate locally (if relevant to the story)?

THE CLIMATE IS GENERALLY VERY DRY, BUT HAS EXPERIENCED SEVERE DROUGHT IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS.

9. When, in the project's lifetime, did the story profiled here occur (e.g., early on, around mid-term, or near the end)?

Near mid-term.

10. Where, exactly, does the story take place (community names/general location)?

Southern Sudan, Equatoria Province (which is just north of the Ugandan border) – there are four communities where we have feeding centers (Mugale, Kongor, Waat, Ayod) and Nimule (where the clinic is).

11. Is the season or time of year relevant to the story (e.g., harvest time, lean season, and school year)?

No.

12. What are the one or two major problems that had to be overcome in relation to this SO? (Please relate them in terms of your results framework.)

Our first task was to educate the communities about the services provided at the feeding centers and the clinic. It is the first time they have had such services available to them. After a year of persistent meetings with community leaders, women's groups, herders' and farmers' groups, we saw clinic visits rise 30 per cent, to about 50 per cent of our target for the end of the project.

Our second task was to provide training to communities on how to recognize when a child or other family member needs to come to the feeding center or the clinic because they are too ill to be treated at home.

Focus groups conducted at mid-term showed us that while 80 per cent of those trained can recognize the signs that their child needs to come to the feeding center, only 50 per cent know when to bring the child directly to the clinic instead. Because of the volume of people that we see at the feeding center, it will help us handle the case load if people know when to take their relatives to the clinic instead of the feeding center.

13. Whom does the story involve (e.g., a specific family or person— please give names, ages, positions in the household, and family size)?

A 6-year-old girl named Awar and her mother, are members of the Lafon tribe. Awar's mother is a widow who has three other children still alive. Two additional siblings died last year. Awar is the second youngest. The Lafon live on very dry land where the Nile comes down from the hills in Uganda to Sudan.

14. Was anyone else (e.g., government service provider, project or partner staff, village health care worker) involved in the event?

Damaris Ruheni, a CRS nutritionist working in the program, who is originally from Kenya.

15. How did the project interventions affect the beneficiaries (positively or negatively)?

When Awar's mother brought her to the feeding center in Mugali, she had suffered from persistent, bloody diarrhea for almost three months; she was exhausted and in great pain. Most children who are severely malnourished have a protruding stomach – there was so little left of her that her stomach could not protrude. It was incredible that she was still alive. Her weight/height (W/H) ratio was 60.3 per cent and she weighed 11.7 kgs (25.7 lbs - about half what she should have). Her height, however, was normal for her age (110.5 cm/ 3'7"). Her situation was so acute that she was immediately taken to the clinic. At the clinic, she ate very well and responded quickly to medicine. When she left after 10 weeks, she had gained 6 kg (13.2 lbs) and grown 2.3cm (0.9") taller (that she grew that much is a good sign and very unusual), and her W/H ratio was 90.2% (acceptable). She was very happy that she had filled out and was ready to go home (she has a huge grin!) and her skin looked very healthy.

16. What is the most significant change the beneficiary(ies) experienced as a result of the project? (*in their own words*)?

"I know my daughter would have died had I not brought her to the feeding center – she was ill for a long time and I did not know how to help her. Two of my children have died already in the last year. I could not bear to lose another. Now we [the community] have a place to bring our children when they are ill where we know they can be helped." (Awar's mother)

17. What changes have project, partner, or government staff noted (in their own words)?

"This little girl was not ready to die: her eyes were too clear. There was determination in her when I first saw her. She would not accept death. I wanted to personally ensure that she lived if I could." (Damaris Ruheni)

18. What are the long-term consequences of this event for the family/individual, the community, and the project?

This is the first time Awar's mother brought one of her children to the feeding center (though Awar actually needed to be at the clinic, because she was in such poor condition). She says she did this because her neighbor had taken her husband to the feeding center when he became ill, and he returned to the village healthy. Awar's mother's experience is indicative of some of the successes we are having with 'testimonials about the good work of the clinic and feeding center in the communities we serve. Awar's mother has agreed to spread the word among her other neighbors that Awar was saved from death, and we have already seen two bring their relatives in and cite Awar's recovery as the reason they felt comfortable bringing their families.

19. What lessons have been learned and are they being applied?

We learned from Awar's experience and other children like her that training in oral rehydration therapy (ORT) – which helps children recover quickly from diarrhea, and can be safely made in the home from typical household ingredients – is needed by the Lafon. We are working with a local partner in the diocese to conduct these trainings in the communities we serve and provide ORT packets to help parents prepare the ORT.

However, the persistent drought has meant that provision of sustainable, clean water systems (clean water is necessary for proper ORT) must become a priority – people are now relying on unsafe water sources (such as rivers in which they dispose of their wastes) for drinking water. We are currently looking for ways to add a clean-water component to our community health and nutrition outreach trainings.

20. Across the life of the project, how many beneficiaries are expected to benefit from the project work described in this story?

CRS' therapeutic feeding centers in Mugali, Kongor, Waat, Ayod, and its clinic in Nimule together now serve 1500 clients per month, 78 per cent of whom are moderately to severely malnourished children between the ages of 1 month and 16 years. Over the 5 years that the project will operate, if this rate of use continues, we will see over 90,000 people. This year we plan to open three additional feeding centers in the towns of Aswa, Atepi, and Nasir, and a clinic in Nasir.

Of course, we are hoping that our other interventions will lessen the extreme malnutrition we are seeing before the project ends, and the attention of the clinic staff can be further turned to other important health issues in the communities.

21. Have any other projects, organizations, or communities adopted the model or the lessons learned from this experience? Please describe which projects, communities, etc., and how they are using the experience.

IN THE COMMUNITIES WHERE THE CLINIC AND FEEDING CENTERS ARE LOCATED, WE HAVE SEEN THE GREATEST GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE USING THEM. ONE OF OUR PROJECT PARTNERS, A LOCAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION IN NIMULE, CAME TO US WITH THE IDEA OF ASKING PEOPLE WHO HAD USED THE CLINIC OR FEEDING CENTERS TO BECOME VOLUNTEER PROMOTERS. THESE PROMOTERS GO OUT TO COMMUNITIES WHICH DO NOT HAVE A CENTER OR CLINIC AND SHARE THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH THE CLINIC OR FEEDING CENTER'S SERVICES. WE ARE NOW LOOKING AT WAYS TO USE THESE PROMOTERS FURTHER TO SPREAD OUR MESSAGES ABOUT CLEAN WATER. THE EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN VERY GOOD FOR BOTH THE NIMULE ORGANIZATION, WHICH IS WORKING WITH US TO GET SOME EXTRA FUNDING TO DEVELOP PROMOTER MATERIALS, AND THE PROMOTERS THEMSELVES, WHO HAVE SEEN INCREASED STATUS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES.

22. How will the positive outcomes described here be made sustainable?

We hope that through the promoters, the communities will become ever more aware of our clinics and feeding centers and make use of them. This will allow us to expand the teaching functions of the feeding centers and clinics (e.g., providing training to families in prevention of diarrhea, treatment of illness in the home, etc.) and give communities the resources they need to stay healthy. Given the current security situation and the deteriorated relationship between these communities and the government in Khartoum, it's unlikely that they would be able to successfully advocate for the government to maintain clinic functions. However, if peace is achieved in Sudan, this may become a more realistic possibility.

For Awar, specifically, her mother now knows how effective the clinic and feeding centers can be and will bring her other children to them long before they reach Awar's dire state.

An unintended beneficial impact that may improve sustainability is the growing relationship between the diocesan office and local groups in the community through their interactions in our project. Previously, they operated independently of one another. The diocese may be able to provide resource support to

these groups to continue promotion and education functions in which we are training them after the end of the project, now that contacts have been established.

BOX 3. SAMPLE STORY 1 – AWAR’S STORY (FAIR)

When her mother brought a gaunt Awar in to the therapeutic feeding center run by CRS¹ at Mugali², no one expected her to live through the day. Children suffering from malnutrition often have protruding stomachs. Not Awar. The emaciated 6-year-old’s skin was stretched tight over each of her tiny bones. She had been wasting away with persistent diarrhea for nearly three months. Her stools were bloody. She was too exhausted and wrought with pain to cry. But her eyes were clear and determined. She was not ready to die.

As soon as she laid eyes on Awar, Damaris Ruheni, a CRS nutritionist, rushed the little girl to the clinic run by CRS in Nimule.² Damaris measured her. Her height was 110 cm³, but her weight was only 11.7 kg.³ Her weight/height (W/H) ratio was a dangerous 60.3 per cent.⁴ Other than her skeleton, there just wasn’t much to her.

Damaris took a special interest in Awar. There was something about this child that just would not accept death. She ate well and responded quickly to the medicine. She started putting on weight. Ten weeks after she was admitted in early December 2003, Awar was rehabilitated.⁵ She had gained more than 6 kg³ and had grown an astounding 2.3 cm³ taller. Her W/H ratio was now 90.2 per cent. Her flesh had filled out and taken on a healthy luster. Best of all, she had a big grin on her face. She was ready to go home.

Home to Awar is where her primitive tribe, the Lafon, live, east of where the Nile descends from Uganda into Sudan.⁶

The CRS team in Nimule is involved in a USAID¹-funded project called EOP.¹ Activities include agriculture and food relief, as well as maintaining therapeutic feeding centers in Equatoria.^{2,7}

¹When using abbreviations, the full name should be spelled out the first time.

²Include the name of the country.

³For the U.S. mainstream audience, provide American equivalents of metric weights and measures.

⁴Some background on the weight/height ratio and context on what percentage is considered good would be helpful

⁵‘Rehabilitating’ a person may have other connotations or sound de-humanizing.

⁶Additional background information on the way of life of the people in the story would be helpful, as well as some background on the situation that caused the community to need help from a humanitarian organization.

⁷This story would have been even better with a quote from either Awar, her mother, or the CRS nutritionist.

Box 4. Sample Story 2 - Awar’s Story (Good)

The strangest thing was that she was alive.

When Awar’s mother brought her to the therapeutic feeding center run by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) at Mugali, in southern Sudan’s Equatoria province, just north of the Ugandan

border, no one expected her to live through the day. Children suffering from malnutrition often have protruding stomachs. Not Awar. The emaciated 6-year-old's skin was stretched tight over each of her tiny bones. She had been wasting away with persistent diarrhea for nearly three months. Her stools were bloody. She was too exhausted and wrought with pain to cry. But her eyes were clear and determined. She was not ready to die.

As soon as she laid eyes on Awar, CRS Nutritionist Damaris Ruheni (BA, Makere University, Kenya) rushed the little girl to the clinic run by CRS in Nimule, 15 miles to the west. There, Damaris measured her. Awar's height was 3 feet, 7 inches, normal enough for a child of her age. But her weight was 25.8 lbs, only half of what it should have been. Even more revealing was her weight/height (W/H) ratio. A healthy person's W/H ratio is 100 per cent. Anything below 80 per cent. is considered dangerous. Awar's W/H ratio was an astonishing 60.3 per cent. Other than her skeleton, there just wasn't much to her.

Damaris took a special interest in Awar. There was something about this child that just would not accept death. She ate well and responded quickly to the medicine. She started putting on weight. Ten weeks after she was admitted in early December 2003, Awar was literally a new person. She had gained more than 13 pounds and grown nearly an inch taller. Her W/H ratio was an acceptable 90.2 per cent. And her skin had a healthy luster. Best of all she had a big grin on her face. She was ready to go home to her people, the Lafon tribe—a small community of agropastoralists who inhabit the parched land east of where the Nile descends from the Ugandan highlands into Sudan.

As her mother gratefully told Damaris, "I know my daughter would have died had I not brought her to [you]." Actually, CRS learned a new lesson from experiences like Awar's: that parents needed to know more about how to judge whether their malnourished children should be taken to a feeding center or, as in Awar's case, directly to the clinic. As it turned out, a local women's organization in Nimule was so impressed with CRS' work that it proposed the idea of asking people who had used these facilities to volunteer to spread this and other health information back in their home communities.

The CRS team in Nimule is involved in a project funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) called the Emergency Operations Project (EOP). Activities include agriculture and food relief in addition to the centers and clinics, which support therapeutic feeding to moderately to severely malnourished people, especially children. CRS is operating two clinics, with four feeding centers linked to each, thereby covering nearly half of Equatoria Province. These facilities serve three of the most drought- and war-stricken tribes of Southern Sudan (besides the Lafon, the Acholi, and Lango). Based on client numbers to date, by the end of the 5-year EOP, it is estimated that more than 90,000 people will have been seen at these CRS-run facilities. From these former clients and the women volunteers sharing their experiences and health messages "back home," many others are also expected to benefit.

In these and many other ways, CRS' work seeks to improve the health and lives of many thousands of men, women, and children, like Awar, in communities all over Africa.

Catholic Relief Services is the official international humanitarian agency of the U.S. Catholic community. The agency provides assistance to people in 94 countries and territories on the basis of need, not race, creed, or nationality. For more information, please visit www.catholicrelief.org.



Annex I. Tools and Templates

BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION FORM:

(to be filled in either at headquarters or by the project staff)

<p>1. Grant #:</p> <p>2. Date this information was filled in:</p> <p>3. Project title:</p> <p>4. Donor(s):</p> <p>5. Start and end dates of project:</p> <p>6. Total number of beneficiaries:</p> <p>7. Project location: (communities, districts, regions, country):</p> <p>8. Food aid commodities used, how used, and amounts:</p> <p>9. Names (first names and surnames) of all individuals who contributed information for this story (yourself and project participants):</p> <p>10. Contact people – name and email address of whom to contact if a question arises regarding information on this form:</p> <p>11. Reference documents (e.g., annual reports, related journal articles) – title, date, and location:</p> <p>12. Are local partners or other organizations involved? Who are they? (Be sure to spell out acronyms.)</p> <p>13. Are there photos available (or attached) that relate to this information? If yes, who took each photo, and what does it show (please provide a caption)? When were the photos taken?</p>



SPECIFIC STORY INFORMATION FORM:

1. What are the project's strategic objectives (SOs) as stated in the results framework?
2. Which of the SOs (or component of them) does your story address?
3. Who are the primary beneficiaries of the project?
4. What special characteristics of any subgroup(s) of beneficiaries lead them to be involved with this project component?
5. What activities does the project undertake to achieve its objectives/the SO in question?
6. What kinds of communities/beneficiaries are being targeted for these interventions? Why?
7. What are the beneficiaries' predominant livelihoods?
8. What is the landscape and climate locally (if relevant to the story)?
9. When, in the project's lifetime, did the story profiled here occur (e.g., early on, around mid-term, or near the end)?
10. Where, exactly, does the story take place (community names/general location)?
11. Is the season or time of year relevant to the story (e.g., harvest time, lean season, and school year)?
12. What are the one or two major problems that had to be overcome in relation to this SO? (Please relate them in terms of your results framework.)
13. Whom does the story involve (e.g., a specific family or person— please give names, ages, positions in the household, and family size)?
14. Was anyone else (e.g., government service provider, project or partner staff, village health care worker) involved in the event?



15. How did the project interventions affect the beneficiaries (positively or negatively)?
16. What is the most significant change (in their own words) the beneficiary(ies) experienced as a result of the project?
17. What changes have project, partner, or government staff noted (in their own words)?
18. What are the long-term consequences of this event for the family/individual, the community, and the project?
19. What lessons have been learned and are they being applied?
20. Across the life of the project, how many beneficiaries (direct and indirect) are expected to benefit from the project work described in this story?
21. Have any other projects, organizations, or communities adopted the model or the lessons learned from this experience? Please describe which projects, communities, etc., and how they are using the experience.
22. How will the positive outcomes described here be made sustainable?

D-4: Erbil Workshop Agenda**ICAP Evaluation Workshop Agenda
Chwra Chra Hotel, Erbil
1-3 July 2006****Saturday 1st July**

----- Participants arrive and check into accommodations

6:30-7:30 Social hour at the Chwra Chra Hotel

Sunday 2nd July**Morning**

9:00-9:15 Introduction of the IBTCI evaluation team (Bob Beckman)

9:15-9:30 Participant introductions

9:30-9:45 Overview of the evaluation, plus participant Q&A (Constance McCorkle)

9:45-10:00 Summary of workshop agenda, plus participant Q&A (Dar Warmke)

10:00-11:00 IP work in small groups on presentations, and rolling break

11:00-12:30 IRD presentation, plus Q&A

12:30-1:30 *Lunch*

Afternoon

1:30-2:30 Mercy Corps presentation, plus Q&A

2:30-3:30 ACDI/VOCA presentation, plus Q&A

----- *Rolling Break*

3:30-4:30 Counterpart presentation, plus Q&A

4:30-5:30 Preliminary analysis of PRS data, plus participant feedback (Harvey Herr)

5:30-6:00 Group discussion of field-visit possibilities and arrangements (Dar Warmke)

6:00-6:15 Explanation of next day's small -group work (Constance McCorkle)

Evening



Free time, independent dinner arrangements (except for CHF)

6:30-7:45 CHF interview with the evaluation team

Monday 3rd July

Morning

When participants are not interviewing with the evaluation team,** they should work in their small groups by IP to prepare for the afternoon Roundtable.

8:00-9:15 ACIDI-VOCA interview with the evaluation team

9:15-10:30 Counterpart interview with the evaluation team

10:30-10:45 *Break*

10:45 -12:00 Mercy Corps interview with the evaluation team

12:00-12:30 Walk-through of data compilation templates, plus addition of new ones as agreed, such as local government and political (Constance McCorkle)

12:30-1:30 *Lunch*

Afternoon

1:30-2:30 CHF presentation, plus Q&A

2:30-3:30 Looking Back: Lessons Learned

----- *Rolling Break*

3:30-4:45 Looking Forward: Recommendations for ICAP re-design

4:45-5:15 Closing (Bob Beckman)

6:30 Dinner hosted by IBTCI (venue to be announced)

**IRD's interviews will take place in Baghdad.

D-5: Clarifications Sought on Community Contributions Data

Data Validation

Before commencing the final data analysis of the project data, we needed to confirm our understanding of these data. Questions are asked about each of the three types of contribution, and a brief note on outliers is provided. Please provide responses to these questions as soon as possible. We would like to conclude our basic data collection by the end of next week.

Clarification on Community Contributions Data

These five questions are focused on community contributions and how the information collected for the projects is reported to USAID. Each of the CAP partners reports to the CTO on a weekly basis through the 'project tracking sheet.' These reporting requirements are specified in the Cooperative Agreements and referred to as the Project Reporting System. These are the data that the CAP evaluation will be analyzing, i.e., the data that reach USAID from your reports. It is important that we understand what it represents and what it does not (or misses). We need your help on this. Please respond to the questions below. Expand on any of the issues that you feel need explanation.

1. We currently understand that the primary source of community contribution data is from the contractor's use of paid local labor on the projects. Is this the same for each of the ICAP partners?
2. Secondary sources for community contribution data possibly comes from enumeration of in-kind local labor deployed on CAG selected projects. How is this implemented? Since this is auditable are there guidelines that you follow for calculating the value of in-kind community contributions?
3. To what extent is the magnitude of in-kind community contributions underestimated due to problems related to obtaining satisfactory documentation that would withstand an audit?
4. What do you see as the biggest weakness in using and providing community contribution data? Is there a way to fix it? Are there other ways to show 'ownership?'
5. Is it reasonable to refer to the community contributions as 'ownership' contributions and to suggest that the LG and Other contributions do not have that same relationship to the project?

Clarification on the LG contributions.

Is there anything that might be called a typical LG contribution? Could you describe these contributions for us? We have notes from the workshop, but these don't seem to be enough to distill any possible recommendation from. Any examples would be welcome.

Clarification on the Other contributions.



We may have misunderstood, but in going over our notes it seems that not all 'other' contributions are necessarily recorded on the project tracking forms submitted to USAID. That is, the real level of contributions may be underreported in the project tracking forms. This was in part because the 15-25% matching target, once achieved, meant that additional reporting didn't serve a management purpose but added to the burden of documenting in case of audit. Is this a reasonable statement?

D-6: Instructions for Community Mobilizer Focus Groups

Focus Group Guide

As mentioned at the ICAP Evaluation Workshop in Erbil, a focus group (FG) is envisioned to be held with community mobilizers (or facilitators, organizers, economic developers – as one or another IP terms them) from each IP.

Based on the pre-test of an initial FG guide with some mobilizers from ACDI/VOCA, the attached, revised and simplified version is hereby circulated for your information, as per IPs' request at the Erbil workshop.

Focus Group Administration

As per IP suggestions at the workshop, it has been decided to hire focus-group interviewers from the same in-country firm that is slated to administer the CAG survey. Reportedly, this firm has considerable prior expertise in FG methodology. The firm will contact each IP directly to set up dates, times, and locales for the focus groups.

Four FGs will be conducted: one each with CHF, IRD, and Mercy Corps; and one for ACDI/VOCA and Counterpart International combined. The latter combination is because: (a) as noted above, ACDI/VOCA has kindly served as the "guinea pig" in a pre-test of the FG guide; and (b) Counterpart reportedly has only 3 mobilizer-type staff at the moment.

All FGs will be conducted in Arabic, as there is simply not time to do a second translation of the guide into Kurdish. Every effort will be made to assign interviewers that best match the majority ethnicity and religion in your AOR.

At the beginning of the FG exercise, a very senior IP manager should:

- introduce the gist of the FG exercise within the larger context of this evaluation and its relation to follow-on ICAP plans;
- explain that participants should speak without constraint, as candidly and honestly as they can -- so as to make for a better-designed and more effective follow-on; and
- briefly introduce the FG interviewer.

The same (ideally) or another manager should also return to close the session, thanking participants for their important and thoughtful input.

However, please note that during the actual focus-group session itself, in no case may any other IP staff be present except for the FG members *per se*.

Please set aside 4 hours for the FG exercise, including introduction and closing, as noted above, and breaks. But as we learned from the pre-test, careful planning is required in case of travel, delays, and snafus, so that the session is not cut short.

Selection of Focus Group Members

FG methodology restricts participants to no more than 12. (A minimum number would be 6.) To choose your participants, we ask that you try to construct a group that meets the following criteria as closely as possible.



1. The group is representative of the male/female breakdown among community mobilizers on your IP. Say, for example, that your IP has a total of 100 community mobilizers, of which 80 are male and 20 female. In that case, you would try to select 80% males and 20% females for the 12 FG members, i.e. 9-10 males and 2-3 females.
2. The group is representative of the various sub-areas within your AOR. In other words, don't include 2 mobilizers who work in the same, or nearly the same, sub-area.
3. The group includes different types of mobilizers, if your IP has such. For instance, one IP distinguishes economic development organizers from other community-level mobilizers.

Note, however, that ACDI/VOCA is allowed only 9 participants, so as to include Counterpart's three mobilizers in the same FG.

One further criterion for ACDI/VOCA only is that FG members will need to be fluent in Arabic even if they are of a non-Arabic ethnicity. However, it is the team's understanding that this should not be much of a problem.

Focus Group Participant Data Table

Attached you will find a template for a table entitled "Community Mobilizers: Focus Group Participant Data." Once you have selected your 12 members, a knowledgeable IP manager should fill this out and return it to the evaluation team c/o hherr@ibtci.com by COB 11 July 2006.

Note that we do not ask for surnames because of security concerns pointed out at the conference. However, if you could give the first name or nickname of FG members, that would be of great assistance to the interviewer in recognizing and interacting with FG members.

If you have any questions, please e-mail Harvey Herr at the above e-address, or phone the evaluation team at 0790-194-0846.

As always, thanks again for you time and trouble in making this a meaningful and useful evaluation exercise for all concerned.

Attachments

- Focus Group Guide for Community Mobilizers
- Table for Participant Data

cc: Van Heest

cc: In-country M&E firm

Name of IP Responding: _____

FOCUS GROUP GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY MOBILIZERS

Notes to Interviewer:

- Please change IP throughout to the name of the particular IP.
- Also please learn and utilize the title(s) for this position that the IP itself uses, e.g.: community mobilizer, organizer, facilitator, economic developer, etc.
- Everywhere try to capture concrete examples and “stories” relevant to the questions and topics in this guide.
- Notes to the interviewer are given in brackets [].
- As currently formulated and working without translation, the focus group will take between 3.5 and 4 hours. So you must provide appropriate refreshments and breaks accordingly.
- It is imperative that you leave adequate time for Question 14. If it seems you are running out of time, please compress some of the earlier questions in order to get to this one.

Training

1. Since joining ICAP, what kinds of training has the program provided you?
2. What were the 1 or 2 best and 1 or 2 worst trainings you received, and what made these the best or worst? E.g., the trainer(s), the modules or materials, the relevance to your work, exposure to new ideas, increased confidence in yourself or your job, etc.

The “Process” and Community Mobilizers’ Roles in It

3. Could you please describe the process or approach your IP takes to creating and strengthening CAGs, along with your roles/tasks in the process?
4. In what ways has your work as a community mobilizer changed across the years that you have been with ICAP?

CAGs and Clusters

6. Are the CAGs you have worked with:
 - ethnically mixed or not?
 - male-only, female-only, or mixed-gender?
 - focused on a special group such as youth, innocent victims of war, the disabled, orphans, certain businesses, etc.?
7. What kinds of training have you given different types of CAGs? (Include exchange visits, informal, non-formal, and “on-the-job” training as well as formal classes, seminars, and



workshops.) How successful or unsuccessful have which kinds of training been, and why? Do CAG trainees receive any kind of certification?

8. What kinds of people tend to emerge as leaders of CAGs? E.g., elites like sheiks and mukhtars, rich people, business men, or just ordinary folks? Why do you think this is?

9. How do CAGs work – alone and with local government – to identify war victims who merit assistance?

10. How have local authorities helped or hindered you in your work with CAGs?

[“Local authorities” may include Local Councils, Neighborhood Councils, Provincial Councils, and localized branches of the central government (directorates, DGs, engineers).]

11. What do you consider to be the short-term and long-term aims behind CAG formation?

12. With regard to the question just before, some of the longer-term aims envisioned for CAGs include:

- A general understanding of democratic principles and processes, and how to put them into practice in the CAG and in the community in general (and possibly even at home)
- Conflict prevention, mitigation, or resolution – between or among different ethnicities, religions, genders, ages
- Oversight of local government (LCs, NCs, PCs) and localized branches of the central government -- holding them accountable for the quantity, quality, mix, and honest cost of public services
- Citizen advocacy with all such local-level government agencies on behalf of community needs

Have any CAGs reached at least some of these long-term aims, at least in part? How do you determine that? If your IP has a system for “graduating” successful CAGs, please describe it.

13. Please tell us about the CAG clusters that have been formed:

- First, how does your IP define a cluster?
- How many clusters have you worked with?
- What kinds of CAGs have formed clusters?
- What activities or projects do/have they done together?
- To what extent have any clusters achieved some of the long-term aims noted earlier?

Looking Ahead

14. It seems that ICAP will continue for at least another year. So, considering all that we have discussed so far, please tell us some of the most important lessons you have learned and recommendations that you would make for the re-design of ICAP.

In other words, what would you do the same? What would you do different? And especially, why?



Feel free to comment likewise on any aspect of ICAP management such as: leadership; staff quality, treatment, and turnover (especially among international staff); finance and administration; monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting; or anything else.

15. Finally, is there anything else you would like to add or ask?

If not, thank you very much for taking the time and trouble to participate in this focus group. As the people at the forefront of ICAP operations, your ideas and recommendations are invaluable for this evaluation.



D-7: Best/Worst Case Instructions

Round Robin of the Best and the Worst.

Explain the case in two minutes. We will go around the room with your responses to the Best aspects of questions 1-5. This will be followed by the worst aspects of questions 1-5.

BEST:

Question 1: Elements in the original program design of ICAP - Best

Question 2: Experiences with the USAID/Iraq Mission regarding ICAP Best

Question 3: Training for the Iraqi Field Staff Best

Question 4: Best experience with a CAG

Question 5: Relations with local authorities Best

WORST:

Question 1: Elements in the original program design of ICAP - Worst

Question 2: Experiences with the USAID/Iraq Mission regarding ICAP Worst

Question 3: Training for the Iraqi Field Staff Worst

Question 4: Worst experience with a CAG

Question 5: Relations with local authorities Worst

D-8: CAG Survey Methodology

Sampling the Community Action Groups (CAGs)

The sample frame. Each of the CAP partners provided a list of active CAGs. It is the nature of CAGs to coalesce around an issue or community problem. Once that problem is solved the CAG may become moribund, or may move on to become an advocate for other community issues. The CAG survey is limited to currently active CAGs. Active CAGs are identified by the CAP partners as those that continue to receive advice and mentoring by staff of the CAP partner. The following table shows the number of active CAGs identified by each of the CAP partners. This identifies the sample frame.

CAP Partner	Active CAGs Sample Frame	Number of CAGs in the Sample
ACDI/VOCA	51	40
CHF	183	40
Counterpart International	45	40
IRD	192	40
Mercy Corps	75	40
Save the Children	120	40

Sample size. Based on assumptions about responses to the CAG questionnaire the sample power for various group sample sizes was calculated.²⁸ Power is the proportion of studies that will yield a statistically significant effect (assuming the effect size, sample size, and criterion alpha specified in the study design). The sample power calculation assumes that we will want to explore differences between the CAP partner CAG questionnaire responses using a one-way analysis of variance testing for differences in mean responses. Results of these sample power calculations, shown graphically in figure 1 below, show that a sample size of 40 CAGs for each of the six CAP partners are sufficient to provide for comparisons between CAP partners. A sample of 40 CAGs was randomly selected from each CAP partner list to be included in the field survey.


The unit of analysis. CAGs typically have five to fifteen members.²⁹ The questionnaire for the survey was designed to capture responses from the group rather than the individual members of the group. The questionnaire developed for the CAGs draws on questions prepared by the evaluators to be responsive to the objectives express in the CAP Cooperative Agreements as well as questions advanced by Social Capital sociologists, and questions used in earlier Iraq Quality of Life Surveys conducted under the USAID LGP 1 program in 2004. The final CAG questionnaire is provided here in this series of Annexes. The questionnaire was first translated

²⁸ The power is for a test of the null hypothesis. The power analysis focuses on the potential for rejecting the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis here is that there is no difference between the CAP partners in how they respond to specific questions. This power analysis is for a one-way fixed effects analysis of variance with 6 levels corresponding to the 5 CAP partners and one sub-contractor. The study proposes 40 cases per cell for a total of 240 cases. The criterion for significance (alpha) has been set at 0.05. The analysis of variance is non-directional (i.e. two-tailed) which means that an effect in either direction will be interpreted. Main effects tested are based on assumptions about CAG responses to question 2.9 "Does the membership of the group successfully represent the minority elements of the community?" The effect size (f) is 0.25, which yields power of 0.86. Power is the proportion of studies that will yield a statistically significant effect (assuming the effect size, sample size, and criterion alpha specified above).

²⁹ In the survey trials the CAGs were represented by 2 to 5 members.

from English into Arabic, and then back translated by a third party. This was done to ensure that the intent of the questions was not lost in translation.

Figure 1. Sample Power as a Function of Sample Size for each CAP Partner



Survey Implementation. The CAG survey is implemented in the field by sub-contracted Iraqi field monitors with extensive experience in survey work in collaboration with the CAP partner program managers. Concern for the security of CAG members and the field monitors is of primary importance when conducting the survey. The field monitors come from the area they survey. Monitors will be identified and introduced to the CAG by the CAP project managers.

Field monitors are trained by field supervisors who also spot check the survey results. The questionnaire has been field tested by the field monitors who test each question for clarity and understanding, but who also measure the duration of the interview. The field test resulted in modifications to the questionnaire, and pointed out the need to better understand the special interview procedure used when interviewing a CAG group. Interviews emphasize both recording categorical responses and the qualitative narrative that captures the process of reaching a decision about responses to particular questions.

D-9: CAG SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

WE ARE FROM IIACSS. WE ARE WORKING ON A PROJECT CONCERNED WITH COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES. I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THIS. THE INTERVIEW WILL TAKE ABOUT 60 MINUTES. ALL THE INFORMATION WE OBTAIN WILL REMAIN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND YOUR ANSWERS WILL NEVER BE IDENTIFIED.

MAY I START NOW? If permission is given, begin the interview.

CAG INFORMATION PANEL **

1. Governorate: _____		2. District (Qada): _____	
3. Sub-District (Nahiya): _____		4. Mahalla/Street: _____	
5. Day/Month/Year of interview: ____/____/____		6. Researcher number: _____	
7. Name of community action group: _____		8. Name or community action partner ACDI/VOCA.....1 9. CHF.....2 IRD.....3 Mercy Corps.....4 Save the Children.....5 Counterpart International.....6	
10. Area: Urban..... 1 Peri-Urban..... 2 Rural..... 3		11. Region: Kurdistan 1 North..... 2 Central..... 3 South Central 4 South 5	
12. Respondents' position in the CAG (indicate gender and number for all that apply)	M	F	13. Result of interview:
Chairman.....			Completed..... 1
....			Refused..... 2
Executive Committee member.....			Not at home..... 3
Other Committee member.....			CAG not found 4
Members.....			Other (<i>specify</i>)..... 5
.....			
Other (<i>specify</i>) _____			



14. Data entry clerk: _____	
<i>Interviewer/supervisor notes : Use this space to record notes about the interview with this community action group, such as call-back times, incomplete interview forms, number of attempts to re-visit, etc.</i>	



1. FORMATION OF YOUR COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP (CAG)		
1.1 HOW DID YOU LEARN ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF A COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP?	At an open community meeting organized by the community action program.....1 A community organizer came to my home...2 Informed by a current group member.....3 Heard about it through a friend.....4 A local community leader told us.....5 The local council (Qada, Nahia, Mahalla) told us.....6 Other.....7 DK/NS.....99	
1.2 WHEN WAS YOUR CAG FORMED?	Date month/year ____/____	
1.3 WERE YOU ASSISTED IN FORMING THE CAG BY THE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM SPONSOR?	Yes 1 No 2 DK/NS 99	
1.4 DID YOU SIGN A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM SPONSORS?	Yes 1 No 2 DK/NS 99	
1.5 HOW MANY MEMBERS ARE IN YOUR CAG?	Number of members:	
1.6 HOW OFTEN HAS YOUR CAG MET IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS?	Number of times:	
1.7 HOW OFTEN HAS YOUR CAG MET WITH THE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM SPONSORS OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS?	Number of times:	
1.8 IS YOUR CAG A FORMALLY REGISTERED ORGANIZATION?	Yes 1 No 2 DK/NS 99	
1.9 HAS YOUR CAG JOINED WITH OTHER CAGS TO ADDRESS MUTUAL INTERESTS OR PROBLEMS IN YOUR AREA? [EXAMPLES OF MUTUAL INTEREST ARE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS THAT AFFECT MORE THAN ONE COMMUNITY OR CONFLICT MITIGATION]	Yes 1 No 2 DK/NS 99	

2. COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP MEMBERSHIP

PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MEMBERSHIP OF YOUR GROUP? (ANSWER ALL THAT APPLY)													
2.1 NUMBER OF WOMEN MEMBERS?	Number:												
	Males						Females						
2.2 NUMBER OF YOUNG MEMBERS < 25 YEARS OLD?	Number:												
2.3 NUMBER OF HANDICAPPED MEMBERS?	Number:												
2.4 NUMBER OF ELDERLY MEMBERS (AGE 60 OR MORE)?	Number:												
2.5 NUMBER OF MEMBERS FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT?	Number:												
2.6 NUMBER OF MEMBERS FROM LOCAL COUNCILS?	Number:												
2.7 NUMBER OF MEMBERS FROM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES?	Number:												
2.8 NUMBER OF MEMBERS FROM ETHNIC MINORITIES?	Number:												
2.9 DOES THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE GROUP SUCCESSFULLY REPRESENT THE MINORITY ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY?	Indicate your level of agreement with the question (circle one) [note to interviewer, record as much as possible of the narrative discussion that took place to reach the consensual agreement. Was the agreement dominated by anyone? What were the main issues raised in reaching agreement?]												
	Disagree strongly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Agree strongly	

3. COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP OPERATIONS
IS THIS PROJECT THE FIRST ONE OF YOUR CAG ... IF YES (GO TO 4 –6) IF NO (GO TO 4 -1)

3.1 WHEN THERE IS A DECISION TO BE MADE IN THE GROUP, HOW DOES THIS USUALLY COME ABOUT?	Decision imposed from outside 1 The leader decides and informs members 2 The leader asks group members what they think and then decides 3 The group members hold a discussion and decide together 4 Other (specify)	
3.2. HOW ARE LEADERS IN THIS GROUP SELECTED?	By an outside person or entity1 Each leader chooses his successor.....2 By a small group of members.....3 By decision/vote of all members.....4 Other (specify)6	
3.3. DOES THIS GROUP WORK OR INTERACT WITH OTHER CAG GROUPS WITH SIMILAR GOALS <u>IN</u> THE COMMUNITY? [IF YES, DESCRIBE THE GROUP]	No1 Yes, occasionally..... 2 Yes, frequently3	
3.4. DOES THIS GROUP WORK OR INTERACT WITH OTHER CAG GROUPS WITH SIMILAR GOALS <u>OUTSIDE</u> THE COMMUNITY? [IF YES, DESCRIBE THE GROUP]	No1 Yes, occasionally.....2 Yes, frequently3	
3.5 DOES THIS GROUP WORK OR INTERACT WITH OTHER CAG GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT GOALS <u>IN</u> THE COMMUNITY? [IF YES, DESCRIBE THE GROUP]	No1 Yes, occasionally.....2 Yes, frequently3	
3.6 DOES THIS GROUP WORK OR INTERACT WITH OTHER CAG GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT GOALS <u>OUTSIDE</u> THE COMMUNITY? [IF YES, DESCRIBE THE GROUP]	No1 Yes, occasionally.....2 Yes, frequently3	
3.7 WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR YOUR GROUP? (MOST IMPORTANT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THE HIGHEST AMOUNT. IT IS THE SOURCE THAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT)	Grants from the community action program sponsors1 Contributions from community members.....2 Support from local government.....3 Support from other NGOs.....4 Other (specify).....5	
	<table border="1"> <tr> <th data-bbox="618 1644 1040 1686">The most important source</th><th data-bbox="1040 1644 1435 1686">The next most important</th></tr> </table>	The most important source
The most important source	The next most important	
<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="618 1686 1040 1812"></td><td data-bbox="1040 1686 1435 1812"></td></tr> </table>		

3.8 WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF EXPERTISE OR ADVICE THAT THE GROUP RECEIVES? [ASK THE RESPONDENTS TO IDENTIFY WHO OR WHAT GROUP THEY ARE REFERRING TO WITH THEIR RESPONSE]	The community action program sponsors1 Members of the community.....2 Local government engineers/technicians.....3 Local elected officials.....4 Local NGOs or Civil Society Organizations....5 Professionals hired by the group.....6 Local universities.....7 Other (specify).....8	
	The most important source	The next most important

4. COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP PROJECT DEVELOPMENT		
IS THIS PROJECT THE FIRST ONE OF YOUR CAG ? IF YES , GO TO 4.8 IF NO GO TO 4.1		
4.1 HOW MANY COMMUNITY PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY THIS GROUP?	Number of projects:	
4.2. HOW MANY OF THESE PROJECTS WERE FOR LOCAL SCHOOLS? [SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION, SCHOOL CLASSROOM REPAIR, NEW FACILITIES FOR THE SCHOOL, REPAIR OF SCHOOL FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT FOR THE SCHOOL SUCH AS FURNITURE AND BOOKS]	Number of school projects:	
4.3. HOW MANY OF THESE PROJECTS WERE FOR LOCAL HEALTH CLINICS, MATERNITY CLINICS, OR HOSPITALS? [CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH FACILITIES, REPAIR AND RESTORATION OF FACILITIES, SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT FOR HEALTH FACILITIES.	Number of health projects:	
4.4. HOW MANY OF THESE PROJECTS WERE FOR LOCAL WATER AND SEWERAGE IMPROVEMENTS? [CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES, REPAIR AND RESTORATION OF OLD FACILITIES, SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT FOR WATER AND SEWERAGE TREATMENT.	Number of water and sewerage projects:	
4.5 HOW MANY OF THESE PROJECTS WERE FOR LOCAL ROAD AND BRIDGE IMPROVEMENTS? [CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ROADS OR BRIDGES, REPAIR AND RESTORATION OF ROADS AND BRIDGES, RESTORATION OF ROAD DRAINAGE SYSTEMS, ETC.]	Number of road and bridge projects:	
4.6. HOW MANY OF THESE PROJECTS WERE FOR YOUTH SECTORS? [CONSTRUCTION OF NEW STADIUMS, SPORT HALLS,ETC.)	Number of youth sector projects	
4.7. HOW MANY OF THESE PROJECTS WERE FOR ENVIRONMENT IMPROVEMENT? [CONSTRUCTION OF NEW PUBLIC GARDEN , RIVER IMPROVEMENTS,ETC.)	Number of environment improvement projects:	
4.8 ASSISTANCE TO INNOCENT WAR VICTIMS INCLUDING	Yes	1



<p>INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES OR INSTITUTIONS IS A POSSIBLE ACTIVITY FOR YOUR GROUP. HAVE YOU IDENTIFIED WAR VICTIMS IN YOUR COMMUNITY?</p>	<p>No 2 DK/NS 99</p> <p>Number of innocent war victims that were identified: _____</p>
<p>4.7 HOW MANY PROJECTS WERE IDENTIFIED BY YOUR GROUP IN SUPPORT OF WAR VICTIMS? PROJECT TYPES FOR VICTIMS INCLUDE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REPAIR AND RENOVATION OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE THAT PROVIDES SERVICES TO VICTIMS. • PROVISION OF MEDICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES. • ADDRESSING SPECIAL NEEDS FOR ORPHANS, CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE PEOPLES THROUGH SERVICES OR PRODUCTS. • PROVISION OF SERVICES AND PRODUCTS FOR DISABLED PEOPLE, INCLUDING SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR ACUTELY INJURED, INCLUDING PROSTHETIC LIMBS, WHEEL CHAIRS, GLASS EYES, ETC. • PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION. • SUPPORT HOME REPAIR NEEDS, INCLUDING PURCHASE OF BUILDING MATERIALS FOR CIVILIANS WHOSE HOMES WERE DAMAGED, AND LIMITED HOME REPAIRS, WITH PRIORITY AND EXTRA CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO ELDERLY OR INFIRM CIVILIANS WHO ARE UNABLE TO PERFORM LABOR THEMSELVES. • SUPPORT TO TARGETED EDUCATION ACTIVITIES AND/OR VOCATIONAL TRAINING. • SUPPORT TO SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT PROVIDE SPECIFIC SERVICES TO VICTIMS. 	<p>Number of innocent war victim projects:</p>
<p>4.8 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG TERM EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IS AN IMPORTANT GOAL FOR MOST COMMUNITIES. HAS YOUR GROUP IDENTIFIED ANY LOCAL COOPERATIVES OR BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES THAT IT SUPPORTS?</p>	<p>Number of cooperative or business projects:</p>



4.9 HOW MANY PROJECTS HAVE YOU DEVELOPED WITH OTHER CAG GROUPS IN OTHER COMMUNITIES?

[PROJECTS DEVELOPED BY GROUPS COMING TOGETHER FROM DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES. RECORD THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SUCH PROJECTS, AND THEN THE NUMBER OF PROJECTS BY TYPE. NOTE THAT THESE PROJECTS MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN COUNTED ABOVE. HOWEVER, THEY SHOULD BE RECORDED AGAIN HERE IF THEY WERE DONE JOINTLY WITH OTHER CAG GROUPS.]

Total number of projects
with other communities:

Number of health projects
with other communities:

Number of education
projects with other
communities: _____

Number of water and sewer
projects with other
communities: _____

Number of road and bridge
projects with other
communities: _____

Number of youth projects
with other communities:

Number of environment
projects with other
communities: _____

5. COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP PROJECT SELECTION PROCESS

5.1 HAS YOUR GROUP DISCUSSED HOW TO DETERMINE
PROJECT PRIORITIES?

Yes	1
No	2
DK/NS	99

HOW WAS THIS DONE? (EXPLAIN):



<p>5.2 DOES YOUR GROUP INVOLVE CITIZENS IN THE DESIGN AND PLANNING OF COMMUNITY PROJECTS?</p> <p>HOW IS THIS DONE? (EXPLAIN):</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>
<p>5.3. DOES YOUR GROUP COORDINATE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES (IN THE TECHNICAL DEPARTMENTS CONCERNED, E.G., WATER AND SEWER, EDUCATION, HEALTH, WELFARE)?</p> <p>[IF YES, DESCRIBE THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OR THE DEPARTMENT]</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>
<p>5.4. HAS YOUR GROUP SOUGHT THE APPROVAL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ON THE DESIGN OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO ENSURE THAT THEY FIT IN WITH LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS?</p> <p>[IF YES, DESCRIBE THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY]</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>
<p>5.5 HAS YOUR GROUP SOUGHT THE ADVICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENGINEERS/ TECHNICIANS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECTS TO ENSURE THAT THE PROJECTS MEET GOVERNMENT STANDARDS?</p> <p>[IF YES, DESCRIBE THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENGINEER AND THE PROJECT]</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>
<p>5.6 HAS YOUR GROUP OBTAINED LICENSES FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY OF THE PROJECTS YOU HAVE DEVELOPED?</p> <p>[IF YES, DESCRIBE THE LICENCE THAT WAS OBTAINED]</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>
<p>5.7 WAS A PUBLIC TENDER PREPARED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GROUP PROJECTS?</p> <p>[IF YES, DESCRIBE WHAT THE PROJECT TENDER WAS FOR]</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>

<p>5.8 HAS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION BEEN DONE BY LOCAL CONTRACTORS?</p> <p>[IF YES, NAME THE LOCAL CONTRACTOR]</p>	<p>Yes, all the time 1</p> <p>Yes, most of the time 2</p> <p>Yes, less than half the time 3</p> <p>Yes, but rarely 4</p> <p>No, never 5</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>
<p>5.9 DOES YOUR GROUP SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS THAT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO CONTRACTORS?</p> <p>[IF YES, DESCRIBE WHAT SUPERVISION HAS TAKEN PLACE]</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>
<p>5.10 DOES YOUR GROUP MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS TO ENSURE CONTRACTOR COMPLIANCE WITH CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS BEFORE THE PROJECT IS FINALLY ACCEPTED?</p> <p>[IF YES, DESCRIBE THE WHAT COMPLIANCE WAS MONITORED]</p>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>DK/NS 99</p>

6. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN GROUP PROCESSES													
6.1 OUR GROUP SUCCESSFULLY DISCUSSES PROJECT BUDGETS AT PUBLIC MEETINGS?	Indicate your level of agreement with the statement (circle one)												
	Disagree strongly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Agree strongly	
6.2 OUR GROUP SUCCESSFULLY INVOLVES THE COMMUNITY IN THE DESIGN AND PLANNING OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS?	Indicate your level of agreement with the statement (circle one)												
	Disagree strongly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Agree strongly	
6.3 THE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTES BOTH TIME AND MONEY TO OUR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.	Indicate your level of agreement with the statement (circle one)												
	Disagree strongly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Agree strongly	
6.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS ARE FULLY INVOLVED IN OUR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.	Indicate your level of agreement with the statement (circle one)												
	Disagree strongly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Agree strongly	



7. COMMUNITY ACTION GROUP TRAINING RECEIVED	
COMMUNITY ACTION PARTNERS PROVIDE TRAINING TO IMPROVE THE CAPACITY OF LOCAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT GROUPS. WHAT TRAINING HAS BEEN RECEIVED?	
7.1 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE ANY TRAINING COURSE?	Yes, informal....1 (go to 7 – 1) Yes, formal2 (go to 7 – 1) Both3 (go to 7 – 1) None.....4 (skip to 8)
7.2 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN HOW TO PRIORITIZE NEEDS? (LISTING COMMUNITY NEEDS, OBTAINING CITIZEN INPUT, SETTING CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, PARTICIPATORY NEEDS ASSESSMENT)	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.3 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PROJECT PLANNING? (IDENTIFYING PROJECTS, PROJECT SELECTION, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, EVENT SCHEDULING)	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.4 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN HOW TO ISSUE A TENDER?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.5. DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN HOW TO MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A WINNING CONTRACT?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.6. DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN HOW TO PROCURE MATERIALS FROM THE LOCAL MARKET?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.7. DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN HOW TO CONVENE AND FACILITATE A PUBLIC MEETING?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.8. DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN HOW TO POST PROJECT BUDGETS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.9. DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN HOW TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PROJECT AND THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTIONS THAT WERE RAISED?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99



7.10 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN ADVOCACY ON HOW TO INFLUENCE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY? [REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY]	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.11 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN ADVOCACY ON HOW TO LOBBY GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, AND HOW TO BUILD LINKAGES TO DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.12 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN CONFLICT.	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99
7.13 DID YOUR GROUP RECEIVE TRAINING IN PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT?	Yes, informal.....1 Yes, formal2 No.....3 DK/NS.....99

8. INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION		
8.1 WAS YOUR GROUP TRAINED ON HOW TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF LONG TERM EMPLOYEES THAT WOULD BE GENERATED BY A PROJECT? [LONG TERM EMPLOYMENT ARE THOSE JOBS CREATED BY COMPLETION OF THE COMMUNITY PROJECT]	Yes.....1 No.....2 DK/NS.....99	
8.2 DID YOUR GROUP USE LONG TERM EMPLOYMENT GENERATION AS A CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS?	Yes.....1 No.....2 DK/NS.....99	
8.3 WAS YOUR GROUP TRAINED ON HOW TO ESTIMATE SHORT TERM EMPLOYMENT THAT WOULD BE GENERATED DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION?	Yes.....1 No.....2 DK/NS.....99	
8.4 DID YOUR GROUP USE SHORT TERM JOB CREATION AS A CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS?	Yes.....1 No.....2 DK/NS.....99	
8.5 WERE LOCAL PEOPLE HIRED TO WORK ON YOUR PROJECTS?	Yes.....1 No.....2 DK/NS.....99	
8.6 WERE MATERIALS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF YOUR PROJECTS MAINLY PURCHASED LOCALLY?	Yes.....1 No.....2 DK/NS.....99	
8.7 HOW MANY LONG TERM JOBS HAVE BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF PROJECTS DEVELOPED BY YOUR GROUP?	Number of jobs: _____ If none Skip to 8.9	
8.8 IN YOUR OPINION HAS THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN YOUR COMMUNITY IMPROVED AS A RESULT OF YOUR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS? [NOTE THIS REFERS ONLY TO EMPLOYMENT AND NOT OTHER ASPECTS OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT]	Agree strongly1 Agree somewhat2 Neither agree nor disagree....3 Disagree somewhat.4 Disagree strongly5	

8.9 WHAT IS YOUR SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS TODAY ? CONSIDER A 9-STEP LADDER WHERE ON THE BOTTOM, THE FIRST STEP, STAND THE POOREST PEOPLE, AND ON THE HIGHEST STEP, THE NINTH RUNG OF THE LADDER, STAND THE RICH. ON WHICH STEP ARE YOU TODAY?	Socioeconomic status										
	Bottom of the ladder	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Top of the ladder
8.10 WHAT WAS YOUR SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS ONE YEAR AGO ? CONSIDER A 9-STEP LADDER WHERE ON THE BOTTOM, THE FIRST STEP, STAND THE POOREST PEOPLE, AND ON THE HIGHEST STEP, THE NINTH RUNG OF THE LADDER, STAND THE RICH. ON WHICH STEP WERE YOU ONE YEAR AGO?	Socioeconomic status										
	Bottom of the ladder	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Top of the ladder

9. TRUST AND SOLIDARITY		
In every community, some people get along with others and trust each other, while other people do not. Now, I would like to talk to you about trust and solidarity in your community.		
9.1. GENERALLY SPEAKING, WOULD YOU SAY THAT MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED, OR THAT YOU CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH OTHER PEOPLE?	Most people can be trusted....1 You can't be too careful	
In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?		
9.2. MOST PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THIS COMMUNITY CAN BE TRUSTED.	Agree strongly1 Agree somewhat2 Neither agree nor disagree....3 Disagree somewhat.4 Disagree strongly5	
9.3. IN THIS COMMUNITY, ONE HAS TO BE ALERT OR SOMEONE IS LIKELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU	Agree strongly1 Agree somewhat2 Neither agree nor disagree....3 Disagree somewhat.4 Disagree strongly5	
9.4 MOST PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY ARE WILLING TO HELP IF YOU NEED IT.	Agree strongly1 Agree somewhat2 Neither agree nor disagree....3 Disagree somewhat.4 Disagree strongly5	
9.5 IN THIS COMMUNITY, PEOPLE GENERALLY DO NOT TRUST EACH OTHER IN MATTERS OF LENDING AND BORROWING MONEY.	Agree strongly1 Agree somewhat2 Neither agree nor disagree....3 Disagree somewhat.4 Disagree strongly5	
Now I want to ask you how much you trust different types of people. On a scale of 1 to 5,		

where 1 means a very small extent and 5 means a very great extent, how much do you trust the people in that category?		
9.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS	To a very small extent1 To a small extent2 Neither small nor great extent...3 To a great extent.4 To a very great extent5	
9.7 LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL MEMBERS	To a very small extent1 To a small extent2 Neither small nor great extent...3 To a great extent.4 To a very great extent5	
9.8 POLICE	To a very small extent1 To a small extent2 Neither small nor great extent...3 To a great extent.4 To a very great extent5	
9.9 TEACHERS	To a very small extent1 To a small extent2 Neither small nor great extent...3 To a great extent.4 To a very great extent5	
9.10 STRANGERS	To a very small extent1 To a small extent2 Neither small nor great extent...3 To a great extent.4 To a very great extent5	
9.11 DO YOU THINK THAT SINCE THE WAR, THE LEVEL OF TRUST IN THIS COMMUNITY HAS GOTTEN BETTER, WORSE, OR STAYED ABOUT THE SAME?	Gotten better 1 Gotten worse 2 Stayed about the same 3	
9.12 HOW WELL DO PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY HELP EACH OTHER OUT THESE DAYS? USE A FIVE POINT SCALE, WHERE 1 MEANS ALWAYS HELPING AND 5 MEANS NEVER HELPING.	Always helping 1 Helping most of the time Helping sometimes 3 Rarely helping. 4 Never helping 5	

10. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COOPERATION

10.1 HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT PEOPLE WHO DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES WILL BE CRITICIZED OR SANCTIONED?	Very likely 1 Somewhat likely 2 Neither likely nor unlikely Somewhat unlikely. 4 Very unlikely 5	
--	--	--



10.2 WHAT PROPORTION OF PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTE TIME OR MONEY TOWARD COMMON DEVELOPMENT GOALS, SUCH AS (REPAIRING A ROAD OR MAINTAINING A COMMUNITY CENTER)?	Everyone 1 More than half 2 About half 3 Less than half. 4 No one 5	
10.3 IF THERE WAS A WATER SUPPLY PROBLEM IN THIS COMMUNITY, HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT PEOPLE WILL COOPERATE TO TRY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?	Very likely 1 Somewhat likely 2 Neither likely nor unlikely Somewhat unlikely. 4 Very unlikely 5	

11. SOCIAL COHESION AND INCLUSION		
11.1 THERE ARE OFTEN DIFFERENCES IN CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN PEOPLE LIVING IN THE SAME COMMUNITY. FOR EXAMPLE, DIFFERENCES IN WEALTH, INCOME, SOCIAL STATUS, ETHNIC BACKGROUND, RACE, OR TRIBE. THERE CAN ALSO BE DIFFERENCES IN RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL BELIEFS. TO WHAT EXTENT DO ANY SUCH DIFFERENCES CHARACTERIZE YOUR COMMUNITY? USE A FIVE POINT SCALE WHERE 1 MEANS TO A VERY GREAT EXTENT AND 5 MEANS TO A VERY SMALL EXTENT.	To a very great extent.....1 To a great extent.....2 To a small extent3 To a very small extent4 No differences5	Skip to 11 - 3 Skip to 11 - 3 Skip to 11 - 3
11.2 DO ANY OF THESE DIFFERENCES CAUSE PROBLEMS?	Yes, always.....1 Yes , sometime.....2 Never3	
11.3 HOW STRONG IS THE FEELING OF TOGETHERNESS OR CLOSENESS IN YOUR COMMUNITY? USE A FIVE POINT SCALE WHERE 1 MEANS FEELING VERY DISTANT AND 5 MEANS FEELING VERY CLOSE.	Very distant.....1 Somewhat distant.....2 Neither distant nor close..3 Somewhat close4 Very close.....5	



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12.2 DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS THAT CHANGE THE COURSE OF YOUR LIFE? RATE YOURSELF ON A 1 TO 5 SCALE, WHERE 1 MEANS BEING TOTALLY UNABLE TO CHANGE YOUR LIFE, AND FIVE MEANS HAVING FULL CONTROL OVER YOUR LIFE.	Totally unable to change life1 Mostly unable to change life.....2 Neither able nor unable3 Mostly able to change life4 Totally able to change life5	
12.3 OVERALL, HOW MUCH IMPACT DO YOU THINK YOUR GROUP HAS IN MAKING THIS COMMUNITY A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE?	A big impact1 A small impact2 No impact3	
12.4 IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS, HOW OFTEN HAS YOUR GROUP OR PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY GOTTEN TOGETHER TO JOINTLY PETITION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR POLITICAL LEADERS FOR IMPROVED SERVICES TO THE COMMUNITY?	Never1 Once2 A few times (5 or less)3 Many times (more than 5)4	
12.5 WERE ANY OF THESE PETITIONS SUCCESSFUL?	Yes, all were successful1 Most were successful2 Most were unsuccessful3 None were successful4	
12.6 TO WHAT EXTENT DO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL LEADERS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS VOICED BY YOUR GROUP AND PEOPLE LIKE YOU WHEN THEY MAKE DECISIONS THAT AFFECT YOU?	A lot1 A little2 Not at all3	
12.7 IN GENERAL, SINCE THE WAR, HAS THE HONESTY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPROVED, DETERIORATED, OR STAYED ABOUT THE SAME?	Improved1 Deteriorated2 Stayed about the same3	
12.8 IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS, DID YOU OR SOMEONE YOU KNOW HAVE TO PAY SOME ADDITIONAL MONEY TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO GET THINGS DONE?	Yes, often1 Yes, occasionally2 No3	Termi nate
12.9 ARE SUCH PAYMENTS EFFECTIVE IN GETTING A SERVICE DELIVERED OR A PROBLEM SOLVED?	Yes, usually1 Yes, but only occasionally2 Usually not3	





ANNEX E: Selected Data Annexes



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E.1: Statistical Outliers in the Project Reporting System Data

Direct Beneficiary Outliers by Type of Project

Project ID	Province	District	Project Description	Grant Amount	Start Date	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Short Term	Total Long Term
Schools and Education								
MC252	Wasit	Al Kut	Construction of Center for Performing Arts	\$464,018	2/20/2005	200000	151	60
AV764	As Sulaym	Halabjah	Supply materials to construct community based radio station to broadcast important topics of interest to wc	\$62,364	4/23/2005	150000	18	18
IRD 168	Baahdad	Karada	University of Baghdad Rehabilitation & Supply Office Equipment	\$118,982	11/1/2003	75000	13	0
MC137	Qadissiyah	Diwaniya	Supply Furniture, Computers & Refitting of Al Hakim Library	\$38,305	11/28/2004	74000	0	0
MC136	Qadissiyah	Diwaniya	Rehabilitation of Al Hakim Library	\$24,373	11/10/2003	74000	10	5
Health								
IRD 418	Baghdad	Sader	Supply Medical Equipment and Furniture to (Health Administration and 5 Health Clinics in Sader District)	\$83,795	1/14/2005	1500000	0	0
AVC_1_22	Al-Anbar	Ramadi	Supplying Medical Biological Instrument, Equipment & Tools for Ramadi Public Health Center	\$33,000	4/25/2004	900000	20	0
AVC_1_09	Al-Anbar	Ramadi	Increase Health standard in Ramadi Supplying New technological Equipment for Ramadi Public Health Ce	\$50,000	4/17/2004	900000		
IRD 130	Baghdad	Sader	Al-Qadessia Hospital Supply Office Equipment & Furniture for All The Departments	\$73,835	10/23/2003	749001	2	14
IRD 211	Baghdad	Sader	Hospital Al-Qadessia Rehabilitation	\$66,589	11/15/2003	385642	45	0
Roads & Bridges								
CHF349	Babil	Al-Hillah	Construction of 850 m Length and 15 m Width Major Primary Road with Drainage System, Side Walks and	\$306,688	3/7/2005	500000	18	0
AV577	Diyala	Baqubah	Supply a layer of sub-base to cover 25% of unpaved road in central Baquba to help people move freely an	\$92,000	3/21/2005	400000	71	0
IRD 1737	Baghdad	Kadhmiya	Pave Al-Gharbi Street in Shu'la	\$196,955	4/20/2006	250000	15	0
CHF127	Najaf	Al-Mishkha	1.2 Km Road Paving and Passage Construction	\$47,068	1/8/2004	150000	3	0
CHF347	Babil	Al-Hillah	Safye Al-Din Street 600 M Primary Road Paving	\$84,921	12/22/2004	100000	8	0
Water & Sewerage								
IRD 19	Baghdad	Kadhmiya	Sewerage Al-Hurriya Supply Pumps and Batteries for The Jetting Trucks	\$2,155	7/27/2003	1400000	6	0
IRD 123	Baghdad	Sader	Sader Municipality Supply Sewer Manhole Covers	\$4,468	10/28/2003	1000000	9	0
AVC_1_04	Al-Anbar	Ramadi	Supplying Water Quality Control Equipment for Central LAB. In Ramadi	\$22,000	4/20/2004	900000	10	0
IRD 121	Baghdad	Sader	Supply Sewerage Jetting Machines for Sader Municipality	\$5,970	10/28/2003	600000	0	0
IRD 118	Baghdad	Rusafa	Open Blocked Sewerage, Clean & Build Mainholes for Sheikh Omar Sewerage Network	\$25,830	10/15/2003	500000	12	0
Marla								
IRD/LI/194	Baghdad	Rusafa	Building Rehabilitation and Supply Office Equipment & Furniture/Iraq Society of Engineers	\$51,302	12/2/2004	60000	12	0
AVL842	Salah Ad D Sharqat (a		Supply the general hospital in Al-Shirgat with physiotherapy equipments	\$21,450	7/23/2005	40000	5	2
SCM069	Al Muthanr	Samawah	Establishment of the power station	\$28,635	8/26/2004	38582	10	8
AVL501	Salah Ad D Dawr		Supplying the health center in Al-Dawr with medical equipment in order to provide better emergency servic	\$46,350	2/5/2005	20000	5	1
MC264L	Qadissiyah	Diwaniya	Construction of Ramps in Local Institutions	\$16,100	2/23/2005	16000	12	0
Business Development/Economic Development								
IRD 390	Baghdad	Taji	Sabe'e Al Bur Lighting Rehabilitaion	\$46,575	12/15/2004	200000	15	0
SCM133	Al Muthanr	Ar Rumayt	Construction of a bakery	\$89,924	10/1/2004	120000	15	25
SCM052	Al Muthanr	Ar Rumayt	Establishing a power staion	\$28,463	8/31/2004	75000	35	8
IRD 263	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Market Construction 9 Nissan	\$978,632	2/21/2004	70000	120	1200
AV481	As Sulaym	Halabjah	Establishing telephone landline communication network to serve 60,000 people in Halabja.	\$237,750	3/22/2005	60000	51	100
Youth								
SCM124	Al Muthanr	Samawah	Constructing the childrens' cultural center	\$82,500	8/28/2004	84285	25	9
SCD127	Dhi Qar	An Nasiriy	Rehabilitation of the central stadium	\$79,508	3/13/2005	66000	20	2
SCD058	Dhi Qar	An Nasiriy	Renovation and equipping youth department	\$7,510	10/23/2004	40000	10	0
IRD 1158	Baghdad	Karada	Renovating the Public Garden in Mahala 966 Including Public Bathrooms, Planting of Grass and Fixing Arr	\$50,264	2/10/2006	35000	12	0
MC419	Qadissiyah	Diwaniyah	Rehabilitation of Al Askan Youth Center	\$199,008	2/20/2006	32760	113	20
Not Elsewhere Classified								
AVC_1_08	Al-Anbar	West Ram	Better Environment Mobile Teams for insecticide in Polluted areas	\$7,500	4/27/2004	660165	30	0
IRD 53	Baghdad	Karada	Karada Fire Station Supply Equipment	\$57,560	10/31/2003	500000	3	33
AVC_1_07	Al-Anbar	East Rama	Better Environment Mobile Teams for insecticide in Polluted areas	\$8,500	4/27/2004	363614	30	0
AVC_1_06	Al-Ta'amer		Better Environment Mobile Teams for insecticide in Polluted areas	\$6,000	4/27/2004	281028	30	0
SC312	Al-Basrah	Basrah	Support to Al Nahrain radio station	\$7,500	10/25/2004	210000	12	0

**Indirect Beneficiary Outliers by Type of Project**

Project ID	Province	District	Project Description	Grant Amount	Start Date	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	Total Short Term	Total Long Term
Schools/Education									
SC247	Al-Basrah	Basrah	Advocating for Nationalism and responsibility	\$38,665	8/25/2004	500	500000	10	0
IRD 474	Baghdad	Mada'aen	School Mada'en Technical for Boys Rehabilitation & Supply Equipment	\$143,314	8/9/2005	663	500000	31	254
IRD 363	Baghdad	Kadhmiya	School Khadmiya Secondary for Boys Rehabilitating Electrical System, and Repair Damage	\$124,986	12/9/2004	1040	500000	9	0
IRD 312	Baghdad	Kadhmiya	University of Al-Nahrain Research Center Supply Office Equipment	\$31,949	10/28/2004	1300	500000	0	0
IRD 109	Baghdad	Rusafa	School Zaid Ben Thabit Primary Mixed Supply Office Equipment & Furniture for Teacher C	\$2,504	9/1/2003	1193	500000	0	0
Health									
CHF308	Najaf	Najaf	Health Clinic Construction	\$250,000	11/8/2004	52500	1000000	599	0
AV839	At Tamim	Kirkuk	Development of Rozh Health center by supplying them with medical equipment to improve	\$65,613	7/24/2005	100000	600000		50
IRD 377	Baghdad	Karada	The First Aid Center Rehabilitation & Supply Equipment	\$29,133	8/23/2004	10000	500000	19	6
IRD 266	Baghdad	Rusafa	Hospital Ibn Al-Nafees Supply Echo Doppler Machine	\$119,787	3/1/2004	350000	500000	0	0
AV657	Salah Ad Di	Tikrit	Supply Medical equipment to Tikrit Hospital	\$40,930	4/19/2005	350000	500000	7	4
Roads & Bridges									
CHF349	Babil	Al-Hillah	Construction of 850 m Length and 15 m Width Major Primary Road with Drainage System,	\$306,688	3/7/2005	500000	500000	18	0
CHF347	Babil	Al-Hillah	Safye Al-Din Street 600 M Primary Road Paving	\$84,921	12/22/2004	100000	500000	8	0
CHF312	Najaf	Najaf	Construction of Steel Structure Pedestrian Bridge Across Main Road in the City Center	\$40,688	12/15/2004	18000	500000	6	0
AV137	At Tamim	Hawija	Paving 78000m2 of the main road (Asfar road) connecting Tikrit to Hawija through Rashad	\$429,000	2/29/2004	20000	300000	33	0
IRD 165	Baghdad	Kadhmiya	Establishing New Dawanin Road and Bridge	\$74,975	11/13/2003	14600	200000	30	0
Marla									
AVL842	Salah Ad Di	Sharqat (al)	Supply the general hospital in Al-Shirqat with physiotherapy equipments	\$21,450	7/23/2005	40000	123732	5	2
MC250L	Qadissiyah	Diwaniya	Celebration of the International PWD Day	\$728	12/3/2004	16000	80000	0	0
CHFL002	Babil	Al-Hillah	Al-Hillah Center For People with Special Needs provision of equipment for the physically di	\$40,887	4/14/2005	70	80000	21	0
CHFL033	Najaf	Najaf	Rehabilitating and Equipping Prosthesis Fabrication Center in Najaf's Educational Hospital.	\$31,971	4/9/2005	50	50000	3	0
MC325L	Wasit	Al-Hay	Rehabilitation of Al-Moufaqia secondary School for Boys	\$94,575	8/25/2005	753	42000	100	0
Business Development/Economic Development									
IRD 170	Baghdad	Karada	Ilwiyah Telephone Exchange Office Rehabilitation & Supply Office Equipment	\$10,669	12/8/2003	250	250000	20	55
IRD 1535	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Rasool Ghmais Oda Soft Drinks Store Expansion Supply with Equipment & Goods	\$3,000	2/2/2006	40	220000	1	3
IRD 32	Baghdad	Karada	Office Equipment & Furniture For Human Relief And Child Protection Committee	\$4,304	8/30/2003	15000	110000	0	0
IRD 741	Baghdad	Taji	Hasan Abid Typical Eye Clinic and Pharmacy Establishment in Taji Supply with Equipment	\$13,900	11/2/2005	40	100000	2	5
IRD 365	Baghdad	Kadhmiya	Local Women's Income Generation Kadhemiya Women And Children Center Supply Com	\$3,815	11/11/2003	9000	100000	0	0
Youth									
IRD 1635	Baghdad	Rashid	Establish Sport Halls for Al-Dura Handicapped City	\$137,812	5/4/2006	2500	500000	25	0
SCM124	Al Muthanna	Samawah	Constructing the children cltural center	\$82,500	8/28/2004	84285	475000	25	9
MC372	Qadissiyah	Shamiyah	Equipping Shamiyah Youth center	\$91,941	11/17/2005	18360	183650	40	0
MC419	Qadissiyah	Diwaniyah	Rehabilitation of Al Askan Youth Center	\$199,008	2/20/2006	32760	163800	113	20
SCD127	Dhi Qar	An Nasiriyah	Rehabilitation of the central stadium	\$79,508	3/13/2005	66000	100000	20	2
Not Elsewhere Classified									
IRD 176	Baghdad	Karkh	Zawra Public Garden Renovation	\$64,216	12/22/2003	180000	8000000	15	0
IRD 488	Baghdad	Rusafa	Supply Equipment for AL-Rusafa Municipality	\$11,700	4/13/2005	5000	1000000	0	0
IRD 53	Baghdad	Karada	Karada Fire Station Supply Equipment	\$57,560	10/31/2003	500000	750000	3	33
MC301	Qadissiyah	Diwaniya	Street Murals in Diwaniya City	\$8,458	5/10/2005	120	650000	0	0
IRD 65	Baghdad	Mansour	Mansour DAC Supply Computer Equipment	\$4,790	8/28/2003	525	500000	0	0

**Short Term Employment Outliers by Type of Project**

Project ID	Province	District	Project Description	Grant Amount	Start Date	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Indirect Beneficiaries	Total Short Term	Total Long Term
Schools/Education									
MC207	Wasit	Al Aziziyah	Construction of Al-Sorat Al-Mostakeem Primary School with 6 classrooms for coed	\$110,000	6/13/2004	700	38000	252	0
MC394	Qadissiyah	Diwaniyah	Building Fences in Al Jadawel Kindergarten, Al Majid and Alamer Schools in Diwaniyah	\$94,506	11/19/2005	1644	8220	246	0
MC336	Qadissiyah	Daqarah	Rehabilitation of Public Librarv in AL-Daqhara Sub-District	\$111,050	9/21/2005	8375	10375	200	4
MC248	Wasit	Al' Aziziyah	Construction of Selman Al-Mohamadi primary school with six classrooms for Coed	\$216,833	1/4/2005	430	16000	186	0
MC349	Maysan	Multiple	Literacy Program Campaign for 2800 Women in Maysan	\$76,082	11/23/2005	2800	14000	178	0
Health									
AVC_2_42	Al-Anbar	Khalidya Sub district	Enhancing Health sector, Building new Health Center, phase two	\$75,191	5/10/2005	1500	7500	1800	0
AVC_2_38	Al-Anbar	Khalidya Sub district	Enhancing Health sector, Building new Health Center, phase one	\$73,000	5/10/2005	1500	7500	1800	0
CHF308	Najaf	Najaf	Health Clinic Construction	\$250,000	11/8/2004	52500	1000000	599	0
SCD098	Dhi Qar	An Nasiriyah	First aid training course	\$1,966	1/15/2005	75	750	375	5
SCD099	Dhi Qar	An Nasiriyah	Training course in motherhood and child care	\$1,636	1/15/2005	30	300	210	4
Roads & Bridges									
AVC_2_41	Al-Anbar	Zangora Village	Developing Ramadi Infrastructure, Paving 1km*2m of roads to Zangora village	\$72,176	5/6/2005	477	2384	1800	0
AVC_1_03	Al-Anbar	Al-Sjaria	Drinking Water Network & Road Pavement for Sjaria Village	\$42,900	4/21/2004	900	0	150	0
MC209	Wasit	Al Kut	Improvement of Neighborhood Streets	\$34,963	6/20/2004	33000	0	140	0
MC384	Qadissiyah	Diwaniyah	Uroba neighborhood sidewalks	\$119,519	11/27/2005	2120	0	125	0
CHF407	Najaf	Al-Manathirah	Construction of Concret Car Bridge of 6 Meters Width and 20 Meters Lenht	\$72,290	12/19/2005	2500	5000	121	
Water & Sewerage									
CHF365	Najaf	Kufa	Rainwater Drainage Svstem installation and Aoricultural Canals Rehabilitation	\$60,373	1/18/2005	7500	20000	245	0
MC081	Wasit	Al Kut	Al kut - City of the future - Manhole & Canal Cleaning Project	\$11,230	8/15/2003	4000	100000	240	0
CHF433	Karbala	Karbala	8044 Meter Potable Water Network Installation.	\$62,708	12/28/2005	2600		151	
CHF442	Babil	Al-Hillah	6000 M Potable Water Network Installation	\$60,621	1/29/2006	3000		127	
CHF405	Karbala	Al-Hindiyah	8000 Meter Potable Water Network Installation.	\$88,580	12/20/2005	3500		109	
Marla									
CHFL044	Najaf	Najaf	Partially Re-building and Repairing Two Homes	\$39,476	1/29/2006	28		270	
CHFL045	Najaf	Najaf	Partially Re-building and Repairing Two Homes	\$79,326	1/18/2006	21		240	
MC379L	Qadissiyah	Sumer	Construction of Sumer Secondary Coeducational school-Phase 1	\$250,125	12/27/2005	750	3750	140	0
CHFL056	Najaf	Najaf	Building of Two Family Homes	\$70,292	3/8/2006	10		120	
CHFL048	Najaf	Najaf	Construction of 2 Kiosks and Provision of Inventory	\$20,709	1/31/2006	17		110	
Business Development/Economic Development									
AV864	Ninawa	Hamdaniya	Irrigation canal cleaning and repair, youth job creation project in Salamiyah to allow 60	\$28,600	1/1/2006	2000	20000	5940	600
MC007	Wasit	Al Kut	Rehabilitation of Sewing Factory and Provision of Sewing Machines	\$22,450	11/1/2003	300	3600	300	0
SC540	Al Basrah'	Basrah	Cleanino and plantino deserted aoricultural land	\$70,000	11/25/2005	300	1500	175	50
SC185	Al-Basrah	Basrah	Upgrading the sewing center for Deaf Association	\$8,890	1/15/2004	150	300	150	50
IRD 263	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Market Construction 9 Nissan	\$978,632	2/21/2004	70000	70000	120	1200
Youth									
SC522	Al Basrah'	Basrah	Training andUpgrading skills of unemployed youth	\$79,200	11/15/2005	400	720	400	0
MC437	Qadissiyah	Diwanivah	Reconstruction of Diwanivah Stadium	\$240,077	4/9/2006	612	12732	216	1
MC326	Qadissiyah	Diwanivah	Rehabilitation of Eight Basketball's playgrounds in in Diwanivah	\$141,308	8/18/2005	18542	92800	175	0
MC323	Qadissiyah	Diwanivah	Upgrading of Scout Camp in AL-Diwanivah City / Saniyah subdistrict	\$87,799	10/3/2005	6096	30480	150	0
MC253	Wasit	An Noamaniya	Noamaniavah Soorts and Recreation Center	\$231,371	2/10/2005	5000	25000	146	20
Not Elsewhere Classified									
CHF408	Najaf	Kufa	Neighbourhood Clean Up and Solid Wastes Removal	\$35,400	12/26/2005	7000	5000	559	
CHF410	Najaf	Najaf	Clean Up and Solid Wastes Removal.	\$39,600	12/26/2005	4000	1000	553	
CHF426	Karbala	Karbala	Clean up and removal of solid waste and placement of new garbage containers.	\$44,710	1/4/2006	8350	10000	535	
CHF411	Najaf	Najaf	Clean Up and Solid Wastes Removal.	\$18,152	1/9/2006	2500	1000	495	
CHF427	Karbala	Karbala	Clean up and removal of solid waste and placement of new garbage containers.	\$41,848	1/4/2006	0		466	



Long Term Employment Outliers by Type of Project

Project ID	Province	District	Project Description	Grant Amount	Start Date	Total Direct Beneficiaries	Total Short Term	Total Long Term
Schools/Education								
IRD 158	Baghdad	Adhamiya	School Al-Sena'a Technical for Boys Rehabilitating Electrical System, Supply Water Tanks, and Repair Damaged Structure o	\$65,576	8/15/2003	1275	51	1250
IRD 1747	Baghdad	Kadhmiya	Al-Kadhmiya Vocational School in Kadhmiya Rehabilitate the Building & Supply with Machines & Equipment	\$121,428	4/25/2006	1170	20	1170
IRD 161	Baghdad	Adhamiya	School Al-Markaziya Technical for Girls Rehabilitating Electrical System, Supply Water Tanks, and Repair Damaged Structu	\$46,884	11/12/2003	1078	14	1000
IRD 167	Baghdad	Karada	School Al-Wehda Technical for Boys Rehabilitating Electrical System, Supply Water Tanks, and Repair Damaged Structure of	\$26,830	10/15/2003	807	26	807
IRD 290	Baghdad	Karada	School Al-Nidhal Technical for Boys Rehabilitating Electrical System, Supply Water Tanks, and Repair Damaged Structure o	\$274,757	5/10/2004	1025	30	757
Health								
IRD 04	Baghdad	Adhamiya	Medical Equipment to Replace Looted Equipment in Physical Thearapy Center	\$4,890	9/4/2003	108000	6	100
IRD 344	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Handicapped Carpentry Workshop Society In Baghdad Al Jadida Supply Equipment	\$49,517	12/22/2004	148	0	60
AV363	Diyala	Khanagiri	Establishing a sheep-raising co-operative to enhance families' income in Balkana village	\$32,950	6/7/2004	275	7	55
AV839	At Tamim	Kirkuk	Development of Rozh Health center by supplying them with medical equipment to improve people health situation especially	\$65,613	7/24/2005	100000		50
CHFL001	Babil	Al-Hillah	Al-Hillah Surgical Hospital Construction of Emergency Ward Cluster Project	\$420,000	8/22/2004	50	34	35
Roads & Bridges								
CHF134	Najaf	Al-Manathi	Al-Qada' Market Sidewalks and Street Rehabilitation	\$77,526	12/21/2003	32000	9	12
IRD 1840	Baghdad	Adhamiya	Paving Al-Ferdos Street (PRT)	\$143,450	2/23/2006	30000	15	10
IRD 268	Baghdad	Rusafa	Tigris River Port Development	\$2,700	1/22/2004	9500	3	7
AV555	Salah Ad D	Tikrit	Establishing calves fattening Co-op in Al Alam district.	\$75,575	3/7/2005	420	7	7
CHF133	Najaf	Najaf	1 Km Secondary Roads Paving and Rainwater Drainage System Installation	\$144,236	1/6/2004	6000	70	6
Water & Sewerage								
AV574	At Tamim	Hawija	Repairing irrigation pump stations to irrigate thousands of dunums in Hawija area.	\$54,409	3/28/2005	4000	8	1000
AV243	As Sulaym	As Sulaym	Constructed storm water culvert under road in Arbet / Sulaymaniyah to prevent leakages of water in the street	\$1,640	9/6/2003	500	5	108
SC525	Al Basrah	Basrah	Rehabilitating Water Channels of farms	\$90,000	11/10/2005	610	12	105
AV603	Salah Ad D	Balad	Supply and install an additional pump to the drainage pump station and cleaning up Al-Shutaita drainage canal.	\$33,165	3/27/2005	8000	13	25
MC280	Wasit	Al Kut	Provision of Raw Water to Kut City Green Areas	\$83,822	2/13/2005	350000	40	20
Marla								
IRD/ACV/4	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Establish Sewing and Computer Training Center for Disabled Victims in Salam Handicap Center	\$21,015	4/5/2006	5478	5	120
WV296	Al-Basrah	Basrah	Rebuiding a small destroyed factory	\$82,780	9/22/2004	75	9	50
WV220	Al-Basrah	Faw	Planting 1500 palm trees for war victims	\$13,500	7/20/2004	3000	40	30
AVCL_2_4	Ramadi	Ramadi Cit	Boosting Technological and Educational levels in Ramadi, to establish a foreign language and internet training center fo	\$21,786	5/8/2005	930	30	30
MC229L	Maysan	Amara	Rehabilitation of 24 classrooms to Al Rasheed Primary School for boys in Musharah, Amarah	\$204,487	11/29/2004	579	43	20
Business Development/Economic Development								
IRD 244	Baghdad	Karada	Zahra Cooperative Rehabilitation and Supply Office & Sewing Equipment	\$112,647	1/28/2004	2510	11	1400
IRD 263	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Market Construction 9 Nissan	\$978,632	2/21/2004	70000	120	1200
IRD 476	Baghdad	Sader	Al-Amal Cooperative Society for Productive Families Rehabilitation & Supply Equipment & Furniture	\$147,055	3/5/2005	750	11	814
IRD 1740	Baghdad	Mansour	Fine Arts Institute for Girls in Mahalla 603 Construct & Supply Classes, Gallery, Cafeteria	\$219,184	5/9/2006	785	25	714
AV864	Ninawa	Hamdaniv	Irrigation canal cleaning and repair, youth job creation project in Salamiyah to allow 600 farmers to plant 2000 donums	\$28,600		2000	5940	600
Youth								
AV549	At Tamim	Kirkuk	Supplying materials for a carpentry workshop for youth activities center in Kirkuk center to train the youth in produci	\$90,553	3/19/2005	245	9	79
MC300	Wasit	Al Kut	Construction of a Municipal Swimming Pool	\$449,323	5/15/2005	27950	75	48
AV612	Salah Ad D	Tikrit	Rehabilitate Tikrit youth center to encourage youth especially disabled in Tikrit Gov. to do sports activities.	\$92,354	3/19/2005	2000	60	32
SC347	Al-Basrah	Al Huwair	Building youth center	\$83,292	11/9/2004	7500	20	30
AV758	At Tamim	Hawija	Supplying youth center in Zab with sport and sewing workshop equipments to practice their activities (3 Lot)	\$35,159	3/15/2005	3500	10	30
Not Elsewhere Classified								
IRD 51	Baghdad	Karada	Rehabilitation of Iraqi Tribes Confederation Building	\$3,727	10/13/2003	1000	18	40
IRD 92	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Kamalial Supply Office Equipment	\$4,984	10/8/2003	320	7	33
IRD 53	Baghdad	Karada	Karada Fire Station Supply Equipment	\$57,560	10/31/2003	500000	3	33
IRD 376	Baghdad	9 Nissan	Zayouna Complex Supply Trash Containers	\$19,200	9/16/2004	12000	10	20
SC478	Al-Basrah	Al-Basrah	Supplying Nour Al Yaqeen Association	\$23,860	11/15/2005	27	6	17

E.2: Responses from IBTCI Multiple-Question E-mail on Clarifying Contributions

ICAP Questions and Responses.

1. *We currently understand that the primary source of community contribution data is from the contractor's use of paid local labor on the projects. Is this the same for each of the ICAP partners?*

"No, the primary source on local Match is from the CAGS and the mobilizers. They must verify time sheets and other community Match obligations"

"Communities do not use the labor paid for by a...contract to constitute their community contribution. However, communities may use the value of the paid labor in an area to support the value of in-kind labor they provide."

"No. Contractor paid labor is not a contribution as this is a contract expense. However, contractors will occasionally do works for free over and above what has been contracted ... For example –the contractor rehabilitate(s) a school with a specific Bill of Quantity/Work Order. The contractor decides to install a new bathroom at his own cost to show his support for the community, this work over and above the contacted works is counted under "Other" as a project contribution. It is verified by contractor BoQ, End User statement, and verification by ...Community Mobilizer (CM) with photographs and all invoices etc..."

"No. Contributions are provided by the community committee and other residents in the area where we are working on a particular community action project (CAP). These contributions are usually in the form of volunteer labor, guarding materials and equipment and providing food to laborers. With these contributions, the contractor provides a smaller number of laborers; will not bring guards; and will not need to spend money providing food for his staff and the laborers."

2. *Secondary sources for community contribution data possibly comes from enumeration of in-kind local labor deployed on CAG selected projects. How is this implemented? Since this is auditable are there guidelines that you follow for calculating the value of in-kind community contributions?*

"Communities are required to submit documentation to support the value of their contribution. This may include, but is not limited to, labor time sheets, receipts, third party estimations of property, etc. Our field office has guidelines for acceptable documentation. The process for verifying this documentation is quite thorough. It first goes to procurement, who check all the documents, and then the scanned documents go to HQ for verification."

"We document in-kind local labor and other forms of community contributions at the beginning of project when the community committee signs an MOU. The committee guarantees, in the MOU, that they will contribute in specific ways with specific dollar values attached to each contribution."

"Yes..all Match is, by contract with the USG, auditable and there are detailed USG regs which govern Match. Match is not Match until certified as meeting USG regs."

“Community voluntary labor is documented by signed time sheets for each person, each day. The ‘value’ associated with voluntary labor is determined by the current rate for a day laborer (US\$8 – 15 for un/semi-skilled) and \$15-20 for skilled. Time sheets are signed by the CAG representative and verified by IRC CM. Community voluntary labor is limited primarily to Clean-Up campaigns, and some school rehabilitation (fixing up a soccer field, painting rooms). During project design with the community/CAG the processes for identifying and documenting voluntary labor are explained.”

3. *To what extent is the magnitude of in-kind community contributions underestimated due to problems related to obtaining satisfactory documentation that would withstand an audit?*

“We try to get as much in-kind as we can. We have far exceeded our CA obligations but within the mobilizers there is a kind of competition to get high in-kind. It (community contribution) signifies greater community buy-in. The amount and extend of the in-kind depends on the Community Mobilizer and how hard s/he wants to work. Rough guess.... We under report by 5-10%”

“...don't confuse Match which is auditable with community contribution which reflects community ownership and which can be estimated.”

“In CAP Al Anbar community contributions are often in the form of volunteer labor, food, guarding materials and equipment, and [for the government or businesses] providing building equipment for projects like paving access roads. Unfortunately it is a completely foreign concept in Al Anbar to ask community members to sign receipts or timesheets for volunteer labor or for serving food. If they were to sign a timesheet then they would expect to be paid for their efforts; otherwise why would they use a timesheet? As a result, in order to maintain a low profile and localized operation we were not able to introduce these protocols as it would damage our reputation and possibly put our staff and contractors in physical danger.” (*hence community contribution is underestimated*)

“This is a significant challenge... Collecting documentation is very difficult in Iraq, and is extremely time consuming for our field staff. Often the community does not have receipts, or the Local Government will not give the required documentation. The documentation requirements often result in only a portion of the community contribution actually being reported.”

4. *What do you see as the biggest weakness in using and providing community contribution data? Is there a way to fix it? Are there other ways to show ‘ownership?’*

“The documentation requirement for community contribution is one of our biggest challenges; it takes up the limited time of our field coordinators, and discourages contributions. Community contributions would be easier to obtain and report if the documentation requirements were not so stringent.”

“There are all sorts of other ways of showing community ownership and the CAG process is built on them. As described at the conference, they are participation in the CAG....oversight of the project, interface with the authorities...getting municipal approvals, and local advocacy. Per request by the donor, we do not quantify those.”

“As mentioned above, the biggest weakness is that we are facing requirements, which in a normal security situation make sense, but given the current security situation in Al Anbar and the perceptions of local residents there, we cannot fulfill these reporting requirements. Concerning in-kind contributions and other M&E requirements, we need greater flexibility so that we can continue to implement the program, provide accurate and sufficient M&E reporting but not put ourselves or the communities in danger by implementing procedures that are not culturally-security appropriate.”

“The biggest problem is when we rehabilitate a school or clinic and the Ministry of Education/Health agrees to donate furniture etc.. They are usually slow, they do make the donation but the end-user (local school) has no documentation and the MoE is soooooo slow in getting us the documentation. We have projects that are finished, all contracts paid, all we are waiting for is the MoE or MoH documentation for the value of the materials they donated.”

5. *Is it reasonable to refer to the community contributions as ‘ownership’ contributions and to suggest that the LG and Other contributions do not have that same relationship to the project?*

“By all means, these are ownership contributions. Other/LG contributions are also ownership – lets not forget the PROCESS... In developing a project, the Community knows that the chances of their project being approved ... increase if they have a good plan, including a high In-Kind Contribution... In addition to obtaining permits and approvals from LG, the CAG/Community has to go to the LG, MoH, MoE etc and LOBBY FOR donations of materials, equipment etc... This increases the CAG/Community ability to interact with the LG/Ministry and makes the LG/Ministry more accountable for addressing community identified needs.... This is civil society in action.”

“NO...municipal contribution also reflect important ownership...albeit at a higher level”

“Yes. Although we have had some limited success in getting contributions from the local government (i.e. building equipment), the real ownership of the project and commitment to implementing and maintaining it are from the community committees and the community's beneficiaries.”

“The relationship of the community and local government to the project varies depending on the type of project. It is true that community contributions do correspond to the community needs, and encourage ownership. However, in some cases, the community encouraged the local government to participate in the projects, and so this contribution could be viewed as representing the local needs.”

6. *Clarification on the LG contributions: Is there anything that might be called a typical LG contribution? Could you describe these contributions for us? We have notes from the workshop, but these don't seem to be enough to distill any possible recommendation from. Any examples would be welcome.*

“...there are hundreds. Many include the donation by the municipality of goods, land and service to the project.”

“...The typical LG contribution includes the provision of access to their surveying or building equipment; this type of LG contribution was secured for the rehabilitation of Hey El Shurta Park.”

“A typical LG contribution is mainly for School/Education rehabilitation and for Medical Projects. (*The CAP partner*) rehabilitates a building and the LG/Ministry equips it. They also ensure that all the necessary accessories and training take place (important with Medical projects).”

“A common Local Government contribution is land. This land can be used to build a school, health center, women's center, etc. (*The CAP partner*) then contributes construction on that land to the project.”

7. *Clarification on the Other contributions: We may have misunderstood, but in going over our notes it seems that not all 'other' contributions are necessarily recorded on the project tracking forms submitted to USAID. That is, the real level of contributions may be underreported in the project tracking forms. This was in part because the 15-25% matching target, once achieved, meant that additional reporting didn't serve a management purpose but added to the burden of documenting in case of audit. Is this a reasonable statement?*

“(Our) "other" contributions are often the contributions of local NGOs. For example, an Iraqi Human Rights Organization may provide the space to host a women's sewing workshop and (we) provide(s) the sewing machines. (We) accept(s) all documented community contribution, regardless of the percentage of the project value. However, as stated earlier, such documentation is very difficult to obtain.”

“Not for (us).”

“NO...we track other match contributions such as Nike and so do my colleagues.”

““Other” contributions when referring to In-Kind donations from the states (medical supplies, school books, computers etc) these ARE NOT assigned to a project or coded as a project so are not included as a Project contribution. As part of our CA with USAID we have an obligation to provide \$XX in-kind, we do document where the contribution goes and keep files for each shipment. For Example: A US group makes a donation; obviously they are going to want a report and photographs of where their donation went. These in-kinds are usually given to one of our current stakeholders. For example, we rehabilitate a few schools then a few months later we get in some cool school kits (backpacks with crayons, notebooks, erasers etc) from the States, we give them to the rehabilitated schools.” (*Thus “other” contributions are not always allocated to a project and using the PRS to summarize “other” contributions would not be comprehensive.*)

ANNEX F

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ANNEX G:

Bibliography - Inventory of Documents and Dataset Received (updated June 22 2006)

- The ICAP Project Reporting System (PRS)

I. ACDI – VOCA

Cooperative Agreement and seven modifications

Semi – Annual Reports:

July – December 2003
January – May 2004
June – December 2004
January – June 2005
July – December 2005

Workplans:

Email regarding work plans
Annual Work Plan May 15, 2003 – May 31, 2004
Quarterly Work Plan October 1 – December 31, 2003
Quarterly Work Plan January 1 – March 31, 2004
Annual Work Plan April 2004 – May 2005

Monthly Reports:

January 2005
February 2005
March 2005
April 2005
May 2005
June 2005
July 2005
August 2005
September 2005
October 2005
November 2005
December 2005
January 2006
February 2006
March 2006
April 2006

Weekly Reports:

September 22, 2005
May 18, 2006

II. Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF)



Semi Annual Reports:

June – December 2003
January – June 2004
July – December 2004
January – June 2005
July – December 2005

Quarterly Workplans:

January - March 2004
April – June 2004
December 2004 – February 2005
March– May 2005
December 2005 – March 2006
March – June 2006

Weekly Reports:

March 15, 2005
May 17, 2005
June 21, 2005
July 19, 2005
August 9, 2005
September 20, 2005
October 25, 2005
November 1, 2005
November 22, 2005
December 27, 2005
January 3, 2006
January 24, 2006
February 7, 2006
February 21, 2006
March 28, 2006
April 4, 2006
May 2, 2006

III. IRD

Cooperative Agreement and eight modifications

Semi – Annual Reports:

January 2004 (for July – December 2003)
June 2004 (for January – June 2004)
July – December 2004
January – June 2005
July – December 2005 (on softcopy only)

Workplans:

Implementation Plan October – December 2003
Quarterly Work Plan January – March 2004
Year 2 Work Plan



June 2004 – May 2005
December 2004 – February 2005
Quarterly Work Plan July – September 2005
October – December 2005

Monthly Reports:

January 2005
February 2005
March 2005
April 2005
May 2005
June 2005
July 2005
August 2005
September 2005
October 2005
November 2005
December 2005
January 2006
February 2006
March 2006
April 2006
May 2006

Weekly Reports:

February 28, 2006
March 7, 2006
March 14, 2006
March 21, 2006
March 28, 2006
April 4, 2006

IV. Mercy Corps International (MCI)

Semi Annual Reports:

July – December 2003 (including 7 annexes and tracking sheets)
January – June 2004
July – December 2004
January – June 2005
July – December 2005

Quarterly Workplans:

July – September 2003
October – December 2003
January – March 2004
September – November 2004
December 2004 – February 2005
March – May 2005
June – July 2005
July – October 2005



November 2005 – January 2006
February – April 2006

2005 Monthly Reports (including financial reports, monthly workplans, evaluations of workplans and activities reports):

January – February 2005
March 2005
April 2005
May 2005
June 2005
July 2005
August 2005
September 2005
October 2005
November 2005
December 2005

V. Save the Children

Cooperative Agreement and nine modifications

Semi – Annual Reports:

January 2004 (for July – December 2003)
July 2004 (for January – June 2004)
July – December 2004
July 2005 (for January – June 2005)
July – December 2005

Workplans:

June 2004 – May 2005
July – September 2004
January – March 2005
April – June 2005
July – October 2005
October 2005 – January 2006

Monthly Reports:

February 2005
March 2005
April 2005
May 2005
June 2005
July 2005
August 2005
September 2005
October 2005
November 2005
December 2005



Weekly Reports:

January 8, 2005
February 26, 2005
April 17, 2005
April 24, 2005
May 8, 2005
June 18, 2005
July 16, 2005
August 25, 2005
September 1, 2005
October 15, 2005
October 30, 2005
November 12, 2005
November 26, 2005
January 8, 2006
January 22, 2006
January 29, 2006